The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed, in part, a district court’s ruling that dismissed the claim of a former coach, who had claimed he was discriminated against because he had supported an investigation into whether his employer had violated Title IX, the gender equity law.
Specifically, the court found that the statute of limitations had expired on plaintiff Charles Moore’s Title IX claim. It also dismissed his argument that supervisor liability had come in to play in the case.
Moore was a basketball coach and math teacher at Ninety Six High School in the Greenwood School District from 1992 through 2002. In May 2000, some parents of student athletes complained to the Office of Civil Rights of the United States Department of Education that Greenwood discriminated against female athletes in its interscholastic athletic program in the areas of locker rooms, practice, competitive facilities, equipment, supplies, coaching and scheduling of games and practice times.
Moore went public with his belief that the women’s athletic program was intentionally discriminated against and that Greenwood was aware of his beliefs and his support for the women’s softball and basketball coach. The OCR interviewed Moore and ultimately concluded that Greenwood did not provide “equivalent benefits, opportunities, and treatment to female students at Ninety Six High School.”
Moore alleged his coaching contract was not renewed based on those comments and his participation in the OCR investigation.
He then filed his own complaint with the OCR.
“After an investigation,” wrote the court, “the OCR found Moore participated in protected activity; the Defendants had knowledge of his protected activity; the Defendants took adverse action against Moore when his coaching contract was terminated; there was a connection between Moore’s protected activity and the adverse action; and the Defendants lacked a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for their actions. Thus, the OCR determined Greenwood retaliated against Moore in violation of Title IX.”
Moore filed his lawsuit almost two years later, alleging the following causes of action: a Title IX retaliation claim against Greenwood; a First Amendment free speech claim against Greenwood and the individual Defendants, in their official and individual capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against Greenwood, Cobb, and Owings, pursuant to § 1983; a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against Greenwood, Cobb and Owings, pursuant to § 1983; and various state law claims.
The district court dismissed Moore’s complaint with prejudice.
On appeal, Moore challenged (1) the district court’s dismissal of his Title IX retaliation claim as untimely filed and (2) the district court’s dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claim against the individual defendants based on qualified immunity, or alternatively, because [*5] Moore did not allege sufficient facts to state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983.
As support for his claim that Title IX provides a private right of action for retaliation, Moore cited Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 125 S. Ct. 1497, 161 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2005), in which a school district employee who claimed the school district retaliated against him for reporting Title IX violations was entitled to file a private cause of action against the district. The defendant did not degree on that point, but did argue that the statute of limitations had expired.
Moore argued “that the applicable statute of limitations in Title IX cases should be the general state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which is two years in South Carolina.”
The appeals court disagreed, writing that “the State Human Affairs Law is the more analogous law in this case, and the district court correctly applied SCHAL’s one-year statute of limitations instead of the two-year limitations period applicable to personal injury actions.”
Next, the appeals court turned to the second argument “that the individual Defendants in their individual capacities are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). Moore alleges that he made statements concerning discrimination and funding issues that were of public concern, and that the Defendants retaliated against him based on those statements.”
The panel sided with the defendant, finding that “the single incident of upholding and ratifying Defendant Doolittle’s decision not to renew Moore’s coaching contract is insufficient as a matter of law to establish supervisory liability. Moore has not alleged that it was customary for Defendant Doolittle to restrict the First Amendment rights of the coaches or teachers, nor has Moore alleged even a single prior instance by Defendant Doolittle or any other official at the high school analogous to his present claim.”
Charles S. Moore v. Greenwood School District NO. 52 et al.; 4th Cir.; No. 05-1303, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21222; 8/18/06
Attorneys of Record: Charles S. Moore, Appellant, Pro se. (for appellees) Andrea Eaton White, Duff, Dubberly, Turner, White & Boykin, L.L.C., Columbia, South Carolina; Andrew Elliott Haselden, William George Besley, Howser, Newman & Besley, L.L.C., Columbia, South Carolina.
