A federal judge from the Eastern District of California has dismissed, with prejudice, the claim of an owner and operator of an sports officiating business, who alleged that the Fresno Unified School District Board of Education discriminated against her by preventing her from obtaining a sports officiating contract based on race, disability and gender.
Plaintiff Ruby J. Earl — a female, African American and disabled person — sued the district, claiming the school district violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the California Education Code § 220 et seq.
The school district moved to dismiss Earl’s complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that Earl failed to allege sufficient facts to support each cause of action.
At issue was the district’s decision in 2010 not to receive bids, including that of the plaintiff, for the 2010/2011 school year. Instead, the district awarded the contract back to San Joaquin Valley Officials Association, the company that controlled the contract for 68 of the past 70 years, and is run by a Caucasian contractor. The court noted Earls’ allegation that San Joaquin “willfully and knowingly discriminates against females, disabled, and African-Americans by not promoting anyone from any of these categories to positions of assignors or supervisors. She further alleges that San Joaquin practices this discrimination with the full knowledge of Fresno Unified.”
In its analysis, the court noted the extra latitude it gives pro se litigants when considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, which has been a factor in previous decisions involving Earl, which have been summarized in Sports Litigation Alert
Turning first to her 42 U.S.C. § 2000d claim, the court found that Earl “has failed to allege facts to show that Fresno Unified did not open the bidding process in order to prevent her from submitting a bid because of her race. In addition, her allegation that the contract was awarded to a non-African American contractor is insufficient to support her claim.
“… (A)lthough this Court must construe her complaint liberally in her favor, Ms. Earl’s complaint must allege some facts to support her intentional racial discrimination claim. Her complaint fails to allege those facts,” wrote the court in dismissing that claim.
Turning to the ADA claim, the court pointed out that the “ADA protects employees, not independent contractors.”
Earl “argues that she is entitled to ADA protection because she is not relying on a statue that provides rights for an employee. Rather, she is relying on a provision of the ADA, which protects a person who is ‘participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity’s qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by’ the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(2). She further asserts that she states an ADA claim because Fresno Unified is ‘utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability[.]’ 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(3). Ms. Earl misunderstands these passages of the ADA, which are pulled out of context of the statutory scheme.”
The court continued: “The ADA prohibits discrimination against ‘qualified individuals’ and actions against ‘employees’ concerning the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’ 42 U.S.C. §12112(a). For purposes of the ADA, a ‘qualified individual’ is defined as ‘an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.’ 42 U.S.C. §12111(8). ‘Thus, one must be able to perform the essential functions of employment at the time that one is discriminated against in order to bring suit under Title I.’ Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000). Pursuant to this statutory definition and Ms. Earl’s allegations, Ms. Earl is not a ‘qualified individual’ pursuant to the ADA, because she was not an employee and was not seeking employment. She was seeking to gain a contract for her business. Accordingly, Ms. Earl’s fourth cause of action must be dismissed. As set forth above, because Ms. Earl was unable to cure the deficiency of this cause of action, her claim is dismissed with prejudice.”
The court also dismissed the other elements of her complaint.
Ruby J. Earl v. Fresno Unified School District Board of Education; E.D. Cal.; CASE NO. F CV 11-1568-LJO-GSA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94548; 7/9/12
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Pro se, Fresno, CA. (for defendant) A. Christopher Duran, LEAD ATTORNEY, Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Rund and Romo, Fresno, CA.
