A federal judge has ruled for a school district in a case in which the district and several officials were sued by a student athlete, who claimed that a haircut policy violated his rights when it prevented him from playing for his middle school basketball team.
In short, the court found that one aspect of the plaintiff’s claim was moot since he could no longer play for the team, while the second part of the claim, which sought to bar the school for dismissing the plaintiff from the high school team, was premature.
This case arose after A.H., the son of plaintiffs Patrick Hayden and Melissa Hayden, was removed from the Greensburg Junior High School boy’s basketball team because he did not comply with an unwritten haircut policy that required him to wear his hair above his ears and collar.
The plaintiffs sued, alleging that the defendants’ removal of A.H. from the basketball team for failing to comply with the haircut policy violated his right to equal protection and his right to procedural and substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
They named the following as defendants: the Greensburg Community School Corporation; Greensburg Community School Board Members Lisa Tressler, David Weigel, Valerie Moorman, Dave Meyer, Al Moore, Tony Owens, and Steve Taylor; the superintendent of Greensburg Community Schools, Tom Hunter ; the principal of Greensburg Junior High School, Dave Strouse; the assistant principal and athletic director of Greensburg Junior High School, Debbie Smith; and Greensburg varsity boys basketball team head coach, Stacy Meyer.
At the time, plaintiff’s attorney Ron Frazier told the media: “It seems like there were actions directly taken by the school administration to punish the Hayden family for challenging the policy. At that point they just wanted to have a discussion, and if a system is so broken that you can’t even discuss the policies and the discipline, then lawsuits have to be filed. You should be able to walk into school and talk to administrators about policies that affect your children. Every parent wants that.”
In considering the motion for an injunction, the court wrote that the plaintiffs’ argument that sought “to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the haircut policy as it applied to A.H. during the 2010-2011 basketball season was moot.
“Legal claims are moot when they no longer present a case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Cornucopia Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 560 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2009). The test for mootness is ‘whether the relief sought, if granted, would make a difference to the legal interests of the parties . . . .’ Air Line Pilots Ass’n Intern. v. UAL Corp., 897 F.2d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S. Ct. 402, 30 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1971)). Since the 2010-2011 basketball season has passed, there is nothing for the court to enjoin, and, thus, no live case or controversy. Tobin for Governor v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 528 (7th Cir. 2001) (‘A case is moot when it no longer presents a live case or controversy’ (citations omitted)).
To the extent that the plaintiffs seek to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the haircut policy on A.H. during future basketball seasons, the plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe. Legal claims are ripe under Article III when the alleged harm has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention, focusing on whether parties face direct and immediate harm. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). In other words, when a claim is brought too early it is unripe for adjudication. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, a series of events must occur before the haircut policy would apply to A.H.: (1) A.H. must enroll and be accepted back into the School District; (2) A.H. must maintain his hair at a length that violates the haircut policy; (3) A.H. must try out for, and make, the basketball team; and (4) the coach must remove A.H. from the basketball team for failing to comply with the haircut policy. Too many steps must occur to justify constitutional adjudication. See id.; see also Crosetto v. State Bar of Wis., 12 F.3d 1396, 1403 (7th Cir. 1993) (‘Before a plaintiff may obtain an injunction against a future enforcement he must show some substantial hardship — the enforcement must be certain and the only impediment to the case’s ripeness is a delay before its eventual prosecution’ (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 39 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1974)).
Patrick Hayden and Melissa Hayden v. Greensburg Community School Corporation et al.; S.D. Ill.; 1:10-cv-1709-RLY-DML, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78799; 7/19/11
Attorneys or Record: (for plaintiffs) Ronald William Frazier, Thomas W. Blessing, FRAZIER & ASSOCIATES, Indianapolis, IN. (for defendants) Jason Thomas Clagg, William T. Hopkins, Jr., BARNES & THORNBURG, Fort Wayne, IN; Thomas E. Wheeler, II, FROST BROWN TODD LLC, Indianapolis, IN.
