By Robert E. Wallace, Jr., of Thompson Coburn LLP
In 2017 and 2018, 25% of NFL head coaches were men of Color. That’s not bad until you recognize that 70% of the men playing the game on the field are men of Color. Contrast that with 2019, when the percentage dropped to just 12.5% after five Black head coaches were fired and only one, Brian Flores of the Miami Dolphins, was hired. Currently, only two out of 32 NFL General Managers are men of Color, and there is not one Black person that has ever held the position of team president.
After the 2019 season, there were five head coach openings — not one of them was filled by a Black man. One Latino was hired, Ron Rivera, who had been fired during the season by the Carolina Panthers, and hired right after the season ironically by the NFL team in Washington, D.C., which itself has come under fire for its racially insensitive name. Again, going into the 2020 season there will still be only four head coaches of Color (Flores, Dolphins; Lynn, Chargers; Rivera, Washington; and, Tomlin, Steelers).
The state of NFL hiring and equal opportunity for Black men in coaching, personnel and high level executive positions is as Rod Graves, President and Executive Director of the Fritz Pollard Alliance, said, “abysmal and shameful.” Graves further concluded that the Rooney Rule, which required clubs to interview one minority person for a head coaching job and has been in effect in some form for over a decade and a half, is not working as intended, and drastic change is needed to it if this hiring trend is going to be reversed.
On May 19, 2020, NFL owners met and adopted 2020 Resolution JC-1 (JC-1) to improve diversity hiring practices for key coaching and executive positions, but left another key proposal 2020 Resolution JC-2 (JC-2) on the table. In the current environment, as our country grapples with damaging racial disparities at all levels of our society and economy, it’s important to analyze these proposals to see which hold the promise of real change, which fall short, and why it’s so hard for the NFL to move forward in the advancement of qualified candidates of Color.
Background
It became very obvious to anyone paying attention that the NFL needed to address this situation, and come up with solutions for corrective action. In looking at the problem a few conclusions became readily apparent. As the results demonstrated, the Rooney Rule was not working in its current form, and the hiring system in place needed revision. Furthermore, several barriers were in place that blocked opportunities for minority coaches. Among those barriers were the biases of those doing the hiring — owners, presidents, general managers and head coaches — and their overwhelming tendency to hire people who look like them or have similar backgrounds. Finally, if the NFL was left to its own devices and its own sense of doing what is right and fair, without change, we would be having the same discussion about NFL hiring practices next year at this time.
In confronting this problem, the NFL had to first acknowledge that as an organization it had failed in identifying and hiring the best talent through a fair, open and competitive process. The result was a system that repressed the growth of people of color and blocked the NFL from maximizing its full potential by not considering, interviewing and hiring the best and most diverse group of candidates. The goal of this change should be to establish hiring controls that would be conducive to a fair and inclusive hiring system and allow the best talent at all levels of coaching and management to flourish. Additionally, new policies and initiatives had to be developed that would have an immediate and sustainable impact towards fair hiring. Regardless, the status quo was unacceptable, and the flawed and broken hiring system in place must not survive another season.
The NFL, led by Commissioner Goodell, Executive Vice President of Football Operations Troy Vincent, and Pittsburgh Steelers Owner Art Rooney, the chair of the League’s Workplace Diversity Committee, understood the need for drastic change. The exclusionary hiring practices being utilized by the League and its member clubs obliterated the League’s core foundation and belief in fair competition. Not only is diversity and equal opportunity the right thing to do, it also results in a better overall product. But despite these indisputable facts, equal opportunity and improved product, hiring fairness eluded the NFL and its decision-makers.
Barriers to Advancement
It also appeared fairly obvious that the NFL’s hiring requirements, including experience as a coordinator, play-caller, or assistant head coach, only mattered when it was convenient, and mainly only as applied to people of Color. Furthermore, the new “hot thing” was to hire an offensive or quarterback guru and there were a paucity of those positions held by minorities. Those with hiring responsibility argue that they cannot identify Black candidates quickly enough once the (on average) three to five head coaching jobs open each year, because, the competition is intense. This rush to hire resulted in successful minority coaches involved in the playoffs being left behind as teams raced to hire better publicized names before the Super Bowl. By delaying and slowing down the rush to hire, teams could engage in a more thorough research and vetting process resulting in a broader swath of candidates, including people of Color, being considered. A longer hiring period is not included in the new policy (JC-1). Only time will tell whether other initiatives can overcome this timing issue enough to make a positive difference in the hiring trend.
