By Michael A. Ross, MS
On August 16th, 2018, Jannie Keith (Plaintiff) filed a lawsuit against the Talladega City Board of Education (Defendant). The Court examined the Plaintiff’s claims brought forth under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act based on the Board’s pay and termination decisions. Both the Plaintiff and Defendant sought summary judgement based on the aforementioned claims brought forth by Ms. Keith. Because Ms. Keith did not produce sufficient evidence to carry her burden of persuading the trier of fact that the Board intentionally discriminated against her, the Court denied Ms. Keith’s motion and granted the Board’s motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ms. Keith began working for the defendant in 1989, but the claims being brought forth in this specific lawsuit were implemented and occurred between the beginning of the 2009-2010 school year and ended during the 2016-2017 school year. From 2009-2013, Keith was employed as a teacher, coach of various athletic teams and served as the assistant athletic director within the school system. For her athletic duties, Keith and all other faculty serving within the athletic department received supplemental pay for their services. The supplemental pay was formulated by the Board at least in part based on the coach’s teaching contract. For high participation/attendance sports, the board would pay a coach a monthly amount as a coaching supplement in addition to paying the coach an extra month or months of teaching pay. This calculation took into consideration the employee’s teaching contract length. The standard teaching contract during this time was nine months while administrative roles were awarded 12-month contracts. For smaller participation/attendance-based sports a fixed annual supplement was awarded to coaches. The court referred to this structure as the old schedule.
Beginning in 2009-2010, the board would implement a new supplement pay scale, which will be referenced as the new schedule. The new schedule established fixed annual supplements based on specific sports being coached. For reference, both the men’s and women’s head basketball coaches received an annual supplement of $8,000. This new supplement structure acted independently of the individual’s teaching contract. At the beginning of this school year, the Board allowed coaches who had been present during the old schedule to elect whether they would continue operating under the old schedule’s policies, or if they would like to adopt the policies established within the new schedule pay structure. It is also noted that the Board paid $3,225 annually to the athletic director and assistant athletic director under both the old and new schedules.
Charles Miller served as the athletic director of Talladega High School from 2009-2010 until the 2012-2013 school year in which he signed an 11-month contract during that tenure. During this same timeframe, Mr. Miller served as the head varsity boys’ basketball coach and golf coach. During the beginning of the 2013-2014 school year, Miller transitioned from his former role to assistant principal and acquired a 12-month contract. As a part of this transition, the Board mandated that Miller vacate his role as athletic director and golf coach while still permitting him to remain as head varsity boys’ basketball coach. As the basketball coach position was still a supplemental pay position, regarding compensation Miller elected to remain on the old schedule and would do so until the start of the 2016-2017 school year.
Ms. Keith served as Miller’s assistant athletic director during his tenure and assumed his position after his transition into the assistant principal role in 2013. While assuming the athletic director position, Keith elected to receive her compensation from the new schedule structure. It was documented that the Board paid Ms. Keith an additional $1,536.28 to transition to the new schedule on February 26, 2014. Ms. Keith would not begin receiving the aforementioned annual $8,000 supplement for the varsity girls’ basketball coaching position until transition from the old schedule. Mr. Miller, in addition to the newly acquired administrative role, would receive $9,166.70 in supplemental pay annually under the old schedule structure to coach boys’ varsity basketball until the 2016-2017 school year in which the Board mandated that all coaches transition to the new schedule structure. Mr. Miller’s supplement was reduced to $8,000 annually after the mandated change occurred in 2016-2017.
The court highlighted that neither party had provided detailed information that explained how the Board determined Ms. Keith’s and Mr. Miller’s supplemental pay under the old schedule or how the old schedule’s complicated relationship with teacher pay was determined and integrated efficiently. Because of the complexity and confusion created by the old schedule structure, the court relied on details provided by both parties and formulated a working graph for the information acquired to better document and understand the supplemental pay awarded to Ms. Keith and Mr. Miller between the 2009-2010 and 2013-2014 school years.
