In two separate opinions delivered the same day, a magistrate judge from the Eastern District of California has delivered a partial victory to a pair of pro se litigants, who each sued a school district for racial discrimination after they were denied a sports officiating contract.
In the first action, plaintiff Ruby J. Earl sued the Clovis Unified School District (CUSD), claiming the school district violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the California Education Code § 220 et seq., and the Continuous Violations Doctrine, 79 Cal. App. 4th 570, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228.
The defendant moved to dismiss the claim for failure to state a claim.
The magistrate judge determined early on that pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, “agencies of the state are immune from private damages actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984).
“California courts, both state and federal, have consistently held that California public school districts and their subdivisions are state agencies for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See e.g., Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir. 1982) (California state colleges and universities are ‘dependent instrumentalities of the state’); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that, because of the funding relationship that exists between California schools and the State of California, public school districts and their subdivisions are state agencies for Eleventh Amendment purposes); Slivkoff v. Board of Trustees, 69 Cal. App. 3d 394, 400, 137 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1977).”
As for the plaintiff’s contention that there were violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986, the judge wrote that the U. S. Supreme Court has held that Title 42 of the United States Code section 1983 “was not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 169, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 n.17.
“Although it could in theory abrogate its own Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of such suits, California has not done so. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1985) (holding California Constitution does not waive immunity from federal court jurisdiction); Dittman v. State of California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-1026 (9th Cir. 1999). Under Ninth Circuit and California law, a school district is ‘a state entity that possesses eleventh amendment immunity from . . . section 1981, 1983 and 1985 claims in damages and for injunctive relief.’ Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 1994) (Eleventh Amendment immunity bars claimed against state agency pursuant to §§ 1985 & 1986).”
The court next turned to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which provides that:
“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
“Accordingly, ‘[t]he two elements for establishing a cause of action pursuant to Title VI are (1) that the entity involved is engaging in racial or national origin discrimination and (2) the entity involved is receiving federal financial assistance.’ Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 903 (E.D. Missouri 1979). Notably, Congress has abrogated States’ sovereign immunity for ‘violations [of Title VI] that occur in whole or in part after October 12, 1986.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(b) (Supp. 1987).”
The judge agreed with the plaintiff that CUSD is a recipient of federal funds for its athletic programs “for which it uses sports officiating service contracts.”
The court construed the plaintiff’s arguments that that the defendant “engaged in racial discrimination in refusing to grant the plaintiff the subject sports officiating contract” liberally, as mandated for a pro se litigant. It noted that the plaintiff “has sufficiently stated a claim against the defendant for a violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”
As for the Americans with Disabilities Act portion of the claim, the court wrote that to successfully state an ADA claim, “a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she is an individual with a disability, (2) she is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities, (3) she was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity, and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of her disability. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F. 3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007).”
To that end, the plaintiff claims she is a disabled woman, who is “qualified to have received the ‘all sports contracts’ from CUSD as she is accredited by the California Interscholastic Federation and operates Central California Soccer Officials Association (CCSOA), a business offering officiating services. Third, the plaintiff claims she was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of CUSD’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by CUSD, when it refused to award her an officiating contract and ‘failed to use an open, fair and legal bidding process in awarding; its sports officiating contracts. Finally, the plaintiff asserts that her exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination by CUSD was ‘in whole or in part,’ by reason of her disability.
“Construing the plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally, (she) has sufficiently stated a claim against CUSD for a violation of the ADA.”
In the other opinion, James M. Lanier filed a complaint against the Fresno Unified School District (FUSD) on September 9, 2011, alleging he was discriminated against “on the basis of race when the defendant refused to award him a sports officiating contract in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Lanier also alleged the defendant’s discriminatory practices violated California Education Code § 220 et seq.
Like Earl, the magistrate judge construed Lanier’s claim liberally, and found that he had sufficiently stated a claim against the defendant for a violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Similarly, the court also found that the plaintiff’s Title 42 and state law claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Ruby J. Earl v. Clovis Unified School District; E.D. Cal.; 1:11-cv-01731-LJO-BAM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 246; 1/3/12
James M. Lanier v. Fresno Unified School District; E.D. Cal.; 1: 11-cv-01522 – LJO – BAM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225; 1/3/12
