The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has injected new life into a University of Georgia coed’s accusation that she was sexually assaulted by two of the school’s student athletes in 2002.
Specifically, the appeals court reversed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment for the University of Georgia and the University of Georgia Athletic Association on the plaintiff’s Title IX claim and deny her leave to amend her complaint.
Plaintiff Tiffany Williams had claimed that she was sexually assaulted in January 2002 by University of Georgia basketball player Steven Thomas and football player Brandon Williams in an on-campus dorm room. Criminal charges were filed, but Brandon Williams was found not guilty, while the charge against Thomas was subsequently dropped.
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a civil suit, naming the university, UGA President Michael Adams, then-athletic director Vince Dooley and former basketball coach Jim Harrick as defendants. Among other things, Williams claimed that the university’s policies violated Title IX, and that the failure of the university to take appropriate remedial actions led to her withdrawal from the university.
Central to the plaintiff’s claim was that Tony Cole, a University of Georgia basketball player who had facilitated the sexual assault on behalf of his friends, had had disciplinary and criminal problems at other colleges, prior to transferring the Georgia and that the individual defendants should have known about it. She also argued that the institutional defendants had a policy in place against sexual harassment that it failed to enforce,
The federal judge overseeing the case found that the plaintiff’s allegation that the university fostered a discriminatory environment that resulted in her being sexually assaulted by the student-athletes to be “wholly unsupported,” dismissing her claim.
Williams appealed, raising four specific issues — whether the district court erred in: (1) denying Williams’s motion to amend her complaint; (2) dismissing her Title IX claims; (3) dismissing her § 1983 claims; and (4) dismissing her claim for injunctive relief.
Addressing the first issue, the appeals court held that she should have been allowed to amend her complaint, since, at the time of her request, only one of the defendants, Thomas, had filed a responsive pleading.
On the second issue, the district court had found that the plaintiff was unable to meet the deliberate indifference requirement of the Title IX cause of action, and thus dismissed the Title IX claim.
In its review, the appeals court started by noting that under “certain narrow circumstances, a plaintiff may be able to recover for student-on-student harassment. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 143 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1999).”
In such instances, “a plaintiff seeking recovery for a violation of Title IX based on student-on-student harassment must prove four elements.
“First, defendant must be a Title IX funding recipient. Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802, 119 S. Ct. 33, 142 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999).
“Second, an ‘appropriate person’ must have actual knowledge of the discrimination or harassment the plaintiff alleges occurred. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290, 118 S. Ct. 1989, 141 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1998).
“Third, a funding recipient is liable for student-on-student harassment only if ‘the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities.’ Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
“Fourth, the discrimination must be ‘so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.’ Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.”
The panel carefully reviewed the applicability of the elements.
“The parties agree that UGA is a funding recipient properly subject to Title IX liability. Although UGAA disputes that it is a funding recipient, we believe that Williams has presented sufficient facts at this stage to show that we should treat UGAA as a funding recipient. Here, Williams has alleged that UGA, a funding recipient, has ceded control over one of its programs, the athletic department, to UGAA and provided extensive funding to UGAA. Notably, the Court has not resolved whether this is sufficient to make an entity a funding recipient subject to Title IX liability. NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470-71, 119 S. Ct. 924, 142 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1999); see also Alston v. Va. High Sch. League, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 526, 531 (W.D. Va. 1999).
Schools Can’t ‘Cede Control’ To Avoid Title IX Liability
“We are persuaded, however, by the analysis of the Western District of Michigan, noting that if we allowed funding recipients to cede control over their programs to indirect funding recipients but did not hold indirect funding recipients liable for Title IX violations, we would allow funding recipients to receive federal funds but avoid Title IX liability. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 80 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733-34 (W.D. Mich. 2000). We hold that Williams’s complaint sufficiently alleges this element, and we leave for the discovery process and the district court to determine whether to treat UGAA like a funding recipient.
“As to the second element, we agree with Williams that an “appropriate person” at both UGA and UGAA had actual knowledge of the harassment. According to Williams, Adams, the President of UGA and UGAA, and Dooley, the Athletic Director of UGAA, had actual knowledge of the three forms of discrimination or harassment that Williams allegedly faced: (1) Cole’s recruitment and admission despite his past misconduct at several other schools; (2) the January 14, 2002 incident involving Cole, Brandon Williams, and Thomas; and (3) UGA’s lax treatment of student-on-student harassment and UGAA’s failure to discuss sexual harassment policies and procedures with student-athletes. Additionally, Williams has sufficiently alleged – and Adams and Dooley do not dispute – that Adams and Dooley had authority to take corrective measures for UGA and UGAA to end the alleged discrimination.”
The above findings led to the court’s consideration of the final two elements of a Title IX cause of action: “Were UGA and UGAA Deliberately Indifferent to the Alleged Discrimination and Was the Discrimination Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive?
On the third element, the appeals court concluded that Williams’s “allegations that: (1) the defendants admitted Cole despite their knowledge of his past misconduct; (2) UGA responded sluggishly to Williams’s allegations; and (3) the defendants failed to implement effective procedures for dealing with student-on-student harassment and informing student-athletes about the defendants’ policies are sufficient to meet Williams’s burden on a motion to dismiss to show that she faced discrimination or harassment and that the defendants reacted with deliberate indifference.” The appeals court also affirmed the fourth element with ease, given the “details” of the case.
Next, the panel revisited the court’s decision to dismiss Williams’s § 1983 claims against individual defendants as well as the UGA and the Board of Regents. In each case, the court affirmed the defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Finally, it addressed the issue of whether the trial court erred in dismissing Williams’s claim for injunctive relief. Specifically, Williams had sought an injunction “ordering UGA and the Board of Regents to implement sexual harassment policies providing for:
(1) notice to students, parents of elementary and secondary students, and employees of the procedure, including where the complaints may be filed; (2) application of the procedure to complaints alleging harassment carried out by employees, other students, or third parties; (3) adequate, reliable, and impartial investigation of complaints, including the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence; (4) designated and reasonably prompt timeframes for the major stages of the complaint process; (5) notice to the parties of the outcome of the complaint; and (6) an assurance that the school will take steps to prevent recurrence of any harassment and to correct its discriminatory effects on the complainant and others, if appropriate – – as required by and in accordance with 62 Fed. Reg. 12044.”
The district court rejected Williams’s claims because she lacked standing. “We agree with the district court’s reasoning and hold that Williams lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief because the threat of future harm to Williams and other students is merely conjectural,” wrote the appeals court.
In summary, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings on Williams’s Title IX claims against UGA and UGAA and to allow Williams to file her first amended complaint in its entirety.
Williams v. Board of Regents of The University System Of Georgia et al.; 11th Cir.; No. 04-13800; 3/9/06
