Judge Rules for Knicks in Cuttino Mobley Case

Sep 7, 2012

A district judge from the Southern District of New York has dismissed the claim of an NBA basketball player, who sued the New York Knicks organization and its owners, for discrimination “on the basis of actual or perceived disability.”
 
Plaintiff Cuttino Mobley is a professional basketball player who began his career with the National Basketball Association (NBA) in the late 90’s. The defendants are companies that own and operate the New York Knicks, a NBA team.
 
In 1999, at the beginning of his NBA career, Mobley was diagnosed with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (HCM), a genetic mutation which causes thickening of a portion of the myocardium, the muscle of the heart. During extreme exertion, HCM can cause dizziness, collapsing, and even sudden heart failure. From his HCM diagnosis through 2008, however, Mobley had been medically cleared to play every year subject to signing a waiver of liability.
 
In 2008, the New York Knicks began trade negotiations with the Los Angeles Clippers to obtain Mobley, a ten-year veteran of the NBA. Mobley alleged that the Knicks attempted to use his condition to leverage further concessions from the Clippers in the trade, but the Clippers refused. Aware of his condition, the Knicks waived Mobley’s pre-trade physical examination and the teams concluded the deal.
 
Pursuant to Mobley’s contract, immediately following his arrival to the Knicks in September 2008, he was required to submit to a physical examination. Mobley was sent by the Knicks to two cardiologists, Dr. Mark Estes and Dr. Barry Maron, to evaluate his ability to play. He alleged that Dr. Estes and Dr. Maron are both known opponents of allowing athletes with HCM to participate in competitive athletics. Following Mobley’s exam, both doctors recommended he should discontinue playing professional basketball.
 
Mobley alleged that contrary to the recommendations of Dr. Estes and Dr. Maron, there had been no change in his heart condition from 1999 to 2008 and he was perfectly fit to play. He further asserted that the risk of heart failure as a result of HCM generally decreases with age. Mobley alleged that even if HCM made it too dangerous for him to play professional basketball without accommodation, it would have been possible to implant a defibrillator in his heart to shock him back to life if his heart were to stop.
 
Mobley alleged that he asked both the doctors and the Knicks if there was any way he could be allowed to play, but was told he had no options. In December 2008, he announced his retirement from the Knicks.
 
Mobley ultimately sued, claiming that the Knicks forced him to retire against his will for financial reasons. Specifically, he contends that the Knicks disqualified him intentionally in order to save money and avoid paying the NBA’s “luxury tax” (imposed on teams when their total payroll exceeds a certain threshold called the “salary cap”).
 
“Because the salary of a player who cannot play for medical reasons does not count against the team’s salary cap, Mobley alleged that the Knicks saved approximately $19 million through insurance payments and avoided luxury tax when the team deemed him medically unfit to play,” wrote the court.
 
The plaintiff charged that their actions constituted discrimination, pursuant to New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), Executive Law § 290 et seq. and the Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107 et seq.
 
The defendants moved to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
 
“To establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that (1) his employer was subject to the NYSHRL and/or NYCHRL; (2) he was disabled within the meaning of those statues; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he suffered adverse employment action because of his disability. Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., Inc., 457 F.3d 181, 184 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006); Roberts v. Ground Handling, Inc., 499 F.Supp. 2d 340, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2007),” according to the court.
 
“Here, the first two elements of the plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim—the fact that the defendants were subject to the statutes and Mobley suffered from a statutorily protected disability—are not disputed. The defendants contest the third element, however, and allege the plaintiff was not a qualified disabled individual entitled to the protections of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL.”
 
Mobley alleged that he was qualified “because he had been playing skilled basketball with HCM for ten years and did not have any adverse symptoms.”
 
The defendants countered that he “was not qualified to play basketball with sufficient skill and competitive ability because two doctors determined he should discontinue playing professional basketball due to his HCM; the Knicks therefore deemed Mobley medically unfit to perform the essential functions of the job.”
 
The court found that Mobley “has failed to allege sufficiently that he had the requisite qualifications and could perform satisfactorily in his job with the Knicks. Mobley has only alleged facts to show that he was qualified in the past and does not offer any evidence to discredit the opinions of the Knicks’ doctors at the time they evaluated him.”
 
He “thus failed to allege that he was qualified without reasonable accommodation to perform the essential tasks of a professional basketball player for the Knicks.”
 
Mobley also argued that “even if he could not play professional basketball without accommodation, it would have been possible to accommodate his disability by implanting a defibrillator in his heart to shock him back to life were it to stop. He alleges that this was a reasonable accommodation that was not afforded.
 
“While reasonable accommodation is generally required, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 466.11 (g) (2), Admin. Code of the City of N.Y. § 8-107 (15) (a), NYSHRL states that ‘reasonable accommodation is not required where the disability or the accommodation itself poses a direct threat.’ Direct threat means a ‘significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the employee or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.’ N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 466.11(g) (2). Employers are required to make an individualized assessment to determine whether a direct threat exists, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective information. Id.
 
“Here, the plaintiff concedes that after joining the Knicks, two cardiologists provided professional medical opinions stating that he should stop playing because of the significant risks from his HCM, including sudden heart failure. If the Knicks believed Mobley’s HCM posed a direct threat to him, they were not required to engage in the accommodation process. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 466.11(g)(2). Mobley has not alleged facts sufficient to show that his HCM did not pose a direct threat and that he was therefore entitled to reasonable accommodation.”
 
Cuttino Mobley v. Madison Square Garden LP; et al.; S.D.N.Y.; 11 Civ. 8290 (DAB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85467; 6/14/12
 
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Milton L. Williams, Jr., LEAD ATTORNEY, Maia Beth Goodell, Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C., New York, NY. (for defendants) Eliza Allan Kaiser, Kevin Bruce Leblang, Steven Mitchell Knecht, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel, LLP, New York, NY.


 

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