By Patrick Smith, J.D. Candidate and Kacie Kergides, Esq., of Montgomery McCracken
In August 2015, fifteen-year old freshman “M.T.” attended the freshman football team’s first “heat acclimation training” session of the year at Penn Hills High School.
It was M.T.’s first ever organized football practice, and it would involve a three-hour conditioning session in the summer heat of August. Despite Penn Hills’ knowledge of M.T. testing positive for the sickle-cell trait, the athletic staff and trainers reportedly did not make any effort to check if he was hydrated or exhibiting any signs of heat-illness during the conditioning session. In fact, M.T. alleged the coaches and trainers specifically asked players to not bring water bottles to practice that day.
As the team’s training session concluded, M.T. reportedly collapsed on the field. Rather than attending to M.T., the athletic staff allegedly returned to the locker room and left M.T. to lie in the field until his mother arrived to take him home. M.T. was apparently able to crawl to the car, where his mother found him gasping for air. When his mother began to drive home, M.T. lost consciousness and began seizing in his car seat. His mother immediately called for an ambulance to bring him to the hospital, where he was found to have suffered a stroke and severe muscle breakdown. The hospital concluded these injuries were a result of a bad sickle-cell reaction, triggered by severe dehydration and physical exertion. These injuries are believed to have lasting effects on the former Penn Hills student-athlete.
M.T., through his mother, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Penn Hills’ head football coach, athletic director, freshman football coach, Penn Hills’ principal, and the Penn Hills’ school district as a whole.[1] M.T. also brought claims against UPMC, the sports medicine group contracted by Penn Hills, and the two athletic trainers present on the day of M.T.’s injury. The most noteworthy cause of action in M.T.’s complaint, and the only claim the Court analyzed thoroughly, was Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.[2]
Section 1983 of the United States Code allows individuals to sue state officials who are acting under the “color” of state law for depriving them of their rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by statute or the U.S. Constitution. M.T. alleged each defendant acted under the “color” of the state when they violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity.[3] In response, the defendants moved to dismiss M.T.’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court noted the defendant’s arguments for dismissal amounted to (1) each individual defendant was eligible for qualified immunity for the § 1983 claims against them and (2) Penn Hills School District and UPMC had Monell immunity because they simply employed the alleged tortfeasors.
Qualified Immunity
Each individual defendant, aside from the Penn Hills School District and UPMC, responded to M.T.’s § 1983 claims by arguing they were entitled to “qualified immunity” for their actions. Qualified immunity arises in a case where a state institution (like a public high school) and its employees (state actors) are the defendants. The doctrine of qualified immunity, in short, shields state officials from lawsuits deriving from the state official’s use of discretionary action while on the job. Whether such a government official “may be held personally liable for allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.”[4]
Therefore, the court asked whether, in August 2015, it would have been apparent to a reasonable high school football coach, principal, or athletic trainer that failure to implement a hydration plan and monitor M.T. for heat illness symptoms violated M.T.’s constitutional rights. Looking to Third Circuit precedent for clearly established rights in the school-athletic setting, the court held that no such right has ever been “clearly established.” The court explained that, in the school-athletic setting, the state actor must have engaged in “patently egregious and intentional misconduct” to have violated a right such that the incident could not be classified as a “typical risk” associated with the athletic activity.
To illustrate a “typical risk” of athletic activities, the court cited to a functionally identical case where a football player died after a rigorous football practice.[5] In that case, the 11th Circuit found that failure to monitor hydration or check for signs of heat-related illness fell into the realm of unfortunate but “typical” risks of athletic activities. Finding no other cases clearly establishing the right to adequate hydration and monitoring for heat-illness, the Western District found the individual defendants eligible for qualified immunity against M.T.’s § 1983 claims.
Monell Liability
Because qualified immunity is only available for individual actors, both Penn Hills School District and UPMC—public entities—argued they could not be liable under § 1983 for vicarious liability.[6] While the court agreed that a public entity could not be held liable solely for employing a tortfeasor, the court subsequently stated that public entities may be held liable if the entity utilizes inadequate policy measures, poor training, or lack of supervision that proximately causes the alleged constitutional injury. If a plaintiff attempts to establish liability on a “failure-to-train” theory, it must show the entity employed acts or omissions which displayed “deliberate indifference.” The court explained, if the plaintiff is relying on the facts of a single-incident, deliberate indifference requires plaintiffs to allege facts which essentially show that the public entity knew to a “moral certainty” that the specific constitutional injury would occur as a result of the entity’s deficient policies or supervision.
Applying this standard, the court found M.T. not only failed to plead facts demonstrating deliberate indifference from a pattern or history theory, but also failed to plead a single-incident theory. The court held that while the events surrounding M.T.’s injury were unfortunate, M.T. did not establish that defendants were “deliberately indifferent” in supervising or knew to a “moral certainty” that the specific constitutional right would be violated. In closing, the court held even if M.T. pled sufficient facts and made an appropriate showing, the right to a proper hydration plan and to be monitored for heat illness was not a clearly established right that could thus be violated.
Hydrate and Monitor Your Student-Athletes
Although the claims against Penn Hills and UMPC were dismissed for failure to state a claim, this case should serve as a warning to all schools and teams to make sure they have an adequate hydration plan in place and an athletic staff capable of spotting signs of heat-illness. While this case focused on § 1983 claims, failure to assure proper hydration and heat-illness detection could be the basis of a multitude of other tort-based claims.[7]
Further, Qualified Immunity and Monell liability are extremely fact sensitive and application of each varies based on the specific context of the alleged injury. Both qualified immunity and Monell liability shield defendants of lawsuits when acting under the “color” of state power, but only to a certain extent. Both doctrines contain an exception for exceptionally egregious behavior that is so obviously unlawful and leads to an injury. As demonstrated by the court’s thorough analysis, failure to properly monitor student-athletes and provide an adequate hydration plan walks the line between “typical risk” and “egregious misconduct.” It is foreseeable that one day a court could rule differently and hold a student-athlete has a recognized right to implementation of a hydration plan and monitoring for heat related illness. As is the case in many § 1983 claims, once one court finds such a right, it is increasingly more likely other courts will follow suit.
In order to avoid being the entity that triggers this legal cascade, we advise all athletic departments to train their athletic staff, athletic trainers, and coaches on preventing exercise-induced exertional heat stroke and other heat-related illness and to provide their student-athletes with adequate hydration and monitor their hydration. This will not only mitigate the risk of any potential liability, but also, more importantly, ensure student-athletes stay safe and ready to compete at a high level.
[1] See M.T. by & Through Eison v. Peterman, 2019 WL 461083, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2019).
[2] Plaintiff’s complaint also alleged defendants violated his right to bodily integrity under the Pennsylvania state constitution. This claim was dismissed because the Court held there is no recognized private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania constitution. See Peterman, 2019 WL 461083, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 2019).
[3] For the sake of analysis, the Court included UPMC and their athletic trainers as “state actors” but did not reach a decision on whether they actually were state actors. Peterman, at *5 (W.D. Pa. 2019).
[4] Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
[5] See Davis v. Carter, 555 F.3d 979, 982 (11th Cir. 2009).
[6] See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (holding court cannot impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on basis of existence of employer-employee relationship with tortfeasor).
[7] Plaintiff’s state law negligence claims against Defendant UPMC were dismissed because Plaintiff failed to file a certificate of merit within sixty days of the complaint’s filing. See Peterman, Civil Action No. 17-1619, 2019 WL 461083, at *7 (W.D. Pa. 2019).