Ms. Keith served as athletic director until September 1, 2016, in which the board named her replacement, Mr. Terry Roller. During Ms. Keith’s tenure as athletic director, she was not given an assistant athletic director like her predecessor. Mr. Roller was not compensated for his service as athletic director, but it was made known that a Board member did suggest that he should receive a $7,000 annual supplement for his services. Per Mr. Roller’s request, this suggestion never came to fruition and no compensation was awarded. In 2013, Ms. Keith began speaking to various parties expressing concern about her supplemental pay after her promotion to athletic director. Notable parties such as union representative, Charmaine Lewis, the Talladega City Schools’ superintendent and the Talladega High School bookkeeper were all contacted by Ms. Keith, and all informed her that no problems existed within her compensation package. Two months after her termination as athletic director, Ms. Keith filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Ms. Keith alleged that the Board violated Title VII and the Equal Pay Act in setting her compensation. No retaliation was alleged by Ms. Keith in her EEOC charge. In March of 2017, Ms. Keith was terminated from her position as varsity softball coach after a controversial social media post was made insinuating that she was cheering for a rival school against her current employer in previous months. The result of this action was documented by the Board as upsetting to the community members, board members, coaches, and students. No evidence was submitted or insisted by Ms. Keith to suggest a second EEOC charge had been filed after the Board terminated her position as softball coach.
A right-to-sue letter was awarded to Ms. Keith by the EEOC in May of 2018. Ms. Keith did not receive a right-to-sue letter from the United States Attorney General as required by federal statue 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Keith would follow up this action by filing a lawsuit.She would assert claimsfor
gender discrimination under Title IX and Title VII; A Title VII claim for hostile work environment; A Title VII claim for retaliation based on her termination as athletic director and softball coach; a claim for pay discrimination based on her pay as basketball coach and athletic director, which she apparently brought under both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act; and a claim for quantum meruit. But she did not cite or otherwise refer to the Equal Pay Act in her compliant.
The court would dismiss all counts except for the Title VII gender discrimination claim and the pay discrimination claim which survived to be reviewed by the court at the summary judgement stage. Her Title IX claim was dismissed on preemption grounds; her hostile work environment claims because she failed to allege facts stating such a claim; her retaliation claims because she failed to list retaliation in the EEOC charge; and her quantum meruit claim on sovereign immunity grounds.
Both parties moved for summary judgement. Ms. Keith moved for summary judgment on her Title VII claim because she served as an athletic director and received the same pay as Mr. Miller but was not awarded an assistant athletic director as he was, and because Mr. Roller was offered $7,000 in compensation to serve as athletic director. Summary judgement was also sought by Ms. Keith through her Equal Pay Act claim, because Mr. Miller received greater compensation for coaching boys’ basketball between 2013-2016 than she received for the same position coaching the girls during the same timeframe. She also requested summary judgement under the Equal Pay Act based on the compensation the Board paid her to work as athletic director. The Board moved for summary judgement on Ms. Keith’s Title VII claim because she never received a right-to-sue letter from the U.S. Attorney General as required by law. The Board also insisted that some of Ms. Keith’s compensation-based claims were time-barred. They also insisted that Keith could not make a prima facie case of the Title VII pay discrimination as it applied to her athletic director or basketball pay claims. The Board also argued that Keith could not prove that the Board’s proffered reasons for terminating her as a softball coach were pretextual under Title VII. Finally, the Board opposed Ms. Keith’s request for summary judgement regarding her Equal Pay Act claim because the Board reasoned that she never asserted a claim under the Equal Pay Act.
CASE ANAYLSIS AND KEY FACTORS
Summary judgement allows the trial court to decide cases that present no genuine issues or material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. The moving party always bears the initial burden of proof which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is a material issue of fact present that precludes summary judgement. It is also stated that the court must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden to determine if the evidence presented by the non-moving party is valid enough for a jury to reasonably conclude that the non-moving party could defeat the motion. It is also stated that the court must view all evidence and inferences drawn from underlying facts in a more favorable manner towards the non-moving party. Because this case presents cross-motions for summary judgement, it is noted that the summary judgement standard stands constant. Each motion must be considered independently as it has been presented by the party requesting summary judgement based on its own merits.
