The 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has provided a partial victory to Los Angeles Laker Kobe Bryant, who had been sued by the wife of a man who claimed her husband was assaulted by Bryant while sitting courtside at an NBA basketball game.
On one hand, the panel of judges affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Bryant on the fan’s claim that the basketball player intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon the plaintiff.
But on the other hand, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s assault and battery claim, sending it back down for further review.
The plaintiff in the case was Bill Geeslin. He alleged that Bryant, going after a loose ball in a road game against the Memphis Grizzlies in 2005, collided with him and then pushed his forearm into the fan’s chest as he tried to get back on to the court.
Two days after the incident, the plaintiff sought medical attention at the Great River Medical Center and was diagnosed with a bruised lung cavity and was given prescriptions for medicine and a breathing machine to be used at home. Geeslin also claimed that he suffered from anxiety after the incident.
Two weeks later, the plaintiff decided to sue Bryant because he felt violated, because Bryant should not have been able to “inject such pain,” and because he felt “disrespected.”
In granting Bryant’s motion for summary judgment, the court found that “no reasonable juror could conclude that the defendant intended to harm the plaintiff when he effectively pushed himself off of the plaintiff’s chest to get up and back in the game. As such, the plaintiff has failed to make the requisite showing for his assault claim under Tennessee law.”
Addressing the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found that while the first requisite element for such a claim — conduct complained of must be intentional or reckless – was met, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second requirement, which the conduct was “so outrageous that it is not tolerated by a civilized society.”
The plaintiff appealed both decisions.
Addressing the ruling on the assault and battery claim first, the panel restated Geeslin’s contention that Bryant “violently struck” him with his elbow. “Geeslin’s support for this claim is his deposition testimony that (a) it was ‘obvious’ that Bryant intended to harm him, and (b) as Bryant left the scene of contact, he ‘kind of pushed his arm towards me and glared at me and walked away.’ … Geeslin presented his description of the events, including offensive contact by Bryant, which he claims caused him injury. Bryant on the other hand, offered neither deposition testimony nor an affidavit in opposition to the motion.
“Although the district court found that Geeslin had ‘assumed the risk or consented to the entire contact between himself and the Defendant,’ by virtue of taking the courtside seat, we find that the analysis applies only to the initial contact between Geeslin and Bryant and not to the secondary, offensive contact described by Geeslin. In viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Geeslin, as we must, we find that a material question of fact remains on his assault and battery claims. For this reason, the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Bryant on these claims was improper.”
Turning to the ruling on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court was more amenable to Bryant.
“As the Tennessee Court of Appeals has described it, a successful claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘is limited to mental injury which is so severe that no reasonable [person] would be expected to endure it.’ Arnett v. Domino’s Pizza I, L.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 529, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
“While Geeslin generally described symptoms including anxiety and sleeplessness following the incident, we find this is not evidence of a ‘severe mental injury,’ which is required for this claim to survive summary judgment. See Miller v. Willbanks, 8 S.W.3d 607, 615 n.4 (Tenn. 1999). We also note that Geeslin’s description of the rough push by Bryant in leaving the scene of the collision does not reach the level of ‘outrageous’ behavior sufficient to support such a claim. Summary judgment for Bryant was appropriate here.”
Betty Geeslin, As Personal Representative of The Estate of Bill Geeslin, Deceased v. Kobe Bryant; 6th Cir.; No. 10-5820, 11a0881n.06; 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25804; 2011 FED App. 0881N; 12/22/11.
Attorneys or Record: (for plaintiffs) Robert L. Coleman, Lead Attorney, Reid Burge Prevallet & Coleman, Blytheville, AR. (for defendant) Barry I. Slotnick, Loeb & Loeb, New York, NY; Edward D. Russell, Robert L. Sullivan, LEAD ATTORNEY, LOEB & LOEB, LLP, Nashville, TN.
