A district judge from the Western District of Pennsylvania has ruled that a cheerleader can amend her lawsuit, which claims that her coach all but ignored past concussions and forced her to participate in dangerous stunts.
At the time of the incident, plaintiff Alexandria Lavella was a senior at Peters Township High School and a member of the varsity cheerleading squad. Chelsea Stockhausen was the head coach of the school’s cheerleading program.
On August 23, 2010, Lavella was participating in a stunt and suffered a concussion after she was struck in the head by a flyer. Stockhausen was allegedly aware of the plaintiff’s injury and the accompanying symptoms. Lavella received medical treatment and was medically restricted from practice for two weeks.
The plaintiff returned to practice on September 8, 2010, without restriction. During this practice, the defendant had the plaintiff fully participate in stunting practice. Lavella was struck in the head by a flyer during practice and suffered concussion-like symptoms. Stockhausen allegedly observed the injury and failed to file a written report of the injury with the high school’s athletic director.
Lavella’s mother emailed the coach to inform her of her daughter’s “repeat stunting-related head injury and related symptoms, her concern about the level of safety at practice and that the plaintiff was not to stunt until the flyers are under control.” Stockhausen kept the plaintiff out of a September 9 practice and the September 10 football game.
Stockhausen ultimately asked the plaintiff to spot gaps and serve as a front-base during a September 11 soccer game. Lavella also participated in stunting during practice on September 13 and 14. A day after those practices, the coach allegedly kept all of the cheerleaders at stunting practice instead of permitting them to attend their scheduled Immediate Post Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing. During this practice, the defendant directed Lavella to serve as a back-base during the middle elevator group with members who were relatively inexperienced. “This was the second most dangerous position in that stunt. The flyer in the plaintiff’s group fell onto her,” wrote the court, quoting the complaint.
Lavella was hit in the head and then fell to the track and hit her head. “She continued practice, but became disoriented and distraught.” Stockhausen called the plaintiff after practice, but did not alert her mother of the daughter’s injuries. Lavella’s mother took her daughter to the hospital where she was diagnosed and treated for a concussion. Since this concussion, ”the plaintiff has suffered serious bodily injury, pain and suffering, anxiety, embarrassment, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and has required extensive medical treatment and follow-up,” according to the complaint.
The coach and school district moved to dismiss the complaint, challenging the sufficiency of her claim, which rested on the state-created danger theory:
“State-created danger theory requires a plaintiff to demonstrate all of the following: (1) the harm ultimately caused to the plaintiff was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the state-actor acted in willful disregard for the plaintiff’s safety; (3) there was some relationship between the state and the plaintiff; and (4) the state-actor used his/her authority to create an opportunity for danger that would not have existed otherwise. Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty, 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006).”
The school district argued that the plaintiff’s position “is not legally supportable … because the plaintiff has not met the second element,” which requires that the defendant’s actions “shock the conscience.” Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 2011). In other words, because the defendant had time to process her actions deliberately, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant displayed a deliberate indifference towards a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” See Phillips, 514 F.3d at 241
The court found that the plaintiff’s allegations “do not demonstrate that the defendant’s affirmative actions shocked the conscience. Notably, on September 6, the plaintiff was released by her doctor to resume cheerleading, without restriction. The only averments against the defendant following this date that could be seen to be affirmative actions on the defendant’s part are: having cheerleaders skip ImPACT testing, asking/having the plaintiff participate in stunting, and directing the plaintiff to serve as a back-base during a September 15 practice. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant ‘violated her ongoing stunting restriction by having her participate in stunting.’ However, no such restriction existed. As previously noted, the plaintiff was medically cleared to fully participate in cheerleading by a medical professional. Also, although Plaintiff’s mother emailed the defendant about her stunting injuries, she only instructed that the plaintiff was ‘not to stunt until the flyers are under control.’ This statement could not reasonably be seen as an unlimited restriction from all stunting. There was no temporal period prescribed in the email and no individual would have able to control practices such that there was no chance that the plaintiff would be injured. Therefore, ‘asking’ and ‘directing’ the plaintiff to participating in stunting during practices and games does not contradict the plaintiff’s mother’s ‘restriction.’ There is also nothing in the complaint that would demonstrate that the practices in which the plaintiff was injured were particularly strenuous or that other injuries had occurred that would alert defendant that the cheerleaders should not practice stunting because there was a high risk of concussions.”
The plaintiff also argued that the defendant “took affirmative actions which ‘shocked the conscience’ because she ‘had time to make unhurried judgments under circumstances allowing for deliberation and forethought.’ However, the plaintiff made the choice to attend cheerleading practice and participate during games. If the plaintiff was at an increased risk of injury, then the increased risk came from her decision to attend those activities, not directly from the defendant’s coaching.
“There are no factual averments that: (1) the defendant needed the plaintiff’s mother’s permission to participate in certain cheerleading moves (apart from the parental consent required to participate in sports programs); (2) the defendant knew that the plaintiff was in danger of further head injury from participating in stunting; or (3) that there was any indication that this particular individual was more vulnerable to further concussions. At most, there is an allegation that the defendant knew of the plaintiff’s “continuing headaches,” the seriousness of concussions and additional risks from repeat concussions, and she “asked plaintiff to participate in stunting.
“The core of the plaintiff’s allegations center on the plaintiff’s September 15, 2010, concussion, which occurred after the plaintiff’s mother emailed the defendant. At that point, the defendant knew that the plaintiff had suffered a concussion on August 23, but also knew that she had been released by her doctor to resume cheerleading without restriction. The Court believes that allegedly violating the plaintiff’s mother’s ‘restriction’ from stunting does not support a claim for state-created danger because the defendant’s actions, in coaching practices where the plaintiff was present, were not proactive and did not affirmatively expose plaintiff to further danger.”
The court summed up that “all allegations against the defendant seem to reduce to actions taken in the course of her coaching duties and unfortunately the plaintiff was injured during some of these cheerleading activities. The injuries that the plaintiff sustained are unfortunate. However, the defendant’s actions, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not support a claim for state created danger in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
Alexandria Lavella v. Chelsea Stockhausen; W.D. Pa.; 5/1/13
