A federal judge from the Northern District of Mississippi has delivered a partial victory to a school district, board member and athletic director in a case in which the trio was sued by a former girls’ softball coach, who charged that they violated Title IX, the U.S. Constitution, other federal laws and state laws when they fired her.
Plaintiff Catherine Papagolos was terminated after questioning why her salary was not comparable to that of the high school baseball coach.
On December 13, 2011, she sued the Lafayette County School District (LCSD); Michael McPhail, a member of the LCSD school board; and Jeff Nelson, athletic director of LCSD. Specifically, Papagolos claimed discrimination under Title IX; retaliation under Title IX; gender discrimination under Title VII; Equal Pay Act violations; age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA); First Amendment free speech retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; First Amendment free speech violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; malicious interference with employment under state law; and wrongful termination under state law.
Instead of answering the complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), challenging the viability of all claims asserted against LCSD, except the Title IX claims and the Title VII claims, as well as all claims asserted against McPhail and Nelson.
Right away, the court dismissed the Title IX, Title VII, Equal Pay Act and ADEA age discrimination claims against McPhail and Nelson, finding that they are not employers, but fellow employees, absolving them of such liability.
Then it turned to the plaintiff’s ADEA age discrimination claim against LCSD. “At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, … the plaintiff need not plead a prima facie ADEA case to state a plausible claim of age discrimination under the ADEA.” Flores v. Select Energy Servs., L.L.C., 486 F. App’x 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2012)
The fact that the plaintiff alleged “that (1) she was discharged; (2) she was qualified for the position of head softball coach; (3) she is a member of a protected class of individuals over forty years of age; and (4) she was replaced by a younger employee ‘with little or no experience coaching a team,’” were “sufficiently plausible to support an ADEA claim of age discrimination at the early Rule 12(b)(6) stage of this case. Thus, the Court shall sustain Plaintiff’s ADEA age discrimination claim against LCSD.”
Next up was the plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims, that the defendants “violated her right to First Amendment right to free speech, retaliated against her for exercising her right to free speech in violation of the First Amendment, and deprived her of her constitutionally protected property interest in her head softball coach position without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
The court wrote that Section 1983 “provides in pertinent part:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“To state a claim under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff must [1] allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and [2] must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988).
Applying West to the instant case, the court found that “the plaintiff has failed to allege the violation of either a First Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right. Thus, the Court need not reach whether the plaintiff has shown that the alleged acts were committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
The court then looked at the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process claims under Section 1983 against all the defendants.
“The plaintiff maintains that she had a constitutionally protected liberty and/or property interest in her continued employment as LCSD’s head softball coach which was deprived by the defendants. The plaintiff maintains that her complaint alleges two theories supporting a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation: that her rights were violated when the defendants barred defendant McPhail from testifying at her non-renewal hearing, and that her rights were violated when she was stripped of her softball duties and reassigned to study hall while her 2010-2011 contract was still in full force. The defendants maintain that the plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim on either ground.”
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations “fail to establish that she had any cognizable liberty or property interest in her continued employment as LCSD’s head softball coach, and thus that her allegations fail to state a claim under Section 1983 that her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated.”
The court moved next to the plaintiff’s allegation, pursuant to Section 1985, the defendants “conspired to deter, by force, intimidation, and/or threat, the plaintiff from exercising her established First Amendment rights and her rights to Equal Protection.
“Because the court has already found that the plaintiff has failed to allege a First Amendment constitutional violation, she cannot assert a Section 1985 conspiracy claim on that basis. As for her Equal Protection allegations, the court finds that the plaintiff’s purported equal-protection claim ‘amounts to no more than a restatement of her First Amendment claim.’ See Thompson v. City of Starkville, Miss., 901 F.2d 456, 468 (5th Cir. 1990). Even if the plaintiff has attempted to assert a separate equal protection claim, her complaint is bereft of allegations supporting such a claim. Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff’s Section 1985 conspiracy claims shall be dismissed in their entirety.”
In sum, the noted that the following claims survive the motion to dismiss: (1) the Title IX discrimination and retaliation claims against Defendant Lafayette County School District; (2) the Title VII gender discrimination and retaliation claims against Defendant Lafayette County School District; (4) the ADEA age discrimination claim against Lafayette County School District; and (5) the state law malicious interference claim against all defendants.
Catherine Papagolos v. Lafayette County School District et al.; N.D. Miss.; CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-CV-00158-GHD-SAA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131835; 9/16/13
Attorneys of Record: (for Catherine plaintiff) Joseph Robert Murray, II, LEAD ATTORNEY, MURRAY LAW FIRM, PLLC, Ripley, MS. (for defendants) Richard Jarrad Garner, LEAD ATTORNEY, ADAMS AND REESE LLP, Ridgeland, MS; Benjamin B. Morgan, ADAMS AND REESE LLP – Ridgeland, Ridgeland, MS.
