A district judge from the Middle District of Pennsylvania has adopted the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, granting summary judgment to Lock Haven University and Athletic Director Sharon E. Taylor, who were sued by a disgruntled former coach amid allegations of a hostile work environment and racial discrimination.
Plaintiff John Wilson, Jr. sued the defendants in 2009, alleging that he suffered adverse employment actions at the hands of the defendants based upon his race. “Notably,” wrote the court, Wilson “does not dispute that from 2002 to 2009 he received numerous sub-par performance reviews, based on, inter alia, the team’s win-loss record, the low grade point averages of his team members, various budgetary issues, including scholarships and fund-raising, and several documented NCAA rules violations.”
After the defendants moved for summary judgment, a magistrate judge agreed, finding that while the plaintiff stated a prima facie case for racial discrimination under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), the defendants “adequately rebutted the presumption of discrimination with legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, and that the the plaintiff has not produced any evidence tending to show the defendants’ reasons were pretext.”
On appeal, the plaintiff “reargued that the evidence already presented in the record before Magistrate Judge Prince shows that the defendants’ proffered reasons for terminating him were pretext,” wrote the district judge in the instant opinion.
“To be sure, the plaintiff has offered no direct evidence of discrimination, thus his task is to show that the defendants’ reasons were ‘weak, incoherent, implausible or so inconsistent that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.’ Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F. 3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F. 3d 1101, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1997)). Alternatively, the plaintiff may provide ‘evidence that the employer’s articulated reason was not merely wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it could not have been the employer’s real reason.’ Id. (quoting Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F. 3d 403, 413 (3d Cir. 1999)). Within his objections, just as in his brief in opposition to the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff makes only conclusory arguments that (he) was treated differently than non-African-American coaches and in doing so, (he) submits that the defendant, in making its decision to no longer employ the plaintiff, was motivated by discriminatory reasons rather than legitimate ones.’ Self-serving arguments such as these do not suffice to overcome the defendants’ multiple proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for, inter alia, not renewing the plaintiff’s employment contract.”
The district judge also noted that the plaintiff “does not object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that summary judgment be granted with respect to his hostile work environment claim. As discussed by (the magistrate judge), the burden for establishing a hostile work environment claim is high, and mere ‘offhanded comments’ or ‘isolated incidents’ are insufficient to sustain such a claim. Rather, the ‘conduct must be extreme enough to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.’ Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 141 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1998). We agree … that there is absolutely no evidence, direct or otherwise, of racially charged conduct that rises to the level of a hostile work environment.”
John Wilson, Jr. v. Lock Haven University, et al.,; M.D.Pa.; 4:09-cv-2566, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39639; 4/12/11
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Christian A. Lovecchio, LEAD ATTORNEY, Campana, Lovecchio & Morrone, P.C., Williamsport, PA. (for defendant)
Patrick S. Cawley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA.