To correct these inequities, it was necessary to confront the lack of minority coordinators, especially on offense, and quarterback coaches, which seemed to be a new path to offensive coordinator or head coach positions. For at least two decades, the NFL had a rule that there were only two classifications for NFL coaches — head coach and assistant coach. Consequently, a team could deny its coach under contract from accepting a position with another club, except to fill a head, not assistant, coaching position. In other words, a running back coach, a position that is traditionally 75% comprised of minority coaches, could be denied a promotion to an offensive coordinator for another club since both were viewed as “assistant coaches.” The same applied, for example, to a defensive back coach (64% minority) moving to a defensive coordinator role. The argument presented for the restrictive mobility rules was that the clubs were playing games with titles and responsibilities and some of these moves were not promotions but lateral ones — in effect just another way to grab a coach under contract to your staff.
The newly-adopted JC-1 is meant to address this mobility problem. Many felt strongly that the NFL mobility rules (called an Anti-Tampering Policy) were stifling opportunities for minorities to move up the coaching ladder. Consequently, simplifying the mobility rules and removing a club’s ability to block promotions described above (ex. running back coach to offensive coordinator, et. al) was very important. It was believed a simplified approach to determining the legitimacy of a promotion would open up opportunities, and JC-1 does that. Still, I believe that the resolution should have gone further and an assistant being hired from another assistant coach position to quarterback coach should be included as a promotion given the recent trend of hiring those coaches to become a head coach or offensive coordinator. JC-1 currently does not include that move as a promotion.
Although most of the public discussion was on coaching positions, the paltry 6% people of color in general manager positions and the complete absence of any Black team president made it imperative that opportunities be expanded to high-level front office positions as well. Rightfully the amended Anti-Tampering Policy included those positions.
Diversity and Draft Picks
As you probably know, the most highly debated proposal, JC-2, was to award enhanced draft choice positioning to teams hiring a minority to a head coach or executive position. That proposal was criticized for putting a price on a minority hire or awarding a team for doing the right thing. Although these criticisms have merit, it was obvious that fair and equal opportunity was not happening because it was the right thing to do, and drastic steps needed to be considered. This NFL proposal was an acknowledgment that the hiring problem rested with the League Office and its member clubs and some sort of proactive steps were needed to address the problem.
As part of this consideration it also had to be acknowledged that the currency of the NFL is more than just money, and a $500,000 to $1 million fine might be viewed as less significant than the currency of draft choices or draft choice positioning. Teams viewed money more as a cost of doing business (not to ignore the fact that at some point an amount of money does become significant), and for those charged with constructing a winning team, draft capital is believed to be more valuable. Recognizing this fact, using draft capital both as a punishment and reward needed to be discussed. Consequently it was proposed that draft compensation as punishment for a team that tries to circumvent the purpose and/or intent of the diversity initiatives could serve as a significant deterrent. Additionally, draft stock could also be used to recognize clubs that have successfully developed Black coaches or executives, and had a successful diversity program and record. This NFL proposal, JC-2 was tabled prior to a membership vote.
Other Considerations
Several other initiatives that did not require a membership vote were reported as included and would be implemented going forward. Included in these new initiatives would be diversity education for all owners, general managers, head coaches and executives responsible for hiring decisions in order to help them understand implicit bias; providing additional avenues for minority coaches to become known to decision-makers through networking opportunities; and, utilizing the Fritz Pollard Alliance to assist in recommendations of improvements, not only to the diversity initiatives, but to an overall Workplace Panel, including serving as a resource to the League and clubs in order to insure diverse pools of candidates going forward.
Additional steps included posting job descriptions for all open positions and a review and certification of a team’s hiring pool and process. In addition to seminars and networking opportunities, minority coaches would be offered the chance to lead teams in the Senior Bowl and East-West Shrine games. Most importantly, the efficacy of the initiatives and the resolutions would be continuously reviewed and revised to constantly improve them and consequently the NFL hiring process
Conclusion
I do not think anyone is under the illusion that after 100 years of an unfair NFL system, and centuries of institutional racism in this country, the problem of equal opportunity will magically be solved. It will take constant vigilance and work. It will take education and a willingness to change. It will take adjustment. It may take more time than one would prefer. But “perfect cannot be the enemy of better,” and unless we are bold and aggressive in the approach, we will be having the same conversation in 2021 and thereafter. That cannot happen!
Bob Wallace was a 35-year NFL front office executive who worked for the Cardinals, Eagles and Rams. He is currently the Chair of the Sports Law Group at Thompson Coburn LLP and a member of the Fritz Pollard Alliance Task Force. The opinions expressed herein are Mr. Wallace’s own.
