A federal judge from the Western District of Pennsylvania has granted, only in part, a school district’s motion for summary judgment against a plaintiff, who was relieved from her coaching position after she resigned as a teacher and subsequently sued for discrimination, retaliation and the deprivation of her Constitutional rights.
Central to the case was an element of the Collective Bargaining Agreement that seeks to prevent the district from rehiring a coach, who was no longer teaching at the school, and an apparent inconsistency in how the district treated the plaintiff and a similarly situated male coach.
Plaintiff Janet E. Davis was employed by the district from September 1970 through her retirement in June 2008 as a health and physical education teacher. She was the first head coach of the Allderdice girls’ basketball team.
On March 28, 2008, while still teaching at Allderdice, Davis submitted an Intent to Return to Coaching Assignment form, which was signed by Allderdice Principal Robert Scherrer. When Davis submitted the form in March 2008, she allegedly had not yet decided whether or not to retire.
A month later, Davis and Scherrer exchanged emails and met regarding her concerns about staffing at Allderdice for the next school year, as well as the male/female ratio of physical education teachers. Scherrer allegedly agreed with Davis’ concerns regarding the ratio issue.
At a May 21, 2008 board meeting for the School District of Pittsburgh, the plaintiff’s coaching assignment, along with more than 350 other coaching assignments, was approved.
In June 2008, Davis notified Scherrer and Marlene Harris, an HR representative, that she planned to retire at the end of the school year. When the plaintiff told Scherrer she intended to retire from teaching, she allegedly informed him that she would like to continue to coach. Davis testified that Scherrer was happy that she could continue to coach. Scherrer testified that he did not, at that time, understand the implications of the CBA to Davis’s continued employment as a basketball coach at Allderdice.
In sum, Article 42 of the CBA provided that when a teacher/coach retired from teaching, the coaching position was deemed vacant and was required to be posted.
On a parallel course, Davis continued her complaints of gender discrimination within the school district, writing a long email to board members.
In late June 2008, the board approved the plaintiff’s retirement.
Michael Gavlik, the athletic director for the district, testified that when a coaching vacancy arises during the summer, the district “will sometimes post the vacancy after school begins so that more candidates will see and apply for the position.”
True to form, the board rescinded the plaintiff’s position as the Allderdice head girls’ basketball coach on September 24, 2008.
After the rescission, the plaintiff continued using the gym for conditioning and held a “fall league” on Sundays. Davis testified that no one questioned her use of the gym because she “was viewed as the coach.” The girls’ basketball season at Allderdice usually begins in mid-November.
Scherrer testified that there are “no official responsibilities” for a basketball coach outside of the official season, but that “in many cases, coaches do conditioning and things throughout the year.” Scherrer was aware that Davis had been performing some functions of the girls’ basketball coach into September and October 2008. In early September 2008, Scherrer signed and approved several applications filed by Davis for use of the Allderdice gym for conditioning. Scherrer approved Davis’s use of the gym for “conditioning,” “basketball conditioning,” “exhibition games,” and “pre-season conditioning” on at least 28 dates from September 2008 through January 2009.
Gavlik testified that while Davis was conducting these training sessions, an anonymous complaint was received from a parent who asked why a retired basketball coach was running official basketball practices. Gavlik emailed Scherrer on September 5, 2008, as a result of the complaint, noting that the position needed to be posted.
The position was posted on September 9, 2008, with a closing date of September 15, 2008. Davis was given a headsup by “either Scherrer or the athletic director at Allderdice” that the position had been posted. She interviewed on October 10, 2008.
Also interviewing was David Walchesky, who had been a teacher with the district since August 1981. Walchesky also had 25 years of coaching experience with the district in multiple sports, including serving as an assistant and head coach in girls’ basketball and softball.
Gavlik and Allderdice’s athletic director, who had conducted the interviews together, determined that Davis was the most qualified. However, HR overruled the men, noting that Davis was no longer an employee. In late October, it offered the position to Walchesky, who accepted.
In a similar situation, James Kahn, a retired teacher, was given a coaching position over another qualified teacher in the district. Like Davis, Kahn signed intent to return forms in the spring of 2008, but did not make a decision on his retirement until June 2008. The position was posted online over the summer, and at least two, then-current employees of the district, applied. When Kahn was selected in mid-November 2008 for the coaching position, one of the applicants filed a union grievance. A settlement was reached where Kahn’s position would be posted again the following year.
Davis filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on February 9, 2009. She cross-filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. The EEOC issued a notice of dismissal and right-to-sue letter dated October 22, 2009. The plaintiff filed the complaint in the instant action on January 14, 2010, within 90 days of the date on which the notice of dismissal and right-to-sue letter was issued. The plaintiff’s complaint contained the following counts: (1) sexual (gender) discrimination in violation of Title VII in that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated male employees (count I); (2) retaliation for actions protected by Title VII (count II); (3) age discrimination in violation of the ADEA (count III); (4) sex and age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the PHRA (count IV); (5) First and Fourteenth Amendment violations and retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 (count V). In her brief in opposition to summary judgment, Davis withdrew her age discrimination claims and consented to the withdrawal of count III.
The defendants moved to dismiss.
On the gender discrimination claim under Title VII and the PHRA (Counts I and IV), the court accepted the fact that there was only one comparator, Kahn, because of the unique circumstances of Davis’ case. “For that reason, and based on the inconsistencies and contradictions in the defendants’ proffered reasons, a reasonable jury could choose either to disbelieve the proffered explanation as not supported by the facts, or could choose to believe based on the apparent disparate treatment between Davis and Kahn that Davis’s gender was a determinative factor in the decision not to hire Davis,” wrote the court. “Because a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of her gender, the court must deny the motion for summary judgment with respect to the gender discrimination claims.”
Turning to the retaliation claims under Title VII (Counts II and IV), the court sided with the defendant, finding that the plaintiff “failed to proffer sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection—the only evidence was the not unduly suggestive temporal relationship. Based upon the record before the court, no reasonable jury could conclude that there was a causal link between the (email about the gender ratios) and the failure to hire Davis in October 2008.”
As for the Section 1983, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim (Count V), the court cited the same rationale it used in favoring the plaintiff on the gender discrimination claims — that the defendants’ “proffered nondiscriminatory explanation for their disparate treatment of Davis and Kahn is merely pretext for discrimination.”
Finally, on the Section 1983, First Amendment Claim (Count V), the court returned to the same logic it used in granting the defendant motion to dismiss the retaliation claim that “no reasonable jury could find a causal link between the protected activity and the failure to hire her”
On a different note, the court declined to dismiss Gavlik as a defendant, “because a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Davis, could find that Gavlik was personally involved in the decision not to hire Davis.”
Janet E. Davis v. School District of Pittsburgh et al.; W.D. Pa.; Civil Action No. 10-61, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37311; 3/20/12
