A federal judge from the District of Minnesota has granted the family of a student athlete’s motion for a preliminary injunction, which will make the student athlete, W.D., immediately eligible to compete on the varsity hockey team, pending a ruling on the merits of the argument.
In so ruling, the court found that the plaintiffs “demonstrated a probability of success on the merits of their procedural due process claim, that (their son) will suffer some degree of irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, and that the balance of harms and public interest weigh in favor of injunctive relief.”
The impetus for the dispute was the plaintiffs’ decision to have the student transfer to a new school before his junior year. The reason for the transfer was that the new high school offered Advanced Placement (AP) courses in economics and business, marketing courses, DECA, and a “Business Career Pathways Program,” all of which were not offered at the previous school. The plaintiffs believed, based on the bylaws of the Minnesota State High School League, that their son would be immediately eligible.
But the League interpreted its bylaws differently and, after an appeal and a hearing, determined that W.D. would be ineligible to participate in varsity athletics for one year.
“Ordinarily, a transfer student is ineligible for varsity athletics for one year from the date of transfer,” wrote the court citing League Bylaw 111.3. “There are, however, a set of standard exceptions that allow a transfer student to be immediately eligible for athletics, but none of the standard exceptions apply to W.D. See League Bylaw 111 (allowing immediate eligibility if the student was in good standing at his or her prior school and one of the following applies: (1) 9th grade option, (2) family residence change, (3) court ordered residence change for child protection, (4) custody of student (divorce), (5) move from out of state, (6) enrollment options program).”
In addition, Bylaw 300.3.A provides eight additional exceptions that allow for immediate eligibility. Of relevance are Bylaw 300.3(A)(5), which allows immediate eligibility if the student transfers for “enrollment in an Advanced Placement program, an International Baccalaureate program or similar advanced academic program not offered at the school the student attends.” And Bylaw 300.3(A)(8), which allows immediate eligibility for “other conditions not covered above, but which may be agreed to by both the sending and receiving schools.”
The plaintiffs alleged that they were informed by officials at the school that W.D. was transferring to “that in general students transferring for academic reasons are routinely approved.” Nevertheless, he was deemed ineligible, prompting the plaintiffs to appeal the ruling. After another denial and with the season approaching, the plaintiffs sought intervention from the court, claiming the defendants were violating its due process rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
While awaiting a decision on the merits of that claim, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. In deciding that motion, the court considered four factors: “(1) the probability that the moving party will succeed on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the moving party; (3) the balance of harms as between the parties; and (4) the public interest.” Roudachevski v. All-American Care Ctrs., Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2011)
Regarding the first factor, the court found a recent opinion — J.K. ex rel. Kaplan v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch. (Special Sch. Dist. No. 1), 849 F. Supp. 2d 865, 877 (D. Minn. 2011) — where a court found that, “under Minnesota law, the property interest in an education extends to participation in interscholastic sports,” wrote the court, citing J.K.
Furthermore, “the Minnesota Attorney General has issued two opinions suggesting that due process protections might attach to interscholastic athletic eligibility. First, in 1977, the Attorney General opined that in some situations interscholastic sports should be considered co-curricular as opposed to extra-curricular. See Minn. Op. Att’y Gen. 169-X, 1977 Minn. AG LEXIS 8, 1977 WL 36280 (Sept. 22, 1977). This opinion suggests that the interest in athletic eligibility may be on equal footing with the interest in public education generally. Second, in 1989, the Attorney General stated that when disciplinary decisions impact athletic activities, ‘due process, with regard to such discipline, must be considered.’ See Minn. Op. Att’y Gen. 169-F, 1989 Minn. AG LEXIS 5, 1989 WL505812, at *3 (Mar. 28, 1989). The Attorney General noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court had not decided the issue, but pointed to Thompson as an indication of the Court’s potential stance on the issue. See Id.
Thus, the court found that W.D. “has a probability of successfully establishing that he has a constitutionally protected property interest in interscholastic athletic eligibility.” Whether he was denied that “interest” centered on his claim that he “received inadequate notice that his transfer would render him ineligible.”
To this point the court cited Giblin v. Minn. State High Sch. League, Civ. No. 4-81-767, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10448, 1982 WL 963044, at *3, which held that “one of the fundamental requirements of due process is ‘warning.’
“… (T)he existence of different reasonable readings suggests that the plaintiffs did not have fair notice that W.D. would be ineligible before he decided to transfer. Thus, the plaintiffs have demonstrated a probability of success on the merits of their procedural due process claim.”
Next, the court turned to whether W.D. would suffer irreparable harm from missing a year of eligibility. “While not as grave as many matters that pass before this Court, the harm of losing a year of varsity eligibility is difficult to quantify and would constitute irreparable harm,” wrote the court, citing Giblin.
As for the balance of harms factor, the court found that the League “will suffer little, if any, harm by virtue of W.D. being eligible for varsity athletics pending resolution of the merits. Therefore, the balance of harm favors W.D.”
Finally, regarding public interest, the court carefully considered the League’s argument that “its rules serve the public interest both by prohibiting students from gaining an unfair competitive advantage and by prioritizing academics over the privileges of sports.
“However, granting preliminary injunctive relief would not threaten these valid public interests because W.D.’s transfer, which was not for athletic purposes, does not implicate concerns of unfair competitive advantage or prioritizing athletics above academics.”
W.D., a minor child, by and through his parents M.J.D. and M.C.D., and on their own behalf v. Minnesota State High School League and Craig Perry individually and in his official capacity; D. Minn.; Civil No. 12-2892 (JRT/SER), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169516; 11/29/12
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiffs) Matthew D. Resch, WAGNER, FALCONER& JUDD, LTD, Minneapolis, MN. (for defendants) Joseph A. Kelly and Patrick J. Kelly, KELLY & LEMMONS, PA, St. Paul, MN.
