Trial Court Fails to Apply Correct Standard in Eligibility Case
In a majority decision, the Supreme Court of Indiana has reversed a trial court’s decision to grant an injunction allowing a student athlete to remain eligible after transferring from one school district to another.
In ruling for the Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA), the state Supreme Court found that the low court “substituted its own judgment for the IHSAA,” instead of “inquiring whether substantial evidence existed to support the ruling,” which was the course the court should have taken.
The legal controversy stemmed from the decision of Jasmine Watson and her family to have Watson transfer from Elkhart Memorial High School to South Bend Washington High School, where she planned to participate on the basketball and track teams.
The high court laid out some facts that were central to the case, such as the fact that Jasmine’s grandmother had visited South Bend Clay High School and talked with the head basketball coach about Clay’s basketball program. Further, she explained that they were looking for a school for Jasmine to play basketball “because Elkhart Memorial was not getting Jasmine the ball enough and because they weren’t treating her right.” The court further noted that Jasmine had told her teammates around this same time that she was going to use her grandmother’s address in South Bend to play at South Bend Washington.
They family ultimately moved to South Bend and applied for an athletic transfer for Watson to South Bend Washington High School under IHSAA Rule 19-5, which provides for transfers due to changes in residence.
By contrast, Rule 19-4 discusses transfers for primarily athletic reasons. It states:
“To preserve the integrity of interschool athletics and to prevent or minimize recruiting, proselytizing and school ‘jumping’ for athletic reasons, regardless of the circumstances, student athletes who transfer from one school to a new school for primarily athletic reasons or as a result of undue influence will become ineligible to participate in interschool athletics in the new school for a period not to exceed 365 days from the date the student enrolls at the new school, provided, however, if a student transfers and it is not discovered at that time that the transfer was primarily for athletic reasons, then under those circumstances, the student may be declared ineligible for a period not to exceed 365 days following the date of enrollment or, may be declared ineligible for a period not to exceed 365 days commencing on the date that the Commissioner or her designee declares the student ineligible which was the result of a transfer for primarily athletic reasons.”
Furthermore, Rule 20-1, which governs undue influence, states:
“The use of undue influence by any person or persons to secure or to retain a student, or to secure or to retain one or both of the parents or guardians of a student as residents, may cause the student to be ineligible for high school athletics for a period not to exceed 365 days and may jeopardize the standing of the high school in the Association.”
Watson appealed to the IHSAA, which assigned Assistant Commissioner Bobby Cox to conduct an investigation. On August 8, 2008, Cox ruled Watson ineligible. She appealed this decision, and the IHSAA Review Committee held a hearing on October 9, 2008 to review Cox’s ruling. It upheld Cox’s decision, finding undue influence in violation of Rule 20-1 and a transfer for primarily athletic reasons in violation of Rule 19-4.
The plaintiffs sought judicial review of the IHSAA decision. The court found that the IHSAA decision was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore the Watsons would be likely to succeed on the merits at trial. It granted the injunction.
In coming to these conclusions, the court “found that the IHSAA disregarded evidence, that it did not support hearsay testimony with any additional evidence, and that several witnesses denied statements or actions alleged by others.”
The IHSAA appealed, and South Bend intervened on the Watsons’ behalf.
Before reviewing the argument, the court noted that under common law, Indiana courts have reviewed the IHSAA’s regulation of student-athletes in a manner analogous to the review of administrative agencies, applying only an arbitrary and capricious standard. They analyze the record as a whole to determine whether substantial evidence supports the IHSAA’s findings. They generally do not engage in their own fact-finding.
“An IHSAA determination is arbitrary and capricious ‘only where it is willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in disregard of the facts or circumstances in the case, or without some basis which would lead a reasonable and honest person to the same conclusion. IHSAA v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Ind. Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1007).”
The Supreme Court continued, noting that “the trial court announced that it applied the arbitrary and capricious standard, but it proceeded to reweigh evidence the IHSAA had already evaluated. In most of its findings, the court cites to evidence that contradicts the IHSAA’s evidence. While courts must consider whether contradictory evidence completely invalidates evidence supporting the IHSAA’s conclusions, they must not find the existence of contradictory evidence allowing for a reasonable debate to constitute a lack of substantial evidence. See Filter Specialists, Inc. v. Brooks, 906 N.E.2d 835, 844 (Ind. 2009) (courts look for substantial evidence supporting agency’s factual findings). Here, the IHSAA considered each witness’s version of events, assessed the credibility of the evidence, and concluded that Jasmine’s transfer was primarily for athletic reasons. The facts, even as they are described in the IHSAA’s ruling, could lead a reasonable person to disagree with its conclusions, but that does not make them arbitrary or capricious.
“Rather than inquiring whether substantial evidence existed to support the ruling, the court substituted its own judgment for the IHSAA’s. It rejected the IHSAA’s assessment of several witnesses, concluded that the IHSAA incorrectly assessed evidence contrary to the ruling, and improperly discredited virtually all hearsay evidence.”
Indiana High School Athletic Association, Inc (appellant) v. Jasmine S. Watson, Individually, and by and through her mother, Valerie K. Watson (appellee) and South Bend Community School Corporation (intervenor); S.Ct. Ind.; No. 71S03-1002-CV-119, 2010 Ind. LEXIS 800; 12/17/10
Attorneys of Record: (for appellant) Robert M. Baker III, Indianapolis, IN. (for intervenor) Jon B. Laramore, Indianapolis, IN; Edward A. Sullivan III, Amy M. Steketee, South Bend, IN.
