A federal judge from the Eastern District of California has left the proverbial door open for a game official to pursue a federal claim of discrimination against a school district. However, the court closed the door on the plaintiff’s two state law claims, granting the school district’s respective motions to dismiss.
Game official James M. Lanier alleged racially discriminatory attitudes and conduct by school officials within the Clovis Unified School District, which purportedly prevented him from equal access to sports officiating contracts over a period of time. His claim, which was lodged on September 23, 2011, was made pursuant to Title 42 of the United States Code section 2000d, and two state law claims.
The school district and the individual defendants moved to dismiss the claim. In considering the motion, the court noted that when a plaintiff represents him or herself, making them a pro se litigant, then dismissal of a claim is only proper when “it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend would be futile.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
The plaintiff’s first cause of action contends that CUSD is a recipient of certain federal funds, and that “CUSD has failed to provide the plaintiff with an equal opportunity to obtain sports officiating contracts due to CUSD’s racially-discriminatory practices.”
The court noted that Section 2000d, of Title 42 of the United States Code provides:
“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Congress has abrogated States’ sovereign immunity for ‘violations [of Title VI] that occur in whole or in part after October 12, 1986.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000d7(b) (Supp. 1987). ‘The two elements for establishing a cause of action pursuant to Title VI are: (1) that the entity involved is engaging in racial or national origin discrimination, and (2) the entity involved is receiving federal financial assistance.’ Jackson v. Conway, 746 F.Supp. 896, 903 (E.D. Missouri 1979).
After satisfying the first point, the court considered the plaintiff’s allegation that “CUSD has failed to treat the plaintiff equally ‘because of his race, African-American, and because of his color, black.’ The plaintiff also contends this practice has continued from 2004 to the present, and contends that CUSD board members acted unfairly and improperly by awarding officiating contracts only to non-black persons, constituting unlawful race discrimination.
“Construing the plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally, the plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim against CUSD for a violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”
The state law claims reaped a different result, primarily because of the application of the Eleventh Amendment and its immunity provisions. “The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that ‘the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State,’” wrote the court. “The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against a state by its own citizens or citizens of other states. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991).”
The court went on to write that CUSD “is a public school district in California, and thus, it is an arm of the state, and is shielded from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment, as are its board members.”
The court went on to dismiss the claim without leave to amend, “as amendment would be futile.”
Next, the court considered the plaintiff’s third claim for a “Violation of Continuous violations doctrine against Defendant CUSD. 79 Cal.App.4th 570”.
It wrote that “even assuming CUSD continues to fail to provide the plaintiff an opportunity to obtain sports officiating contracts because of his race and color, a separate cause of action does not arise under the continuing violations doctrine.”
In sum, the instant claims “are asserted more than 2 years after the date of accrual of the claim and so are time-barred under California’s applicable statute of limitations.”
James M. Lanier v. Clovis Unified School District; E.D. Cal.; 1:11-cv-01613 LJO GSA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126703; 11/2/11.
