A federal judge from the Western District of Pennsylvania has provided some relief to the University of Pittsburgh (Pitt), which is defending itself in a wrongful termination suit brought by its former head football coach.
Specifically, the court granted a motion to dismiss the third count of a complaint, which centered on plaintiff Michael A. Haywood’s allegation that the university violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when it fired him 17 days into his contract after he had been arrested on a domestic matter. The court concluded that Haywood failed to allege a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Haywood was hired by the university on December 15, 2010. Pursuant to the employment contract entered into by the parties, he was set to receive a base annual salary of $1 million a year for five years.
Seventeen days into the term of the contract, Haywood was fired by Jerome Cochran, Pitt’s Executive Vice Chancellor. Three days later, Cochran sent a letter to the plaintiff’s agent, advising him that the University had terminated Haywood’s employment contract for “cause.”
The impetus for “cause” occurred on December 31, 2011 when Haywood attempted to see his son at the residence where his son lives with his mother. An argument ensued between Haywood and the boy’s mother. The police then took Haywood into custody. He was released the next day.
But the damage was done. Cochran allegedly called Haywood’s agent and told him that Haywood’s employment had been terminated.
On September 19, 2011, Haywood sued the university, raising three claims: 1) breach of employment contract (count A); 2) breach of agreement to buy out Miami University contract (count B); and 3) deprivation of due process rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (count C).
On October 14, 2011, the university filed a partial motion to dismiss count C of the complaint, arguing that “Haywood, who was an at-will employee, had no constitutionally protected interest in his employment and thus had no due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of its position, the University relies on several decisions, including Linan-Faye Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of Camden, 49 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 1995); Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Board of Public Education, 968 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1992), and Unger v. National Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1991).
The plaintiff countered that his employment contract provides for an internal dispute resolution mechanism, “whereby any grievance Mr. Haywood had regarding the terms and conditions of his employment could be discussed with Defendant’s Director of Athletics and then the Vice Chancellor.”
The court was unmoved, noting that Section 20 is not applicable to the “Employer,” only the “Employee.”
It added that existing case law points to “two general types of contract rights that have been found to be property protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Second Circuit noted in S & D Maintenance [Co., Inc. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 966 (2d Cir. 1988)], the first type arises where the contract confers a protected status, such as those ‘characterized by a quality of either extreme dependence in the case of welfare benefits, or permanence in the case of tenure, or sometimes both, as frequently occurs in the case of social security benefits.’ The second, albeit related type of property interest, arises where the contract itself includes a provision that the state entity can terminate the contract only for cause. Id. at 967.
“Applying these principles here, it is clear that the plaintiff’s interest in the liquidated damages or continued employment (to the extent the plaintiff raised it) is not protected under the Constitution. The plaintiff does not allege that this matter involves ‘extreme dependence’ such as welfare benefits or ‘permanence in the case of tenure’ or that the contract could be terminated only for cause. Because the employment contract could be terminated without cause, the plaintiff did not have a property interest arising from that contract and therefore he was not entitled to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff’s harm as alleged arises from a breach of contract.”
Michael A. Haywood v. The University Of Pittsburgh, Michael A. Haywood; W.D. Pa.; CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-1200, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21946; 2/22/12
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Anthony G. Buzbee, PRO HAC VICE, Christopher K. Johns, PRO HAC VICE, The Buzbee Law Firm, Houston, TX; Rolf Louis Patberg, Sean J. Carmody, Terrence M. Ging, Patberg, Carmody & Ging, Pittsburgh, PA. (for defendant) Pamela W. Connelly, Pittsburgh, PA.
