Given another bite of the apple, Cuttino Mobley has apparently cured the defects in a discrimination complaint against the Knicks, which was initially dismissed by a federal judge last summer.
The court let Mobley’s amended complaint stand in the face of the Knicks’ most recent motion to dismiss.
Mobley is a professional basketball player who began his career with the National Basketball Association (NBA) in the late 90’s. The defendants are companies that own and operate the New York Knicks, a NBA team.
In 1999, at the beginning of his NBA career, Mobley was diagnosed with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (HCM), a genetic mutation which causes thickening of a portion of the myocardium, the muscle of the heart. During extreme exertion, HCM can cause dizziness, collapsing, and even sudden heart failure. From his HCM diagnosis through 2008, however, Mobley had been medically cleared to play every year subject to signing a waiver of liability.
In 2008, the New York Knicks began trade negotiations with the Los Angeles Clippers to obtain Mobley, a ten-year veteran of the NBA. Mobley alleged that the Knicks attempted to use his condition to leverage further concessions from the Clippers in the trade, but the Clippers refused. Aware of his condition, the Knicks waived Mobley’s pre-trade physical examination and the teams concluded the deal.
Pursuant to Mobley’s contract, immediately following his arrival to the Knicks in September 2008, he was required to submit to a physical examination. Mobley was sent by the Knicks to two cardiologists, Dr. Mark Estes and Dr. Barry Maron, to evaluate his ability to play. He alleged that Dr. Estes and Dr. Maron are both known opponents of allowing athletes with HCM to participate in competitive athletics. Following Mobley’s exam, both doctors recommended he should discontinue playing professional basketball.
Mobley alleged that contrary to the recommendations of Dr. Estes and Dr. Maron, there had been no change in his heart condition from 1999 to 2008 and he was perfectly fit to play. He further asserted that the risk of heart failure as a result of HCM generally decreases with age. Mobley alleged that even if HCM made it too dangerous for him to play professional basketball without accommodation, it would have been possible to implant a defibrillator in his heart to shock him back to life if his heart were to stop.
Mobley alleged that he asked both the doctors and the Knicks if there was any way he could be allowed to play, but was told he had no options. In December 2008, he announced his retirement from the Knicks.
Mobley ultimately sued, claiming that the Knicks forced him to retire against his will for financial reasons. Specifically, he argued that the Knicks disqualified him intentionally in order to save money and avoid paying the NBA’s “luxury tax” (imposed on teams when their total payroll exceeds a certain threshold called the “salary cap”).
Because the salary of a player who cannot play for medical reasons does not count against the team’s salary cap, Mobley alleged that the Knicks saved approximately $19 million through insurance payments and avoided luxury tax when the team deemed him medically unfit to play.
Mobley sued, claiming the defendants’’ actions constituted discrimination, pursuant to New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), Executive Law § 290 et seq. and the Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107 et seq.
The defendants moved to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the court granted after finding Mobley failed to plead facts showing that he was qualified to perform his job at the time of his trade to the Knicks. Mobley v. Madison Square Garden, No. 11 Civ. 8290 (DAB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85467, 2012 WL 2339270, (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2012). Mobley was, however, granted leave to amend his complaint to cure this deficiency.
In considering the amended complaint, the court noted that the NYSHRL “specifically requires that the disabled person have ‘the ability, with or without accommodation, to satisfactorily perform the essential functions of the job or occupation.’ N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 466.11(f) (1) (2012). To perform satisfactorily, one must meet the ‘minimum acceptable performance of the essential functions of the job as established by the employer.’ The ‘employer’s judgment as to what is minimum acceptable performance will not be second-guessed’ as long as the performance standards are applied equally to all employees in the same position. Id. at (f) (2). Similarly, the NYCHRL requires that the disabled individual have the ability to ‘satisfy the essential requisites of a job.’ N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-107(15).
“When this case was last before the Court, the plaintiff alleged that he was qualified because he had played skilled basketball with his heart condition for ten years without any adverse symptoms. The plaintiff relied on the inference that past performance indicated present ability. The court found this inference unavailing because it failed to show that Mobley was qualified to perform his job duties in 2008 and did nothing to counter the medical opinions of the cardiologists who found Mobley unqualified to play professional basketball. Mobley, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85467, 2012 WL 2339270. Mobley’s Amended Complaint makes new factual allegations, discussing three prominent cardiologists’ medical opinions regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s heart condition in Fall 2008, and mentioning that medically-respected reports have concluded that the risks associated with HCM decrease with age.”
The defendants countered that the plaintiff’s amended complaint “admits he failed physical examinations conducted by several expert cardiologists and therefore remains deficient.” The defendants cited various disability discrimination cases “in support of their argument that dismissal is appropriate where an employee fails an employer’s physical examination and offers insufficient evidence to show that he is qualified.” See e.g., Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2003); Siederbaum v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 2d 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d, 121 F. App’x 435 (2d Cir. 2005); Burton v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 244 F. Supp. 2d 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
The court, however, found these cases “inapposite. All were decided on summary judgment against plaintiffs who offered no evidence that they were qualified to perform the essential functions of their jobs.”
In contrast, the plaintiff’s case “is at the pleading stage, and thus he is required only to plead facts sufficient to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Moreover, Plaintiff has pled facts that contradict the views of Dr. Estes and Dr. Maron and make it plausible that he was qualified to perform safely the essential functions of a professional basketball player. Accepting as true the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, several prominent cardiologists have determined that there was no material change in the thickness of the walls of the plaintiff’s heart (and, thus, in his heart condition) between the beginning of his professional basketball career and the present time, and that the plaintiff was as medically fit to play in Fall 2008 as he was in 1998 and 2012. The plaintiff was medically cleared to play each season for ten consecutive years, including two months prior to his trade to the Knicks. The plaintiff further alleges that reports published in sources respected in the scientific cardiology community have concluded that the risks associated with HCM decrease with age. Together, these allegations make it plausible that the plaintiff was as qualified to play professional basketball in Fall 2008 for the Knicks as he was during the period of 1999 to September 2008, when he was medically cleared to play for the Houston Rockets, the Orlando Magic, the Sacramento Kings, and the Los Angeles Clippers.
“The defendants contend that the medical opinions to which the plaintiff cites are irrelevant because they were obtained in 2011 and 2012 rather than in 2008, when the Knicks evaluated the plaintiff. The defendants reason that the plaintiff’s failure to obtain these medical views during his employment is fatal to his claim because he ‘could have sought to obtain such contrary evidence during his employment with the Knicks.’ (Id.) the defendants fail to point to any statutory or case authority in support of their argument, and the court is aware of none. Indeed, while the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL require the plaintiffs to show they were qualified to perform their job duties at the time of their employment, neither the statute requires that such evidence be obtained while the plaintiff is employed. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 466.11; N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-107(15). As discussed above, the plaintiff has shown plausibly that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his job in Fall 2008; he need not have collected the evidence of his qualifications at that time.
Cuttino Mobley v. Madison Square Garden LP; et al.; S.D.N.Y.; 11 Civ. 8290 (DAB); 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46341; 3/15/13
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Milton L. Williams, Jr., LEAD ATTORNEY, Maia Beth Goodell, Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C., New York, NY. (for defendants) Eliza Allan Kaiser, Kevin Bruce Leblang, Steven Mitchell Knecht, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel, LLP, New York, NY.
