A federal judge from the Northern District of Mississippi has denied summary judgment to a country club, which sought to dismiss an age discrimination claim brought by one of its tennis directors after he was fired.
“Although a very close question, a reasonable juror could conclude that (the plaintiff’s) age, rather than (the defendant’s) stated reasons, was the true motivation for (the plaintiff’s) termination,” wrote the court.
By way of background, the court noted that Tupelo Country Club (TCC) is a member-owned, non-profit country club located in Tupelo, Mississippi. TCC is governed by a board of directors selected from its membership. The board hires a general manager who is in charge of managing the day-to-day operations of the club, including staffing. Walter Curtis Brown was hired in 1990 as TCC’s head tennis professional, and he worked in this position until his eventual termination in March of 2010. During Brown’s tenure, he worked under several different general managers. In 2007, TCC hired Wray Crippin as general manager of the club. Crippin testified that, as general manager, he possessed full authority over employment decisions regarding staff members and did not need board approval to terminate an employee.
Crippin became dissatisfied with Brown’s management of the tennis program at TCC. According to Crippin, he was concerned about the low level of play on the courts at TCC, as well as Brown’s lack of initiative in creating new programs to attract member interest in tennis. Further, Crippin received complaints from members about Brown’s failure to enforce the club’s guest policy. According to Crippin, Brown allowed non-members to use the club facilities without paying a guest fee and showed favoritism to certain members. In October 2009, Crippin, along with then-president of the board Mark Shelton, met with Brown to discuss these concerns. This meeting was memorialized by a note placed in Brown’s personnel file, although Brown claims he was never shown the note.
In March of 2010, Crippin made the decision to terminate Brown. Prior to terminating Brown, Crippin informed the board of his decision. Crippin testified that this was purely informative and no vote was required nor taken regarding the decision. On March 26, 2010, Brown was called into a meeting with Crippin and Paula Fuqua, another club employee. Crippin allegedly informed Brown that, “I have a new vision for the tennis program, and it’s not gonna include you. We won’t be needing you any longer.”
Brown asked Crippin whether he had done anything wrong and Crippin allegedly responded, “no.” Brown then accused Crippin of wanting to replace him with a younger tennis professional, and Crippin responded by stating, “We’re not going to discuss your tenure.” At the time of his termination, Brown was 59 years old and the oldest department head working for the club. Brown was eventually replaced by Kevin Jackson, a much younger tennis professional.
Shortly after his termination, Brown and his wife, Melinda Seitz (who, though not an employee of TCC, helped Brown run the club’s tennis shop), met with the president of the TCC board, Matt McCarty, to find out why Brown was fired. According to Seitz, McCarty was very sympathetic, and told him them that “Curtis had not done anything wrong . . . the members loved him,” and that the same thing had happened to his mother, that “one day they let her go because they thought she was too old and they wanted to hire some young people.”
After filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, Brown sued on January 21, 2011, alleging that he was terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
To prove an ADEA claim, “a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial), that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 174 L. Ed. 2d 119 (2009). In this case, Brown claims to possess both direct and circumstantial evidence that he was terminated because of his age. “Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.” Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 309 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Since the claim was based on circumstantial evidence, the court used the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010). Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination. Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003). If the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision, the plaintiff must introduce evidence that would enable a reasonable trier of fact to find that the purported explanation is merely pretextual. See Gross, 557 U.S. 167, 129 S. Ct. at 2350, 174 L. Ed. 2d 119; Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff may show pretext either “through evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is false or ‘unworthy of credence.'”
Jackson, 602 F.3d at 378-79.
Under this approach, the first two steps of the framework are not at issue because: (1) TCC concedes that Brown has established a prima facie case, and (2) TCC has offered its dissatisfaction with Brown’s job performance as its reason for terminating Brown’s employment, which Brown concedes is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.
The court noted that “TCC has produced the testimony of numerous club members, as well as other employees, corroborating Crippin’s allegations of Brown’s poor performance. Brown fails to refute this criticism other than to imply that the witnesses are biased. However, there is other evidence in the record, which, if believed, would allow a reasonable juror to conclude Brown was terminated based on his age. According to Brown’s wife, Melinda Seitz, shortly after Brown’s termination, she and Brown went to visit Matt McCarty, the President of the board at TCC for ‘answers’ and to find out why Brown was terminated. According to Seitz:
“Matt told us that [Crippin] told him that Curtis had not done anything wrong, and reiterated what [Crippin] had told Curtis on March 26—that the members love him (Curtis) and no one had any complaints. Matt said that [Crippin] just wanted some new blood. Then Matt shared a story with us about his mother. Matt said that the same thing had happened to her. She had worked at, I believe a bank for a very long time (maybe 30 years) and one day they let her go because they thought she was too old and they wanted to hire some young people. Matt was very sympathetic because he recalled what this event had done to his mother.”
The Fifth Circuit has held that comments “may be sufficient evidence of age discrimination if they are: ‘(1) related to the protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member, (2) proximate in time to the complained-of adverse employment decision, (3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue, and (4) related to the employment decision at issue.’ Jackson, 602 F.3d at 380; Jenkins v. Methodist Hosp. of Dallas, Inc., 478 F.3d 255, 262-63 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Patel v. Midland Mem’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 298 F.3d 333, 343-44 (5th Cir. 2002)).”
TCC and McCarty “vigorously” disputed Seitz’s characterization of this conversation; however, the court is not to make credibility determinations at this stage. TCC next asserts that because McCarty did not make the decision to terminate Brown, his statement is not probative as to whether Brown would have been terminated ‘but-for’ his age.
“Whether characterized as direct or circumstantial evidence, viewing Seitz’s characterization of the conversation in the light most favorable to Brown, a reasonable juror could find that age was the reason for Brown’s termination,” wrote the court. “On its face, the alleged statement by McCarty indicates that Brown’s age was a basis for his termination. The alleged statement is neither vague nor remote in time. Although TCC contends that Crippin, not McCarty, made the decision to terminate Brown, there is evidence in the record that McCarty, as president of the board, had ‘authority over the employment decision at issue,’ or at the very least, was involved in the decision. See Woodhouse, 92 F.3d at 254. In particular, McCarty testified that, in his capacity as president of the board, he discussed the issue of Brown’s termination with Crippin and gave his approval, stating in his deposition that ‘Crippin approached us that – me that had a performance issue and it was a direction he wanted to take – in a different direction, so I agreed with the – with the separation.’ Although a very close question, a reasonable juror could conclude that Brown’s age, rather TCC’s stated reasons, was the true motivation for Brown’s termination. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied as to this claim.”
Walter Curtis Brown, Jr. v. Tupelo Country Club; N.D. Miss.; CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-19-SA-DAS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132755; 9/18/12
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Jim D. Waide, III, Ronnie Lee Woodruff, WAIDE & ASSOCIATES, PA, Tupelo, MS. (for defendant) John Samuel Hill, LEAD ATTORNEY, MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS, Tupelo, MS; Stephen Pierce Spencer, MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS – Tupelo, Tupelo, MS.
