A federal judge from the Southern District of Mississippi has delivered a partial victory to the Mississippi High School Athletics Association (MHSAA) and one of the state’s school districts in an eligibility dispute, finding that a student athlete does not have a Constitutional right to participate in athletics even though he suffers from attention deficit disorder.
At the same, the court declined to dismiss the portion of the plaintiffs’ complaint that alleged he was discriminated against based on his race.
The plaintiff, E.C., was enrolled in the Gulfport School District (GSD), where he attended Gulfport High School (GHS) during the 2010-11 school year. While at GHS, he excelled at football, which he would later allege was an “’integral part of his educational experience,’ due to the fact that he suffers from attention deficit disorder.” More specifically, he alleged that he needs “physical activity to stimulate his mind.”
E.C. transferred to Saint Stanislaus for the 2011-12 school year, “because his mother believed that he would receive a better academic and religious education at Saint Stanislaus, and he is able to participate in an Academic Assistance Program there that was not available at Gulfport,” according to the court.
After his transfer, the plaintiff was not permitted to play football or participate in other athletic and academic activities at Saint Stanislaus for one school year. He and his mother filed a lawsuit against Gulfport School District, Saint Stanislaus, the Gulfport and Saint Stanislaus athletic directors, and MHSAA, claiming that two Caucasian students who also transferred from Gulfport to Saint Stanislaus were not required to sit out for one year. E.C. alleged that he was required to sit out, because he is African-American. The plaintiffs sought nominal, actual, compensatory and punitive damages, and “they asked the court to declare parts of the MHSAA handbook void,” according to the court.
The defendants moved to dismiss.
Among the allegations that the court considered were those centered upon E.C.’s procedural and substantive due process claims.
The Fifth Circuit has held:
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends constitutional protection to those fundamental aspects of life, liberty, and property that rise to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement but does not protect lesser interests or mere expectations. A student’s interest in participating in a single year of interscholastic athletics amounts to a mere expectation rather than a constitutionally protected claim of entitlement. As decided in Mitchell, it falls outside the protection of due process. Walsh v. La. High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 616 F.2d 152, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing Mitchell v. La. High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970)).
“E.C. attempts to argue that he has a due process claim, because he claims that football is an integral part of his education due to his ADHD, and he also claims that his participation in football is a liberty interest,” wrote the court. “However, the Fifth Circuit specifically held in Walsh v. La. High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 616 F.2d 152, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1980) that a student’s property interest in receiving an education does not extend to all integral parts of the educational process, such as athletics. Walsh, 430 F.2d at 159. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit precedent on the subject has left no room for a lower court to hold that participation in sports is a liberty interest, since it has held that participation in athletics falls completely outside the protection of due process. Id. at 159-60; see also Hardy v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 759 F.2d 1233, 1234 (5th Cir. 1985).
The Fifth Circuit in Hardy explained:
‘We repeat: we are not super referees over high school athletic programs. Questions about eligibility for competition may loom large in the eyes of youths, even their parents. We do not disparage their interest in concluding, as here, that these issues are not of constitutional magnitude. Behind this observation rest important values of federalism and the reality that the mighty force of the constitutional commands ought not to be so trivialized. Hardy, 759 F.2d at 1235.’
“This court is bound by Fifth Circuit precedent and must dismiss E.C.’s due process claims against all of the defendants.”
Next, the court turned to E.C.’s claim that the defendants violated The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and discriminated against him based on his race. Most relevant was the claim against the MHSAA, which argued that the claim should be dismissed pursuant to the Fifth Circuit decisions in Walsh and Mitchell.
“In Walsh, the Court held that the classification of students created by a rule that designated transferring students ineligible to compete in sports for one year was ‘rationally related to the state’s valid and legitimate interest in deterring or eliminating the recruitment of promising young athletes by overzealous coaches, fans, and faculty members.’ Walsh, 616 F.2d at 160. Therefore, the Court held that the transfer rule did not violate the equal protection clause. Id.
“In Mitchell, the Court held that a rule that prevented students who had repeated a grade for reasons other than failure from participating in sports during their senior year did not violate the students’ right to equal protection. Mitchell, 430 F.2d at 1158. The Court noted that the classification created by the rule was not inherently suspect, nor was it an encroachment on a fundamental right. Id.
“Importantly, neither the Mitchell decision nor the Walsh decision pertained to an alleged classification based on race. In E.C.’s Complaint, he alleges that Caucasian students were treated more favorably than he was under the transfer rule due to their race. Thus, while the facts alleged in Walsh and Mitchell required only a rational basis inquiry, the facts alleged by E.C., assuming that those facts are true, require strict scrutiny. Furthermore, MHSAA’s apparent argument that the due process analysis contained in the Walsh and Mitchell decisions supports dismissal of E.C.’s claims is also without merit. The right to due process and the right to equal protection are separate rights, and claims based on those rights were dismissed on separate grounds by the Fifth Circuit in those cases. As a result, the Court finds that E.C. has stated a plausible claim for denial of his right to equal protection against MHSAA.”
Also of relevance was E.C.’s 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) Claim against Saint Stanislaus and its AD.
“Section 1985 provides a cause of action for civil rights conspiracies that deprive a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws,” wrote the court, citing 42 U.S.C. §1985. “The Supreme Court has made it clear that a violation of Section 1985(3) requires ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.’ Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1983). As this Court has previously held, E.C. has not alleged that Saint Stanislaus and McRaney treated him differently than others due to his race. He alleges that these defendants abided by the MHSAA decision with regard to the decision concerning his eligibility as well as the eligibility concerning the Caucasian students, and these defendants did not file an appeal for any of the students. Therefore, E.C. does not have a plausible claim against these defendants pursuant to Section 1985(3).”
E. C., JR., a minor, by and through his natural mother Audrey Chatman, and Audrey Chatman v. Mississippi High School Athletics Association; Gulfport School District; Howard McNeill; Saint Stanislaus College; and Stace Mcraney; S.D. Miss.; CAUSE NO. 1:11CV395-LG-JMR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53925; 4/16/12
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Joseph R. Murray , II, MURRAY LAW FIRM, PLLC, Ripley, MS; Walter B. McBride, MCBRIDE LAW FIRM, Tupelo, MS. (for defendant Mississippi High School Athletics Association) Richard Jarrad Garner, LEAD ATTORNEY, Benjamin B. Morgan, ADAMS AND REESE, LLP – Ridgeland, Ridgeland, MS. (for defendant Gulfport School District, Howard McNeill, in his individual capacity and his official capacity as Athletic Director for GSD) John M. Harral, Michael Clark McCabe, Jr., BUTLER, SNOW, O’MARA, STEVENS & CANNADA, PLLC-Gulfport, Gulfport, MS. (for defendants Saint Stanislaus College, Stace McRaney, in his individual capacity and his official capacity as Athletic Director for SSC) Thear Jules Lemoine, PHELPS DUNBAR, LLP, Gulfport, MS.
