A federal judge from the Northern District of California has dismissed a claim brought by a group of student-athletes, who alleged that the NCAA rule that governs the transfer of student-athletes from two-year schools to Division I colleges and universities was unconstitutional.
Specifically, the court determined that the claim fell “far short of negating every conceivable rational basis for the challenged bylaw.”
At issue was NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.5.4.2, which sets forth the eligibility requirements for certain student-athletes wishing to transfer from a two-year college to a four-year Division I college. At the time of matriculation from high school to college, each student-athlete is either a “qualifier” or a “non-qualifier” for Division I athletic scholarships, practice, and competition, based on his or her academic performance in high school. A qualifier is someone who has graduated high school, completed a certain number of core courses (including four years of English and three years of mathematics), and attained a minimum grade point average and SAT score. A non-qualifier is someone who has failed to meet one or more of those requirements.
If a non-qualifier attends a two-year college immediately after high school, but later wishes to transfer to a four-year Division I school and participate in Division I athletics, his or her eligibility for athletic scholarships and participation is determined by NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.5.4.2., which was amended in August 2009. Before amended, it required the student to have (1) graduated from the two-year college, (2) completed a minimum of 48 semester-hours or 72 quarter-hours of transferable degree credit, (3) spent at least three semesters or four quarters as a full-time student, and (4) achieved a grade point average of at least 2.0 on a four-point scale. The August 2009 amendment added the additional requirement that the student’s transferable degree credit earned at the two-year college must include (a) six semester-hours or eight quarter-hours of English credit and (b) three semester-hours or four quarter-hours of math credit (Walters Exh. B at 156-57). This additional requirement generally translates into two English classes and one math class. At the hearing, counsel stated that a waiver provision in the NCAA rules allows the requirements of Bylaw 14.5.4.2 to be waived as to specific individuals in certain circumstances.
If a non-qualifier attends a four-year college immediately after high school and later wishes to participate in a Division I athletic program, his or her eligibility is determined by different bylaws. To become eligible for athletic scholarships and participation, the student must complete one year in residence at the four-year school during which he or she earns a minimum amount of degree credits and achieves a minimum grade point average. No substantive curriculum requirements apply.
Similarly, if a qualifier attends a two-year college immediately after high school, yet another set of requirements govern his or her eligibility to participate in Division I athletics upon transfer to a four-year Division I school. The student must spend at least one semester or quarter as a full-time student at the two-year school, and he or she must earn a minimum amount of degree credit and achieve a minimum grade point average. The student, however, need not stay at the two-year school long enough to earn a degree, and no substantive curriculum requirements apply to the transferable credits earned there.
The plaintiffs in the instant case were a class of non-qualifier student-athletes who enrolled in two-year colleges, who desire a transfer to four-year Division I colleges, where they can participate in their athletic programs. However, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the academic requirements of Bylaw 14.5.4.2, making them ineligible for such a transfer.
Thus they sued the NCAA and several individual defendants, challenging the adoption and application of Bylaw 14.5.4.2 as violating both the United States Constitution and the California State Constitution. Specifically, they alleged that the bylaw impermissibly singles out and discriminates against non-qualifiers who attend two-year colleges, in violation of both the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution. The plaintiffs challenged three aspects of the bylaw: (1) the requirement that students spend at least three semesters as full-time students at the two-year college; (2) the requirement that they earn an associate’s degree from the two-year college; and (3) the requirement that they take a minimum number of English and math courses.
The defendants moved to dismiss, spawning the instant opinion.
The court noted that the parties agreed that the rational-basis review standard, rather than any heightened review standard, applied to the federal equal protection claim. In other words, the complaint must be pled with sufficient facts and inferences to make it plausible that Bylaw 14.5.4.2 is not rationally related to any conceivable legitimate purpose. “It does not,” wrote the court.
“The challenged bylaw concerns only those students who (a) emerged from high school as academic non-qualifiers, and (b) proceeded to two-year rather than four-year institutions of higher education. That students in this category should meet specific requirements to show they are equipped to succeed as student-athletes at four-year Division I schools is rational. As compared to qualifiers who initially attended two-year schools, these students had not yet proven their readiness to succeed as Division I student-athletes upon departure from high school. As compared to non-qualifiers who initially attended four-year schools, these students have not directly shown whether they can succeed academically at a four-year institution. Instead, they must prove themselves indirectly. The requirements of Bylaw 14.5.4.2 serve to identify those students who have done so.
