In a case of first impression, an Illinois appellate court has affirmed a trial court ruling that citizens have extensive latitude when it comes to pushing a school board for the dismissal of high school coach.
Specifically, it agreed with the lower court that the defendants had immunity under the Citizen Participation Act (the “Act”), 735 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (2008).
Steve Sandholm was hired as a teacher and head basketball coach at Dixon High School for the 1999-2000 school year. For the 2003-04 school year, he was also assigned the additional position of athletic director for Dixon High School.
Beginning in February 2008, a group of citizens started a campaign to have him removed as basketball coach and athletic director “due to their disagreement with his coaching style.” Initially, they approached principal Michael Grady, Superintendent James Brown, and members of the Dixon School District Board to complain about his coaching style and performance. When the board and school administration did not remove him from those positions, they continued to campaign against him, forming a group known as the “Save Dixon Sports Committee.” Eventually, the school board removed him as a coach, but retained him as an athletic director.
Sandholm sued the defendants, alleging defamation, false light, and tortious interference.
Count I, specifically, alleged defamation against Richard Kuecker, who published allegedly defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff’s abilities as a basketball coach and athletic director on the “Save Dixon Sports” Website. Among the statements was that the plaintiff “criticized athletes, badgered, humiliated, and bullied players, and was excessively abusive.” Sandholm alleged that Kuecker’s statements “imputed to plaintiff an inability to perform his job and/or a lack of integrity in the discharge of his duties; prejudiced plaintiff’s ability to perform his duties; and implied that he engaged in criminal activity.”
More than a dozen other counts implicated other individual defendants for defamation, as well as false light and tortious interference.
The defendants moved to dismiss on August 26, 2008, arguing that “the complaint should be dismissed for numerous reasons” and that the Act provided the most well-founded reason, according to the appellate court. “In reviewing the Act’s history, public policy, intent, and broad-reaching language, the trial court determined that the Act barred the plaintiff’s complaint. The trial court stated that the Act applied to any claim based on, related to, or in response to any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party’s rights to petition, speak, assemble, or otherwise participate in government. In this case, defendants first sought action at a school board meeting but were unhappy with the result. The defendants sought to gain support for their position by publicizing their grievances against the plaintiff, and their conduct did result in a reconsideration of the school board’s initial decision. … The trial court held that the Act barred the plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety. It dismissed all 25 counts of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint.”
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that: “(1) the Act deprives him of his constitutional right to remedies for his injuries; (2) the Act is unconstitutional because it violates the due process and equal protection clauses; (3) defendants’ conduct was not performed with the genuine aim of procuring favorable government action; and (4) the trial court failed to strike a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits and the constitutional rights of persons to petition and participate in the government.”
Siding with the defendants on the first point, the court wrote that the Act “provides protection for such statements only when made ‘in furtherance of the moving party’s rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government.’ The Act provides a qualified privilege, granting more protection for speech than the common law provides, when the speech occurs in the exercise of the right to participate in government. Thus, the legislature’s enactment of the Act cannot be said to violate section 12 of article I of the Illinois Constitution.”
The court also rejected the second argument on appeal, noting that the plaintiff “has not provided us with a valid argument to strike down the Act on constitutional grounds.”
Lastly, it lumped together the plaintiff’s last two arguments, which it noted involved “the applicability of the Act to the facts of this case. The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that the Act protected the defendants’ statements made outside the actual petition to the school board. Further, the trial court failed to strike a balance between the plaintiff’s right to file a lawsuit and the defendants’ right to participate in government. The defendants argue that the Act was written broadly enough that it applies to their statements made outside the petition and the school board meeting and that the trial court did not have the authority to give more weight to the plaintiff’s right to file a lawsuit. We agree with the defendants.”
Steve Sandholm v. Richard Kuecker et al.; App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist.; No. 2-09-1015, 2010 Ill. App. LEXIS 1095; 38 Media L. Rep. 2377; 10/18/10
Attorneys of Record: (for appellant) Stephen T. Fieweger, Katz, Huntoon & Fieweger, P.C., Moline, IL (for appellees) Richard E. Lieberman, Michael R. Lieber, Jacob P. Hildner, McGuireWoods LLP, Chicago, IL; Linda A. Giesen, Dixon & Giesen Law Offices, Dixon, IL; James W. Mertes, Magen J. Mertes, Mertes & Mertes, P.C., Sterling, IL; and Jeffrey J. Zucchi, Clark, Justen, Zucchi & Frost, Ltd., Rockford, IL.
