An Illinois state appeals court has affirmed a lower court’s ruling for the Chicago White Sox and several of its security officers, who were sued by a spectator at a baseball game after an altercation.
In sum, the court found the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants “because the plaintiff was unable to establish a violation of her rights under section 1983 of the United States Code or that the defendants were liable for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or false imprisonment and arrest.”
The plaintiff, Marianne Fricano, alleged that as she exited a game between the White Sox and the Cleveland Indians at U.S. Cellular Field in Chicago on June 23, 2004, she was attacked by another patron, Megan E. Wolfe, and was subsequently taken into custody by security guards, all of whom were off-duty police officers. She alleged that she was violently beaten, handcuffed, and manacled to a wall by the guards before being formally arrested by police. Fricano was ultimately charged with aggravated battery and mob action. However those charges were dismissed by the state on August 8, 2005.
A contrasting story was told by others, which painted Fricano and her party as the aggressor in the melee.
Nevertheless, Fricano filed suit against the White Sox and several security guards, alleging section 1983 civil rights violations, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false arrest and imprisonment.
After the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, Fricano alleged that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on (1) her section 1983 claim against the individual defendants, (2) her section 1983 claim against the White Sox, (3) her malicious prosecution claim, (4) her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and (5) her false imprisonment and false arrest claims.
Addressing her section 1983 claim, the court began by noting that “Section 1983 of the United States Code provides that a plaintiff may recover civilly if she is deprived of a constitutional right by a private individual acting under color of law. (42 U.S.C. 1983 (West 2008)).”
Fricano claimed that the private security guards, who were actually off-duty police officers, used excessive force against her, in violation of her constitutional rights. Just because they were off-duty police officers, however, did not mean they were “acting under color of law,” according to the appeals court.
“Here, the fact that the individual defendants were off duty police officers employed as private security guards for the White Sox is insufficient, on its own, to establish section 1983 liability,” the court wrote. “The undisputed evidence shows that they did not identify themselves as police officers or display their badges to plaintiff, nor did they wear police uniforms, but instead wore clothing indicating they were part of White Sox security. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record indicating that any of the individual defendants was carrying his service weapon or used his department-issued handcuffs to restrain her. Like those in Herrera, the defendants here brought Fricano to the White Sox security office rather than a police station, filed White Sox incident reports rather than police report, and had no involvement in the State’s decision to file criminal charges against Fricano. Thus, because there is no evidence in the record which would indicate that the individual defendants were acting under color of state law, Fricano’s section 1983 claim against them must fail as a matter of law.”
The section 1983 claim against the White Sox also failed. “Courts have repeatedly and consistently held that where there has been no showing of a constitutional violation by individual police officers, their employers, as well, cannot be held liable under section 1983,” wrote the court.
Turning to the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim, the court wrote that to prove such a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: “First, the conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous. Second, the actor must either intend that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there is at least a high probability that his conduct will cause severe emotional distress. Third, the conduct must in fact cause severe emotional distress.” McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 86, 533 N.E.2d 806, 127 Ill. Dec. 724 (1988) (Emphasis in original).
The appeals court wrote that Fricano was “unable to satisfy any of the elements of her IIED claim. Her brief merely makes the bald assertions that the defendants ‘knew or reasonably should have known that their actions had a high probability of causing severe emotional distress to her,’ but does not cite anything in the record which would support such a claim. Fricano has failed to provide any evidence that any of the defendants acted in an extreme and outrageous manner, or that their actions caused her severe emotional distress.”
Marianne Fricano v. The Chicago White Sox, LTD., et al.; App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist., 5th Div.; No. 1-10-1978, 2012 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 278; 2/10/1299
