A federal judge from the District of Connecticut has granted summary judgment to a school district and its coach, who were sued for negligence after one of their student athletes suffered a concussion and was re-inserted back in the game.
In so ruling, the court held the defendants to “a recklessness or intentional conduct standard of care for the actions.”
Plaintiff Jessica Mercier was a student at the Westminster School and a member of Westminster’s varsity women’s basketball team. On January 4, 2011, Westminster’s team played a game against Greenwich Academy in Greenwich, Connecticut. During the second half of the game, Mercier was struck in the front of the head by a player on Greenwich’s team. Bryan Tawney, Westminster’s coach, called a timeout.
Mercier allegedly told Tawney that she was dizzy, that her eyes were blurry, and that she needed to sit down. She sat on the bench for approximately five minutes, during which time Mercier alleges that she exhibited signs of a concussion and acted out of character. Tawney asked Mercier whether she was ready to return to the game. Mercier re-entered the game. During one play, she lost her balance and alleges that she felt disoriented, according to the complaint. Sometime thereafter, Mercier was struck in the head a second time by a player on Greenwich’s team. Mercier asked to be removed from the game. Tawney removed her and did not put her back in for the remainder of the game. Mercier alleged that she suffered a concussion and other injuries.
Mercier alleged that Tawney was aware of the symptoms of head injuries and concussions and had received “training and education in the prevention, recognition, and treatment of head injuries.” Mercier also alleged that Tawney was aware that Westminster protocol required that athletes exhibiting symptoms of a concussion could not return to play before being evaluated by an athletic trainer or physician. In addition, she charged that Tawney was charged with “protecting his players from injury as much as possible.”
Mercier sued Westminster and Tawney for negligence. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
In reviewing the arguments, the court noted that the plaintiffs alleged that Westminster and Tawney were negligent in failing to have Mercier examined and evaluated after the first strike to her head; in failing to remove Mercier from the game “as a result of her concussion like symptoms;” and in refusing to keep Mercier out of the game until she “received written clearance from a licensed health care professional.”
The Westminster defendants argued that Connecticut law bars negligence claims in the context of competitive contact sports. In Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399, 696 A.2d 332 (1997), the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted a reckless or intentional conduct standard of care for co-participants in contact team sports. See id. at 408. In doing so, the court first conducted a threshold inquiry to ask whether the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable. See id. at 405-07. Concluding that it was, the court then considered four factors to determine the extent of a co-participant’s responsibility:
The normal expectations of the sports in which the plaintiff and defendant were engaged; (2) the public policy of encouraging continued vigorous participation in recreational sporting activities while weighing the safety of the participants; (3) the avoidance of increased litigation; and (4) the decisions of other jurisdictions. Id.
More recently, this court applied the rule in Jaworski to a co-participant’s coach and that coach’s employer. See Trujillo v. Yeager, 642 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D. Conn. 2009). Analyzing the situation under the four factors in Jaworski, this court concluded that the Connecticut Supreme Court would find that reckless or intentional conduct is “the appropriate standard of care to be imposed on coaches for injuries caused by their players.” Id. at 91.
Turning to the instant case, which involves “a player’s lawsuit against her own coach arising out of conduct at a competition,” the court focused first on the foreseeability inquiry. The incident was foreseeable, according to the court, since “A coach can reasonably foresee that failing either to have a player checked out or to keep a player out of a game after that player complained of dizziness and blurred vision might result in the type of injuries that allegedly resulted in this case.”
Next, it examined the four factors analyzed in Jaworski and Trujillo.
On the first factor that centered on “normal expectations,” the court found that Mercier “had a reasonable expectation of injury while playing in the basketball game.”
Regarding the second factor, which weighs the “public policy of encouraging continued vigorous participation in recreational sporting activities” against “the safety of the participants” (Jaworski, 241 Conn. at 408), the court found the “general principle” applicable:
“Coaches are often required to make split-second decisions during a game, and holding coaches liable for negligence for such decisions, including player substitution decisions, would dampen their willingness to coach aggressively and would ‘unreasonably threaten to chill competitive play.’ Id. at 91.”
Turning to the third factor, or the “avoidance of increased litigation,” the court also agreed with the defendants, noting that “holding coaches to a negligence standard of conduct for decisions made during athletic competitions would certainly create an influx of litigation against coaches and schools for injuries directly caused by other players.”
The final factor centered on relevant case law from other jurisdictions.
“The Westminster defendants cite two helpful cases. In Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 103, 75 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2003), the plaintiff, a high school swimmer broke her neck attempting a dive at a junior varsity competitive swim meet. She alleged that her coach breached his duty of care to her by insisting, despite her objections, lack of expertise, and fear of diving, that she dive at the swim meet. Id. at 32. The California Supreme Court noted that California (like Connecticut) holds co-participants in a sport to a recklessness or intentional conduct standard of care. Id. Acknowledging that the relationship between a coach and a student ‘is different from the relationship between co-participants in a sport,’ the court nonetheless applied the more stringent standard of care to situations where a coach failed to provide adequate instruction or supervision before directing the player to take action that resulted in injury. Id. The court reasoned that a coach’s role ‘could be improperly chilled by too stringent a standard of potential legal liability.’ Id.”
In the second case—Karas v. Strevell, 227 Ill. 2d 440, 884 N.E.2d 122, 318 Ill. Dec. 567 (Ill. 2008) — “a hockey player brought a negligence action against co-participants, officials, and the league, among others. In concluding that non-participant defendants were exempt from negligence-based claims, the Supreme Court of Illinois reasoned that coaching and officiating decisions involve subjective decision-making that often occurs in the middle of a fast moving game. It is difficult to observe all the contact that takes place during an ice hockey game, and it is difficult to imagine activities more prone to second-guessing than coaching and officiating. Applying an ordinary negligence standard to these decisions would open the door to a surfeit of litigation and would impose an unfair burden on organizational defendants . Id. at 137.
“Both of these decisions weigh in favor of rejecting a negligence standard of care. Mercier, like the plaintiff in Kahn, seeks to hold her coach liable in negligence for conduct related to his supervision of her during a competitive event. As in Kahn, holding coaches such as Tawney to a negligence standard of care could improperly chill the coach’s role, which is to push athletes to perform in the context of a competition. Additionally, as the Karas court highlighted, coaching decisions involve split-second, subjective decisions. Because such decisions are particularly prone to second-guessing, permitting a negligence-based standard of care ‘would open the door to a surfeit of litigation and would impose an unfair burden on’ coaches such as Tawney.” See Karas, 884 N.E.2d at 137.
Jessica Mercier v. Westminster School, INC., et al.,; D. Conn.; CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-4 (JCH), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103950; 6/25/13
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Thomas Peter Moriarty, LEAD ATTORNEY, Moriarty, Paetzold & Sherwood, LLC-Gstnby, Glastonbury, CT. (for Greenwich Academy, Inc., defendant) David G. Hill, Joseph James Blyskal, III, LEAD ATTORNEYS, David G. Hill & Associates, LLC, Glastonbury, CT. (for Trustees of Westminster School, Inc., doing business as Westminster School, Bryan Tawney, Defendants) James M. Sconzo, Jonathan C. Sterling, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Jorden Burt-Smsby, Simsbury, CT.
