A federal judge from the District of New Mexico has dismissed all but one count of a coach’s claim that the New Mexico Activities Association (NMAA) improperly suspended him for his actions involving a potential student athlete.
Specifically, the court denied summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff’s allegation that the bylaw employed by the NMAA in suspending him was “unconstitutionally vague.”
Jerry D. Isler was the head coach of the boys’ basketball program and a science teacher at Clovis High School (CHS). In mid-July 2009, he received a call from Todd Lieb, the father of Lathan Lieb, a student at Dora High School who played for the school’s basketball team. Lieb informed the coach that he and his son were considering moving from Portales, New Mexico, to Clovis, New Mexico, which meant that Lathan would enroll at CHS.
While initially deciding to make the move, the Liebs changed their mind and opted to go to another school. After enrolling at the other school, the Liebs changed their mind again and sought to transfer to CHS.
The NMAA received a complaint regarding Lieb’s transfer, and commenced an investigation of the CHS basketball program. Based on the investigation, the NMAA determined that Isler had violated NMAA Bylaw 6.1.3(K) (Undue Influence), which prohibits “communication with student/parents by school personnel that might be construed as inducement for them to attend a particular school.” As a result of this determination, on December 16, 2009, the NMAA suspended the coach from all coaching duties at CHS for the remainder of the 2009-2010 school year. That same day, the Superintendent of the Clovis Municipal Schools, Dr. Rhonda Seidenwurm, advised Isler by letter that the Clovis School District was terminating his coaching duties as of January 13, 2010, and that, in the interim, he was suspended from all coaching duties.
On February 9, 2010, the plaintiff’s successfully secured an injunction, ordering the NMAA to allow Isler to coach for the remainder of the 2009-2010 season, including any post-season tournament games.
Isler ultimately reached a settlement with the Board of Education and Dr. Seidenwurm, and the court dismissed those defendants from the case on March 17, 2010. On April 13, 2011, he filed a third amended complaint against the NMAA for Violation of Civil Rights, seeking: a declaratory judgment and damages, including punitive damages, based on his allegations that NMAA Bylaw 6.1.3(K) is unconstitutionally vague and his allegations that the NMAA’s conduct in suspending him violates his right to freedom of association (Count I); an injunction enjoining the NMAA from suspending him as the CHS basketball coach (Count II); damages for the state law torts of defamation and tortious interference with contract (Counts III and IV); and damages for depriving him of his liberty interest in his good name and reputation without due process of law (Count V).
During the course of the litigation, the NMAA revised Bylaw 6.1.3(K), which the plaintiff agreed made it less unconstitutionally vague.
On October 17, 2011, each party moved for summary judgment in its favor. In response to the defendant’s motion, the plaintiff, who had since taken a college job, conceded that, because he is no longer employed by CHS and because the NMAA rule at issue has been revised, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Further, he conceded that his freedom of association claim is unsupported. Accordingly, he agreed to the dismissal of Count II (request for injunctive relief), the portion of Count I that requests a declaratory judgment, and the portion of Count I that seeks damages as a result of the NMAA’s alleged violation of his right to freedom of association. In his own motion, the plaintiff seeks judgment in his favor on the remaining portion of Count I (seeking damages based on the unconstitutional vagueness of NMAA Bylaw 6.1.3(K)), Count III (seeking damages based on defamation), and Count V (seeking damages for the violation of his due process rights).
The court turned first to the plaintiff’s claim that NMAA Bylaw 6.1.3(K) was unconstitutionally vague, and thus violated “the Due Process Clause, both because it fails to provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits, and because it is subject to arbitrary enforcement.” It also focused on whether NMAA “is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for punishing him pursuant to the unconstitutionally vague Bylaw” as alleged by the plaintiff.
One by one, the court eliminated the defendant’s arguments that the vagueness argument applied only to criminal statutes, that the claim is moot because the plaintiff has left CHS, and that the plaintiff does not have the requisite property or liberty interest at stake.
It reiterated its determination that the plaintiff “has demonstrated both that a reasonable person would not have foreseen that NMAA Bylaw 6.1.3 would be applied to his conduct, and that he was the victim of arbitrary enforcement practices. Accordingly, the plaintiff prevails on his due process challenge to NMAA Bylaw 6.1.3 as unconstitutionally vague.”
As for whether the NMAA’s “application of the unconstitutionally vague Bylaw subjects it to Section 1983 liability,” the court determined that the plaintiff “may recover only compensatory damages. The law is settled that ‘a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’ City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981).”
The court was more receptive to the NMAA’s argument that it was immune from the intentional tort claims (Counts III & IV).
Formed in 1921 for the purpose of regulating, directing, administering and supervising interscholastic activities in the State of New Mexico, the NMAA is a private/non-profit organization that “is so intertwined with the New Mexico Public Education Department that it has become an alter ego of the Department,” according to the court. “While the NMAA was not specifically created by statute, ‘it derives its status and authority from state law.’ Univ. Interscholastic League v. Sw. Officials Ass’n, Inc., 319 S.W.3d 952, 960
(Tex. Ct. App. 2010).”
For that reason and others highlighted by the court, the NMAA “is a governmental entity for purposes of the Tort Claims Act. As there is no waiver of immunity pursuant to the TCA for intentional torts under the circumstances here, the NMAA is immune from suit on Plaintiff’s claims for defamation and interference with contract.”
As for the final count that the oral and written statements of the NMAA “deprived the plaintiff of his liberty interest in his good name and reputation without due process of law,” the court found for the plaintiff, noting that the NMAA “did not make its alleged statements ‘in the course of terminating’ the plaintiff and the NMAA’s alleged statements did not ‘foreclose other employment opportunities.’”
Jerry D. Isler v. The New Mexico Activities Association; D.N.M.
No. 10-CV-009 MV/WPL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139889;9/20/12
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Warren F. Frost, PC, Logan, NM. (for defendant) Elizabeth L. German,, Albuquerque, NM; Terrill E. Pierce, German and Associates, Albuquerque, NM.
