A federal judge from the Middle District of Florida has denied a school district’s motion to dismiss a former coach’s claims of race discrimination and wrongful termination, finding that the plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies before filing an action with the court.
Plaintiff Carlos D. Clark is an African American male and employee for the District School Board of Collier County. He was also a high school basketball coach before he was terminated from the coaching position by the school board.
Clark’s background included a stint as a professional basketball player. From 2008 through the spring of 2012, he served as head coach of the Barron Collier High School (BCHS) Varsity Boys Basketball team, amassing a successful track record in the process.
In 2009, Mark Rosenbalm became the athletic director of BCHS. The plaintiff claims that from the beginning, he exhibited “rudeness” and “standoffishness” toward him. Rosenbalm also brought in Joe Radar, a Caucasian friend, as a volunteer assistant coach for Clark. The plaintiff further alleged that Rosenbaum, who would become a co-defendant, “catered to Caucasian coaches to the exclusion of persons of color.” He cited an example of how Rosenbalm congratulated Rader on the 2012 District Championship, “but did not congratulate plaintiff or invite plaintiff to the awards banquet.”
Two days before the banquet, on or about May 26, 2012, Clark claimed he was terminated as head coach without reason except for “communication skills.” He claimed this was a harsh punishment compared with the punishment imposed on other coaches for lesser offenses. Rader was installed as head coach.
Clark sued, alleging in Count I an unlawful employment practice in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, against the school board. In Count II, he alleged a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both defendants, the school board and Rosenbalm.
The defendants moved to dismiss.
Addressing Count I first, the court noted that prohibited discrimination typically falls into two categories, disparate treatment and/or disparate impact.
Disparate treatment discrimination, the form alleged in Clark’s complaint, can take the form either of a “tangible employment action,” such as a firing or demotion, or of a “hostile work environment” that changes “the terms and conditions of employment, even though the employee is not discharged, demoted, or reassigned.” Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 807 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)(citing Hulsey v. Pride Rests., LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2004)).
To establish a claim for tangible employment action under Title VII, the plaintiff must show: “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to adverse employment action; (3) his employer treated similarly situated employees outside of his class more favorably; and (4) he was qualified to do the job.” Hall v. Dekalb Cnty. Gov’t, 503 F. App’x 781, 787 (11th Cir. 2013).
To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must show: “(1) that he belongs to a protected group; (2) that he has been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment must have been based on a protected characteristic of the employee, . . .; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that the employer is responsible for such environment under either a theory of vicarious or of direct liability.” Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002).
“As currently pled, Count I incorporates facts which arguably support both theories in part, but not completely, and results in confusion as to what Title VII claim or claims the plaintiff is attempting to assert,” wrote the court. “The factual allegations are not sufficient to properly allege a claim of hostile work environment as to the severity or persuasiveness element, and do not allege a similarly situated employee for equal protection purposes. “
Thus, the court granted the school board’s motion to dismiss.
Turning to Count II, the court noted that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleges that both the school board and Rosenbalm violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. In essence, Count II alleges that Rosenbalm, while acting under the color of state law, “worked a denial of the plaintiff’s rights” by “impeding and hindering the due course of justice with intent to deny the plaintiff equal protection of the laws.”
The court continued: “To establish a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege and ultimately prove that (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff also must allege and prove an affirmative causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the Constitutional deprivation. Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc).”
While the court did grant summary judgment to the defendants on this count as well — because “there are insufficient factual allegations to support either a policy violation or deliberate indifference arising from a failure to train as currently pled” — it did leave the door open for the plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
Carlos D. Clark v. School Board of Collier County, Florida and Mark Rosenbalm, in his individual capacity; M.D. Fla.; Case No: 2:13-cv-820-FtM-29DNF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173526; 12/16/14
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Esmond J. Lewis, LEAD ATTORNEY, Esmond Lewis Law Firm, PA, Ft Myers, FL. (for defendants) James Donald Fox, LEAD ATTORNEY, Roetzel & Andress, LPA, Naples, FL; Jonathan D. Fishbane, LEAD ATTORNEY, Collier County School District, Naples, FL.
