A Texas appeals court has affirmed a lower court’s ruling that granted immunity to Potter County, Texas, which was sued by a baseball club after the county sought to terminate its lease with the club for unpaid rent.
Reunion Sports Group, which owns the Amarillo Dillas of the United League, had a lease with the county to use Potter County Memorial Stadium, now known as Amarillo National Bank Sox Stadium, to stage its baseball games. However, when the plaintiff started missing payments in the summer of 2010, the county moved to evict the team.
The Dillas sued on November 5, 2010, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. The request for declaratory relief “asked that the trial court declare that (1) the lease remains in effect unless the Dillas fail to pay the accrued rental after the County strictly complies with a paragraph of the lease; and (2) the purported termination of the lease by the county is not in compliance with the terms of the lease and is, therefore, void.”
The plaintiff sought “an opportunity to cure any breach and, for 180 days thereafter, (to enjoin) the County from entering into a lease with any other person or entity.”
The country successfully argued that it was entitled to governmental immunity, sparking an appeal in which the Dillas argued that section 89.004(c) of the Texas Local Government Code “waives governmental immunity. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 89.004(c) (West 2008).”
The appeals court noted that “both parties recognize that Potter County is a political subdivision of the State of Texas. Political subdivisions within the State of Texas enjoy governmental immunity, which protects them from lawsuits for damages. Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009). Governmental immunity involves two issues: whether the State has consented to suit, and whether the State has accepted liability. Id. Immunity from suit is jurisdictional and bars suit. Id. A statute shall not be construed to waive immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034 (West Supp. 2012).”
The plaintiff argued that section 89.004(c) “contains the clear and unambiguous language that will lead to the conclusion that the legislature intended to waive immunity in the situation before the court. The language keyed in on by the Dillas is contained in the first sentence of subsection (c) and is as follows, ‘A person may file suit for injunctive relief against a county.’ § 89.004(c). According to the Dillas, this sentence clearly establishes permission to file suit. The Dillas’ analysis begins with an investigation of the use of the word ‘may’ which, under the Dillas’ analysis, must be interpreted to mean permission pursuant to the Code Construction Act. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.016(1) (West 2005). Accordingly, the portion of the statute at issue must be read as ‘A person [is permitted to] file suit for injunctive relief against a county.’ This, then, satisfies the requirement for legislative permission under the Dillas’ first theory.
“However, this analysis overlooks some very important keys to statutory construction. First, ‘our objective is to determine and give effect to the [l]egislature’s intent.’ Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 283 S.W.3d at 842. We look to the plain meaning of the statute’s words, while reviewing the statute as a whole and not just selected portions. Id.”
Taking the approach, the court found that the statute “established a presentment requirement as a condition precedent to suit. The exception for the filing for injunctive relief set forth in Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 89.004(c) (2008) contained no language that the court could view as express legislative permission to file suit for injunctive relief against a county.
“In the final analysis, the language of the statute is clear to this Court. From that language, we do not conclude that the legislature has made a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity.”
Amarillo ‘Dillas Baseball Club, LLC v. Potter County, Texas; Court of Appeals of Texas, 7th Dist., Amarillo; NO. 07-11-00059-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 8539; 10/11/12
Attorneys of Record: John Bryant, Attorney at Law, Dallas, TX.; C. Scott Brumley, Potter County Attorney, Amarillo, TX.; John Mozola, Richard Biggs, Mullin Hoard & Brown, L.L.P., Amarillo, TX.