Regarding the issue surrounding the need to have an Attorney General’s right-to-sue letter, the court confirmed that Ms. Keith did not have the proper documentation required but confirmed that she had taken proactive measures in acquiring the EEOC right-to-sue letter. Relying on precedential frameworks and cases, the court determined that such actions resulted in Ms. Keith from appropriately invoking the equitable waiver doctrine. It is noted that the court will equitably waive the Attorney General’s right-to-sue requirement, in place of the EEOC letter because refusal to do so would penalize Ms. Keith for merely following a course of conduct prescribed by the federal agency charged with administering the Civil Rights Act. The court will eventually grant the Board summary judgement of the merits of Ms. Keith’s claims but not on the basis of the aforementioned procedural grounds.
As previously mentioned, the Board did not request for summary judgement on Ms. Keith’s Equal Pay Act claim because she did not cite the act in her complaint and because of this, the Board argued that her claim should be denied because she had not properly brought one in this case. Regarding the compensation of her serving as the girls’ basketball coach, the court supported such a justification on behalf of the Board and denied Ms. Keith’s motion based on the understanding she did not have such a claim properly established before the court. The court also granted summary judgement to the Board in regard to Ms. Keith’s Equal Pay Act claim addressing her pay as athletic director and the conditions considering Mr. Miller and Mr. Roller previously stated. The court’s reasoning behind this decision was that the record displayed that the claim fails as a matter of law. Ms. Keith failed to establish a basis that equal work was being conducted and that the Board had created a disservice by not allowing an assistant athletic director or other grounds displaying a clear violation in unequal pay based on gender. The wording in the claim presented by Ms. Keith referenced pay discrimination and not specific inequalities based on wages of a specific title. Because the court found this related to her additional coaching roles and not specifically to the athletic director comparison to Mr. Miller and the fact it was not met with additional clarification and supporting information, the court deemed the pay for additional coaching responsibilities in this light abandoned. In summation, Ms. Keith’s motion for summary judgement pertaining to her athletic director pay-based Equal Pay Act claim was denied and summary judgement was granted for the Board because Ms. Keith failed to designate specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial.
In reference to the time-bar claims posed by the Board, Ms. Keith was found to have filed her EEOC claim of Title VII pay discrimination after the required one-hundred-and-eighty-days granted after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. By relying on this legislation, the court deemed the Board would be granted summary judgement based on these findings because the one-hundred-and-eighty-day timeframe granted for Ms. Keith to file a valid claim started anew once each paycheck was issued to her under the structure in question. As the structure in question was identified as the old schedule structure, her final timeframe began when she received her final paycheck prior to her promotion as athletic director and before she elected to change from the old schedule to the new schedule. Her documented claim regarding this issue was not made until over two years after the one-hundred-and-eighty-day window had expired. Unfortunately for Ms. Keith, time, existing legislation, and procedure did not work in her favor addressing this particular claim. Similar issues and results were found within the claims brought forth by Ms. Keith concerning her payment as athletic director and the working conditions surrounding those circumstances, her payment while serving as basketball coach in comparison with Mr. Miller’s, and her termination as softball coach from Talladega High School. Despite the evidence and documentation, she presented, Ms. Keith was unable to provide valid evidence that the Board acted in an unjust manner or that their actions warranted discrimination claims.
CONCLUSION
Expressed within this case and found to be common with many employment and discrimination cases, the court stated that neither party had fully explained the Board’s actions in their entirety. Because of the current legislation and relying on precedential framework that was applicable to the claims stated by Ms. Keith and the Board, the burden of proof fell upon Ms. Keith to satisfy the McDonnell/Burdine framework. It was her responsibility to provide evidence in which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the Board acted with discriminatory animus toward her. Because she was unable to bring such evidence to the court, the court denied Ms. Keith’s motion for summary judgement and granted the Board’s motion for summary judgement. The court entered summary judgement on behalf of the Board and against Ms. Keith on all claims listed within this case.
References
Keith v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., No. 1:18-CV-01311-KOB, 2021 U.S. Dist. 913481, at *(N.D. AL. Mar. 10, 2021)
Michael A. Ross is the Department Chair and an Assistant Professor of Sport Management at Shorter University and a PhD student at Troy University specializing in research related to youth sport studies, leadership, sport law, social media policies and procedures within athletics and participation motivations in sport and recreation.
