A federal judge from the Eastern District of California has granted summary judgment to a school district, which was sued by the owner of an officiating service for race and employment discrimination, pursuant to Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when the school district awarded another entity an officiating contract.
In so ruling, the court determined that the owner failed to establish that the reason for the school’s district’s decision was “mere pretext” for its discriminatory reason, a requirement to prove a Title VI claim. Second, the owner was not an employee, which undercut the Title VII claim.
The plaintiff in the case was James M. Lanier, an African American and the owner of “SportsTime Officials Association.”
From 2005 through 2008, Lanier attempted, without success, to obtain a sports officiating contract with the Clovis Unified School District, the defendant. In March 2008, Dennis Lindsay, the District Athletic Director for Clovis Unified, asked Lanier to support Clovis Unified’s efforts to award the contract to California Sports Officials Association. California Sports is owned and operated by a Caucasian, but at the time was not yet licensed nor did it have a staff. Lanier “was bewildered by the fact that Clovis Unified did not view his officiating business as acceptable for the contract but reluctantly agreed to support California Sports because he was assured that he would be part of their management team,” wrote the court.
In May 2008, Clovis Unified awarded a two year contract to California Sports for the 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 school years. In January 2009, Lanier was discharged from the bidding process, allegedly without any reason or explanation.
On September 23, 2011, Lanier sued, alleging a Title VI claim and two state law claims. The court dismissed his state law claims with prejudice and filed the Title VI claim to proceed. Clovis Unified filed a motion to dismiss. In response, Lanier filed an amended complaint in which he re-alleged his Title VI claim of race-based discrimination as well as two Title VII claims.
Clovis Unified filed another motion to dismiss, claiming it was entitled to summary judgment because Lanier cannot prevail on his Title VI claim because he cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination and that even if he could Clovis Unified had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not awarding him the contract.
Clovis Unified further argued that it is entitled to summary judgment on Lanier’s Title VII claims because Lanier was never employed by Clovis Unified.
Lanier countered that Clovis Unified’s motion for summary judgment on his Title VI claim should be denied because “there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Clovis Unified’s proffered reason for not awarding him the contract was a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.” In the alternative, Lanier argued that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. Lanier did not challenge Clovis Unified’s arguments regarding this Title VII claims.
Addressing the Title VI claim, the court noted that “in order for an independent contractor to establish a prima facie case of discrimination during a contract bidding process, the independent contractor must show that: (i) he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he submitted a bid for a contract that he was qualified to fulfill, to an entity seeking bids; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the contract remained open and the entity continued to seek bids from independent contractors of complainant’s qualifications.” Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
The court continued: “Lanier fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. As an African American, Lanier is a member of a racial minority. He submitted a bid for Clovis Unified’s sports officiating contract for the 2010-2011 school year, the bid was rejected, and Clovis Unified awarded the contract to three other contractors. Where Lanier’s claim falls apart is that he fails to show that he was qualified to fulfill the contract.
“In May 2010, Clovis Unified sought bid proposals for its sports officiating services contract. As part of the bidding process, bidders were required to fill out a questionnaire about their organization. Lanier failed to respond to questions two and five of the questionnaire. Question five specifically requests the number of officials registered with the bidder’s organization, their names, certification/credentials, years of experience, and sports background. Lanier failed to provide this information and instead challenged the legality and legitimacy of the question.”
The court added that even if Lanier “had established a prima facie case of discrimination, which he has not, Clovis Unified has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their actions.” It states that “it did not award Lanier the contract because he failed to submit a complete bid. Specifically, it explains that Lanier’s failure to respond to question five prevented the selection committee from determining whether Lanier was capable of servicing the contract. The committee had concerns over whether Lanier had enough qualified officials with the appropriate level of experience to service the contract.
“Where the defendant presents legitimate reasons for the challenged action, the plaintiff must then raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether the defendant’s proffered reason is a ‘mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.’ Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155. Evidence to show pretext must be both ‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ in order to overcome the articulated reason for the challenged action. See Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006).
Lanier fell short when it came to establishing that the defendant’s actions were “pretext. First, he argues that African American contractors were unable to supply the names, certification, years of experience, and sports background of the officials registered with their organizations because only Caucasian-owned organizations previously serviced Clovis Unified’s contract. The questionnaire does not require the registered officials to have previously worked for Clovis Unified. Thus, even if Clovis Unified has only awarded its contract to Caucasian-owned organizations in the past; this does not prevent organizations owned by African Americans from supplying the names of officials registered with their organizations.
“Next, it appears that Lanier contends that the Caucasian owned organizations did not have to submit the names, certification, years of experience, and sports background of the officials registered with their organizations because they were given the opportunity to recruit officials after the bidding process whereas Lanier was not given the same opportunity and was required to provide the information during the bidding process. This contention is belied by the record. It is undisputed that the contract was split between three organizations all of which submitted a roster of officials with their past experience and qualifications.”
Turning to the Title VII claims, the court considered the defendant’s arguments that the claim was vulnerable because Lanier was never employed by Clovis Unified.
“Here, it is undisputed that Lanier was never employed by Clovis Unified. It is further undisputed that at all times relevant to the claims raised in Lanier’s first amended complaint, that he was an independent contractor seeking a contractual relationship with Clovis Unified and not an employment relationship. Thus, Lanier has failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to this issue and Clovis Unified is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
James M. Lanier v. Clovis Unified School District; E.D. Cal.; 1:11-cv-01613-LJO-GSA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79978; 6/6/13
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Pro se. (for defendant) Benjamin L. Ratliff, LEAD ATTORNEY, Chad Thomas Snyder, Law Offices of Benjamin L. Ratliff, Fresno, CA.
