A federal judge from the Northern District of Mississippi has held that a rule adopted by the Mississippi High School Activities Association (MHSAA), which regulates the participation of student athletes on school and non-school (independent) teams in the same sport during the academic year “is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of promoting fair competition in schools.”
As such, the court denied the plaintiffs request for an injunction that would have blocked the rule and granted the MHSAA’s motion for summary judgment.
The rule drawing the ire of some parents, who ultimately sought legal intervention, was adopted prior to the 2013-2014 school year. The so-called 50 percent rule read as follows:
“During the school’s sports seasons an independent team can be made up of no more than 50 percent of the number that make up the starting number of players for that sport from any one school. The penalty for this violation is the loss of eligibility of all participants from the school that participated on the team. School personnel cannot coach an independent team during the school year. NOTE: Only 4 players per school may participate on a baseball or fast pitch softball team, 2 basketball players, 5 soccer or slow pitch players, etc. Exception: five starters in soccer must be identified by the coach. Independent teams may participate in summer league post-season play through August.”
The exception for soccer applied the 50 percent rule to only the number of starters as opposed to players, according to the court. “This allowed high school soccer players who attended the same school to also play on the same independent team provided no more than five starters, as designated by the high school coach, were on the same independent team. The soccer exception to the 50 percent rule was adopted in 2006 and was continuously applied through the 2012-2013 school year.”
On November 1, 2012, the 41- member MHSAA Legislative Council revised the rule, removing the soccer exception and interpreting that rule to apply to, essentially, the entire school year. The new rule, 6.2.1, was adopted on February 7, 2013.
The revised rule had a “substantial impact” on soccer, since the high school season runs from October to February, and the independent team soccer season runs from August through May.
The plaintiffs claimed that Rule 6.2.1, prevents them and other similarly situated student athletes from participating on both a school and non-school team in the same sport during the academic year. Accordingly, the plaintiffs “contend that the 50 percent Rule creates two classes of student athletes based on private activity outside of school activities: (1) student athletes who may associate with independent teams and interscholastic teams, thereby having the opportunity for additional training and development in the sport of their choice, and (2) student athletes who may associate with either high school or independent teams, thereby having limited opportunities for training and development in the sport of their choice. This, the plaintiffs alleged, deprives those student athletes of their fundamental right to equal protection of the law as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for temporary restraining order, or alternatively, a preliminary injunction. The defendants have responded and filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, a motion for summary judgment.
The court noted that “the Fifth Circuit employs a well-known four-part test—which the applicant bears the burden of satisfying—to secure a preliminary injunction: (i) a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits; (ii) a substantial threat that [the applicant] will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (iii) that the applicant’s threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom he seeks to enjoin; and (iv) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Morrell v. City of Shreveport, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 14420, *4-5 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (citing Bluefield Water Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252-53 (5th Cir. 2009).
The plaintiffs tripped on the first part of the test.
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’ U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. This is essentially a requirement that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985). To demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must prove that the defendants’ actions had a discriminatory effect and were motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-74, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 60 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976). ‘Discriminatory purpose . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the – . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’ Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279, 99 S. Ct. 2282.
“If a claim does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, courts review state action using a rational basis test. Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 149 (5th Cir. 1991). Where, as here, the classification created by the regulatory scheme neither trammels fundamental rights or interests nor burdens an inherently suspect class, equal protection analysis requires that the classification be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See e. g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 350-53, 99 S. Ct. 1742, 60 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1979); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 49 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1976); Jackson v. Marine Exploration Co., 583 F.2d 1336, 1346 (5th Cir. 1978).”
This is a more liberal threshold, since the regulation is “accorded a strong presumption of validity and must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1993). Although better alternatives may exist, the MHSAA is not required to choose the least restrictive method of achieving its desired ends.”
Weighing in the defendants’ favor was the affidavit of MHSAA Executive Director Don Hinton, who said the purpose of the rule is to “promote fair competition between all member schools, … prevent a particular school from specialization in one sport by having all the starters on a specific team play together year round on an independent team, … and encourage students to participate in as many sports as they can, which increases the number of students playing sports rather than increasing the quality of a select few.”
Recognizing the off-stated legal holding that participation in interscholastic sports is a privilege, not a right, the plaintiffs framed their lawsuit as “not an eligibility determination challenge, but a suit to redress the denial of equal protection by a state actor, the plaintiffs’ alleged injury is their right to participate in and be eligible for interscholastic competition.”
Still, the court would have none of it.
“As all parties agree that rational basis scrutiny applies to this equal protection claim, MHSAA has stated a legitimate state interest, and the rule is rationally related to meet those interests, the court finds that summary judgment is appropriate as the plaintiffs’ have failed to put forth any Constitutional violation.”
B.A., et al. v. Mississippi High School Activities Association, INC., et al.; N.D. Miss.; Cause NO.: 1:13CV170-SA-DAS,; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150188; 10/18/13
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiffs) Joseph Andrew Hughes, Mark Nolan Halbert, Lead Attorneys, J. Andrew Hughes, P.A., Tupelo, MS. (for defendant MHSAA) Benjamin B. Morgan, Lead Attorney, Adams And Reese LLP – Ridgeland, Ridgeland, MS; John Jeffrey Trotter, Lead Attorney, Adams And Reese, Ridgeland, MS; Richard Jarrad Garner, Lead Attorney, Adams And Reese LLP, Ridgeland, MS. (for defendant Tupelo Public School District) Benjamin E. Griffith, Lead Attorney, Michael S. Carr, Griffith & Griffith, Cleveland, MS.