“All three challenged aspects of the bylaw are rationally related to this legitimate purpose. The requirement that students spend at least three semesters as full-time students at the two-year college is rationally related to preparing for the demands of being a full-time rather than part-time student. The requirement that they take a minimum number of English and math courses is rationally related to acquiring the skills necessary to complete academic course work at a four-year college. The requirement that they earn an associate’s degree from the two-year college is rationally related to building a record of credentials.
“Plaintiffs vigorously attack the distinction between two-year and four-year schools, arguing that “a more expensive education is not always better”. Expense, and even quality of education, do not control the question at hand. Two-year and four-year institutions of higher learning have different missions, and offer different types of degrees and training. Many two-year schools are vocationally oriented, whereas four-year schools tend to be more academically oriented. Many two-year schools offer part-time enrollment programs, whereas four-year schools tend to require full-time study. Without attempting to compare the average cost and quality of the education offered by two-year and four-year institutions, this order finds that the educations they provide are different in kind, or so the NCAA could reasonably have found. Defendants’ distinction between two-year and four-year schools is rational.
“Plaintiffs also allege that the requirements of Bylaw 14.5.4.2 were adopted without ‘consideration of any studies or other analysis’ of their likely effect. As plaintiffs concede, however, a challenged measure need not be based on any factual findings or review of evidence in order to survive rational-basis review. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (noting that a legislative choice “may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data”). Moreover, as described above, the requirements of the challenged bylaw — including the newer English and math requirements — are rationally related to the legitimate purpose of ensuring that non-qualifier student-athletes who transfer into Division I programs from a two-year colleges are equipped for academic success.
“Plaintiffs emphasize that the students subject to Bylaw 14.5.4.2 tend to come from disadvantaged backgrounds. The complaint alleges that ‘[f]or many young women and men — a disproportionate number of whom are from communities of color or grew up in an at-risk environment — athletic-based financial aid provides their only chance for obtaining a college education.’ Because of their financial circumstances, ‘enrolling at junior college is their only option for continuing their education after high school and their last meaningful chance for success’ without an athletic scholarship. According to plaintiffs, the challenged bylaw places an unfair barrier between these students and a Division I athletic scholarship.
“It is true that the individuals plaintiffs describe face a difficult road to success. The Court is sympathetic to the many challenges they face. Such allegations of hardship, however, do not state an equal protection claim. They do not undermine the rational basis for the challenged bylaw. Furthermore, the NCAA bylaws explicitly do not prevent non-qualifiers from accepting need-based (as opposed to athletic-based) financial aid from Division I schools. In this respect, the bylaws leave these disadvantaged individuals with the same educational options as their peers who lack the good fortune of athletic talent.
Plaintiffs’ allegations fall far short of negating every conceivable rational basis for the challenged bylaw. As explained, this order rejects plaintiffs’ contention that the classifications created by the bylaw — whether students were academic qualifiers or non-qualifiers, and whether they attended two-or four-year institutions immediately after high school — are arbitrary. Also rejected is plaintiffs’ argument that the fit between the requirements of the challenged bylaw and its stated goal ‘is so imperfect that it undermines completely the credibility of the expressed goal.’ Plaintiffs’ theories as to why NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.5.4.2 violates the equal protection clause fail. Because the challenged bylaw does not violate the equal protection clause, the parties’ arguments concerning whether the NCAA is a state actor need not be reached.”
Reginald Davis et al. v. National Collegiate Athletic Association et al.; N.D.Calif.; No. C 11-01207 WHA; 6/24/11.
Attorneys of record: (for plaintiffs) Stephen Scott Walters, LEAD ATTORNEY, Bryan Lakeith Hawkins, Cathy Ann Hongola, Nicholas A. Subias, Robert Rory Moore, Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP, San Francisco, CA. (for NCAA defendant) Robert E. Sims, LEAD ATTORNEY, Debbie C Won, Latham & Watkins, LLP, San Francisco, CA; Brian E. Kowalski, James Scott Ballenger, PRO HAC VICE, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC. (for individual defendants) Denise A. Smith-Mars, Loeb & Loeb LLP, Los Angeles, CA. Darlene Mi-Hyung Cho, Denise A. Smith-Mars, Laura Ann Wytsma, Michael Lawrence Mallow, Loeb & Loeb LLP, Los Angeles, CA; Douglas N. Masters, PRO HAC VICE, Loeb & Loeb LLP, Chicago, IL.
