A federal judge has granted the request of a football player’s parents to remand their claim that the Kentucky High School Athletic Association “acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing” to grant an eligibility waiver to their son to a Kentucky state court.
In so ruling, the court found that the plaintiffs’ claim centers primarily on questions involving the Kentucky Constitution.
The student athlete, identified as W.L.D., played on the Danville High School football squad in the fall of 2009. He transferred to Boyle County High School on January 5, 2010 and sought to become a member of the football team.
On February 17, 2010, the KHSAA made the initial decision to deny a waiver of ineligibility under Bylaw 6, the “Transfer Rule.” The decision was appealed to a hearing officer, who recommended that the waiver of ineligibility be denied. The plaintiffs filed exceptions and requested a new hearing, which was denied. On June 14, 2010 KHSAA Commissioner DeVries issued a final order upholding the hearing officer’s recommendations.
The plaintiffs asked the Boyle Circuit Court to overturn the KHSAA ruling and enjoin the defendants from prohibiting their son from participating as a full member of the Boyle County High School football team and from otherwise interfering with his eligibility.
Relevant parts of the complaint read: “Pursuant to Section 11 and other applicable sections of the Kentucky Constitution, W is entitled to be protected from the arbitrary and capricious actions of the defendants and this action is brought to enjoin a denial of Plaintiff’s state and federal constitutional protections against such actions by the defendants.” Further, the complaint states the KHSAA decision “was arbitrary and capricious in violation of Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution and sound public policy.”
The defendant sought to remove the case to federal court, noting use of the word “federal” in the complaint.
In its analysis, the court noted that “Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint established either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Palkow v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2006), (quoting Franchise Tax Board v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 77 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1983)).
The court reviewing the request for remand wrote that “it is clear that Plaintiffs are not alleging that federal law creates their cause of action. No federal statute is ever mentioned.”
It added that the plaintiffs’ claim that the KHSAA and others acted arbitrarily in refusing to waive the Transfer Rule certainly “should be decided under state law and does not ‘necessarily’ require resolution of ‘a substantial question of federal law.’ The plaintiffs specifically relied upon two sections of the Kentucky Constitution and referenced the federal constitution only in passing.
“The burden was on the defendants to show that this Court would have original jurisdiction. The face of the plaintiffs’ complaint does not show any substantial federal question that is necessary or essential to resolution of his claim. It is the opinion of this court that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the case should be remanded to the Boyle Circuit Court.”
W.L.D., II et al., v. Kentucky High School Athletic Association; E.D.Ky. ; CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:10-CV-241-KSF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120208; 11/12/10
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiffs) Charles A. Grundy, Jr., Grundy Law Group, Lexington, KY. (for defendant) Chad Willis Collins, Kentucky High School Athletic Association, Lexington, KY; Jason Trent Ams, Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, PLLC – Lexington, Lexington, KY; Phillip D. Scott, Theodore Roberts Martin, Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, PLLC – Lexington, Lexington, KY.
