A federal judge from the District of Vermont has denied a former student-athlete’s bid to stay what was left of his breach of contract claim against Middlebury College until some elements of that claim, which the judge had already ruled on, could be considered on appeal.
In so ruling, the court found that “the claims on appeal and the claims pending before this court are sufficiently intertwined that they will all but guarantee duplicative proceedings and piecemeal appeals” if it were to side with the plaintiff.
Plaintiff James Knelman was a player on Middlebury’s men’s ice hockey team. During the final weeks of the 2010-2011 season, Coach Bill Beaney dismissed Knelman from the team.
On May 11, 2011, Knelman, who has since graduated from Middlebury, sued the college, alleging that his relationship with Middlebury “was contractual in nature and that Middlebury breached its alleged promise to provide him with procedural due process before he could be dismissed from the ice hockey team,” according to the court.
Further, he asserted that Middlebury breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based upon the same conduct. He further alleges that the relationship between himself and Middlebury was fiduciary in nature and that Middlebury had a “duty to act in Knelman’s best interest and with the highest standards of integrity and good faith in its dealing with Knelman.” He asserts a parallel claim of breach of fiduciary duty against Coach Beaney.
Knelman argued that the manner in which Coach Beaney handled his dismissal from the team was “arbitrary and capricious” and defamed him in his chosen prospective profession as a professional ice hockey player. Knelman’s defamation claim is based upon Coach Beaney’s alleged statements that “Knelman is selfish, Knelman ‘had problems’ on the hockey team last year, the decision leading to Knelman’s dismissal was ‘not an isolated incident,’ and he does not think ‘hockey is a priority’ for Knelman.”
Finally, in his negligent supervision claim, Knelman alleged that Middlebury knew or had reason to know that Coach Beaney had a “propensity to engage in tortious acts of breach of the fiduciary duty owing to his students and defamation,” and “was advised of Coach Beaney’s ongoing tortious conduct and Middlebury took no action to stop, prevent or sanction Coach Beaney, but rather condoned, approved and ratified the incidents of tortious conduct.”
The plaintiff sought compensatory damages in an amount in excess of $75,000 and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and prejudgment interest as permitted by Vermont law.
On September 28, 2012, the court granted partial summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on Count I (breach of contract against Middlebury); Count II (breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Middlebury); Count III (breach of fiduciary duty against Middlebury); and Count IV (breach of fiduciary duty against Coach Beaney). The court granted in part and denied in part summary judgment with regard to Count V (defamation claim against Middlebury and Coach Beaney) and denied summary judgment on Count VI (negligent supervision against Middlebury) because the defamation claim was only partially dismissed.
In a tactical move, Knelman sought an entry of final judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), as to Counts I through IV of his complaint so that he may take an immediate appeal. With regard to his defamation claim, although the court dismissed part of that claim, Knelman did not seek to appeal any portion of it, instead he asked for a stay of all remaining claims in this court pending the outcome of his appeal.
In its analysis, the district court noted that the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the trial courts must balance four criteria in determining whether to stay a case pending appeal: “the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury if a stay is denied, substantial injury to the party opposing a stay if one is issued, and the public interest. Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).
“Knelman seeks to appeal legal issues which he describes as unsettled in Vermont and the Second Circuit. His claims that have been dismissed are properly characterized as ‘novel’ in the context of a student-athlete suing his coach and college based upon his dismissal from an extracurricular sport which carried with it no scholarship benefits.
The court thus cannot find that he has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits.
“The only injury Knelman will suffer if a stay is not granted is the possibility that he will need to litigate his claims twice—a risk that is arguably insubstantial if his claims are not factually and legally intertwined as he claims. In seeking a stay, however, Knelman concedes that the claims he seeks to appeal and the claims remaining in this court, if he is successful on appeal, will require a second trial involving the same facts, the same parties, and many of the same witnesses. Although the harm Knelman may suffer if forced to litigate his claims twice is neither unexpected nor unusual, two trials involving the same set of facts, the same parties, and many of the same witnesses would clearly be a waste of judicial and party resources. There is thus the possibility of unnecessary and duplicative expense if a stay is not granted.”
Middlebury and Beaney contend that “the court must also consider their competing interests and the hardships they will suffer in deciding whether to grant a Rule 54(b) certification and a stay. They point out that this case has been pending since May of 2011 and that it will be pending for potentially several more years if Knelman’s motion for certification and a stay are granted. The defendants will be thus exposed to prolonged litigation rather than receiving a prompt adjudication of the claims against them while Knelman pursues an appeal that, if successful, will benefit only him. As defendants point out with regard to the claims Knelman seeks to appeal: ‘If those claims are as separate and distinct as [Knelman] argues that they are, then there is no reason why those claims cannot proceed to trial forthwith. Trial on the remaining claims should take at most a day or two, and Defendant Beaney is entitled to have those claims resolved expeditiously.’
If, in contrast, the facts and claims are intertwined in a manner that makes Rule 54(b) certification unadvisable, the defendants argue the court should not attempt to cure this problem by granting a stay that is not warranted. For the reasons stated by Defendants, the court agrees that this is not a case where certification and a stay will ‘make possible a more expeditious and just result for all the parties.’ L.B. Foster Co. v. America Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1998).
“Finally, the public interest does not favor a stay. Although the public interest in a private dispute such as the instant one is not a compelling one, and although the public interest is not advanced by duplicative judicial proceedings, the public also has no interest in prolonged litigation or in partially adjudicated cases that remain pending but which do not progress to a resolution while one party pursues an appeal.
“On balance, Knelman has not established that a stay is warranted in this case. In the absence of a stay or dismissal of his remaining claims, a Rule 54(b) certification is not appropriate as the claims on appeal and the claims pending before this court are sufficiently intertwined that they will all but guarantee duplicative proceedings and piecemeal appeals.”
James “Jak” Knelman v. Middlebury College, and Bill Beaney; D. Vt.; Case No. 5:11-cv-123, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3391; 1/9/13
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Andrew D. Manitsky, Esq., Robert F. O’Neill, Esq., Gravel & Shea PC, Burlington, VT; Joseph W. Anthony, Esq., Kristen B. Rowell, Esq., Mary L. Knoblauch, Esq., PRO HAC VICE, Anthony Ostlund Baer & Louwagie P.A., Minneapolis, MN. (for defendant) Karen McAndrew, Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, VT. For Bill Beaney, Defendant: Karen McAndrew, LEAD ATTORNEY, Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, VT.
