A federal judge from the Eastern District of California has sided with the owner of a sports officiating service, who sued a school district for discrimination when it awarded another entity an officiating contract.
Specifically, the court denied the Clovis Unified School District’s motion to dismiss, which was based on the argument that the court had already considered the arguments earlier in the litigation. In so ruling, the court found that the previous arguments and the existing ones were not “identical,” which is required in making an argument for claim or issue preclusion.
Plaintiff James M. Lanier is an African American and the owner of “SportsTime Officials Association.”
From 2005 through 2008, Lanier attempted, without success, to obtain a sports officiating contract with the Clovis Unified School District. In March 2008, Dennis Lindsay, the District Athletic Director for Clovis Unified, asked Lanier to support Clovis Unified’s efforts to award the contract to California Sports Officials Association. California Sports is owned and operated by a Caucasian, but at the time was not yet licensed nor did it have a staff. Lanier “was bewildered by the fact that Clovis Unified did not view his officiating business as acceptable for the contract but reluctantly agreed to support California Sports because he was assured that he would be part of their management team,” wrote the court.
In May 2008, Clovis Unified awarded a two year contract to California Sports for the 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 school years. In January 2009, Lanier was discharged from California Sports without any reason or explanation.
On September 23, 2011, Lanier filed a pro se complaint, alleging three causes of action: (1) denial of the equal opportunity to obtain a sports officiating contract for the 2010/2011 school year based on race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; (2) violations of California Education Code § 220; and (3) violations of the “continuous violations doctrine, pursuant to 79 Cal. App. 4th 570, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228.” In a screening order, the court determined that Lanier’s allegation that Clovis Unified violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000d was sufficiently pled for purposes of pro se screening, and dismissed the other causes of action without leave to amend.
On February 24, 2012, Clovis Unified moved to dismiss, pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In considering the motion, the court wrote that pro se complaints are held to “’less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). Where the plaintiff is pro se, the Court has an obligation to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, a pro se plaintiff must still allege facts sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine that a claim has been stated. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).”
Clovis Unified’s first challenge was based on the doctrine of res judicata. “Clovis Unified argues that because the court previously found that … Lanier failed to provide a bid for the 2010/2011 school year that Lanier is now precluded from seeking damages for any alleged discriminatory conduct that arose out of the May 2010 bidding process.
“The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as ‘res judicata.’ Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit. Issue preclusion, in contrast, bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008)”
Clovis Unified argued that both claim preclusion and issue preclusion apply.
“Claim preclusion bars any lawsuits on any claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior action. Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004). Claim preclusion applies if there is (1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or privity between parties. Id. at 1174.”
The court sided with the plaintiff on the claim preclusion argument, finding there was a difference between the claims that were made by the plaintiff.
“The claims in the prior and present action arise out of a different transactional nucleus of facts,” wrote the court, citing Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) and its holding that claim preclusion did not apply because the present action challenged conduct that was different from the conduct challenged in the previous action. “Thus, Lanier’s claim that Clovis Unified failed to give him an equal opportunity to obtain a sports officiating contract for the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 school years because of his race, is not precluded.”
The court next turned to issue preclusion, which bars “the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated in previous litigation between the same parties.” Kamilche Co. v. United States, 53 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1995).
“A party invoking issue preclusion must show: (1) the issue at stake is identical to an issue raised in the prior litigation; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior litigation; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in the earlier action. Littlejohn v. United States, 321 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2003).”
In its analysis, the court wrote that its determination in previous litigation involving the parties, that the fact that Lanier “did not submit a bid for the 2010/2011 school year, was not a ‘critical and necessary’ part of the judgment because Lanier did not challenge the allegedly unfair selection process for the 2010/2011 school year in the prior action. In Lanier I, Lanier alleged claims that related to actions that occurred prior to the time he submitted a bid for the 2010/2011 school year. The court denied the claims based on the statute of limitations. When rendering its decision the court stated that because Lanier did not submit a bid in 2008 or 2010 the alleged harm did not occur within the statute of limitations period. Because Lanier only challenged conduct that allegedly occurred prior to the 2010 bidding process, the court’s finding that Lanier did not submit a bid in 2010 was not a ‘critical and necessary’ part of the judgment. Littlejohn, 321 F.3d at 923. Therefore, this issue is not precluded.”
James M. Lanier v. Clovis Unified School District; E.D. Cal.; 1:11-cv-01613 LJO GSA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54554; 4/18/12.
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) pro se. (for defendant) Benjamin L. Ratliff, LEAD ATTORNEY, Chad Thomas Snyder, Law Offices Of Benjamin L. Ratliff, Fresno, CA.
