A federal judge has denied a school district’s motion for summary judgment in a case involving a volleyball coach, who allegedly suffered from post-concussion syndrome after being hit in the head with a volleyball, and her claim that the school district would not provide reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for her to return to work.
In ruling for the plaintiff, the court found that material facts still needed to be uncovered before the court could grant such a motion.
Plaintiff Nikole “Nikki” Hansen was hired by the Jerome Joint School District #261 (Idaho) under a one year contract for the 2008–2009 school year to be a physical education teacher at Jerome High School. Hansen was also hired to coach girls’ volleyball and basketball. On September 9, 2008, Hansen was hit in the head during a team volleyball practice with a volleyball served at high velocity. After the incident, Hansen sought medical treatment and later filed a workers’ compensation claim.
Hansen first saw Physician Assistant (P.A.) William Jacobs on September 12, 2008, for treatment for her injury. Jacobs diagnosed Hansen with a concussion. Although Jacobs released her to work, she was restricted to sedentary work. On September 18, 2008, Hansen again saw Jacobs, who diagnosed Hansen with traumatic vertigo and post-concussion syndrome. On this visit, Jacobs referred Hansen to a neurologist, and did not release Hansen to return to work. On September 23, 2008, Hansen returned to Jacobs, who on this appointment cleared Hansen to return to work provided she did not walk on rough, uneven ground, did not jump, and did not participate in sports. On September 26, 2008, Hansen followed up with Jacobs, who at this appointment referred Hansen to a chiropractor, and limited her activities to exclude sports. By October 13, 2008, Jacobs had cleared Hansen to return to work with no restrictions.
On November 18, 2008, Hansen went to the emergency room, where the ER physician opined that Hansen’s previous injury had rendered her “totally incapacitated” and unable to return to work. On November 20, 2008, Physician’s Assistant Bob Gruver determined she could return to work without restriction. On November 24, 2008, P.A. Jacobs cleared Hansen to return to sedentary work.
Hansen communicated primarily with Marsha Capps, the Jerome School District Payroll Specialist, over the winter. On March 10, 2009, after seeing a neurologist, Hansen provided Capps with a “disability certificate” dated March 10, 2009, excusing Hansen from work “until 4/9/09.” The certificate contained no further diagnosis or notation.
Hansen returned to work on April 10, 2009, and continued to teach until the end of the school year. However, on April 17, 2009, JSD informed Hansen that her teaching contract was not being renewed for the 2009–2010 school year. The rationale given centered primarily on her lack of attendance.
However, from the late spring to the early fall of 2009, the plaintiff saw various doctors and specialists, who found that she was far from 100 percent and could not return to work without reasonable accommodation.
On December 10, 2009, Hansen filed a complaint seeking workers compensation benefits with the Idaho Industrial Commission, claiming total temporary disability status and requesting that the Commission pay benefits. In connection with her workers compensation case, Hansen was deposed on April 16, 2010. Hansen confirmed that, in September of 2009, (the neurologist) indicated to her that she could not return to work as a physical education teacher. “When asked about her other teaching credential, history, which is a more sedentary job, Hansen was asked and testified as follows:
“Q: Do you feel that you could have done a history teacher’s job?
A: I don’t.
“Q: Why couldn’t you do a history teacher’s job?
A: There’s a lot more to teaching than just sitting at a desk and standing up instructing students. You know, you have the grading of the papers and the—you know, the daily just mental grind that it takes, and right now I don’t have that capability.
“Q: What in particular do you feel about your accident from September 2008 would prevent you from functioning as a history teacher for the Jerome School District?
A: The medications that I have to take on a daily basis to function. I don’t have the mental capabilities to have that level of expertise to teach. I don’t have the ability to focus and recall those—the information as well.
“Q: Do you feel that is going to change substantially by June of this year?
A: I don’t.
As for her ability to teach physical education, Hansen was asked and testified as follows:
“Q: Well, according to Drs. Beaver and Kadyan, there’s no reason that you couldn’t go back to being a PE teacher, and I take it you disagree with that.
A: I do.
“Q: And you base that on whose opinion, other than your own?
A: I base that on what I know of what it takes to be a PE teacher.
“Q: But do you rely on anyone’s professional opinion?
A: I rely on Dr. Brait and Dr. Speed.
“Q: And if Dr. Kadyan and Dr. Beaver also said that you’re capable of being a history teacher—which I presume they would since it’s less active than a PE teacher, wouldn’t you agree?
A: Right.
“Q: Is there a reason you feel you couldn’t be a history teacher at this point?
A: I honestly don’t feel like I can be a teacher at this point right now. I don’t. I know my body can’t keep up with the daily rigors of being a teacher.
“Q: Even in sixth grade?
A: Right.”
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff sued, pursuant to the ADA.
The court noted that a plaintiff’s requirements for stating a prima facie case under the ADA: “(1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the statute; (2) she is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job she holds or seeks; and (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.” Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., 220 F.3d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000); Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999).
JSD moved for summary judgment, focusing on the second element set forth above.
Specifically, the district argued that Hansen “cannot establish that she is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of her position as a physical education teacher. JSD contends that Hansen’s absenteeism in violation of school policy, and the unreasonableness of her requested accommodations, preclude her from proving the second essential element of her prima facie case. Hansen, on the other hand, opposes JSD’s arguments, and asserts that there are genuine factual disputes on each issue precluding summary judgment.”
The district’s argument, in large part, centered on her testimony in the workers’ compensation case.
“In Cleveland v. Policy Mgt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 119 S. Ct. 1597, 143 L. Ed. 2d 966 (1999), the United States Supreme Court addressed the perceived inconsistency between statements made in furtherance of seeking disability coverage under the Social Security Act, and statements that the employee could perform essential functions of her job under the ADA,” wrote the court. “In Cleveland, in support of a disability claim, the employee stated she had been unable to work since she was terminated from employment due to her medical condition. However, in support of her ADA claim, the employee contended she could have continued working with reasonable accommodations. The Supreme Court explained that the two statements ‘do not inherently conflict,’ because ‘an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff can perform her job with reasonable accommodation may well prove consistent with an SSDI claim that the plaintiff could not perform her own job (or other jobs) without it.’ Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803. In other words, a disability claimant avers that she is too disabled to work, whereas an ADA claimant avers that she is too disabled to work without reasonable accommodations.”
The court also drilled down on another relevant aspect of the instant case, that a school district must engage in an interactive process with the disabled person to determine the scope of the reasonable accommodations. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, U.S. Air, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 152 L. Ed. 2d 589 (2002).
Nikole J. Hansen v. Jerome Joint School District #261, D. Idaho; Case No. 1:11-cv-00073-CWD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64538; 5/7/12
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Robert C Huntley, LEAD ATTORNEY, THE HUNTLEY LAW FIRM, Boise, ID. (for defendant) Bruce J Castleton, Kirtlan G Naylor, LEAD ATTORNEYS, NAYLOR AND HALES, Boise, ID.
