A state court in Connecticut has denied a religious school’s bid to strike the “sole count” in a wrongful termination lawsuit brought by its former athletic director.
Central to the court’s ruling was that the facts of the complaint “do not concern matters of church government, faith, or doctrine,” which would have bolstered the defendant’s argument.
Plaintiff William Buscetto was hired by the Saint Bernard High School, the defendant, in August 2007. Four months later, he was also hired as the school’s baseball coach. The school consists of a high school and middle school located in Uncasville, Connecticut on property owned by the diocese. Specifically, the diocese owns the school, controls the school’s board of directors, and the school is governed by the employment policies and practices of the diocese.
By all accounts, the plaintiff was successful in his leadership of the athletic department. One example of this was his efforts to improve the condition of the school’s athletic fields and facilities, particularly by organizing the Saint Bernard Athletics Golf Tournament in 2008 and 2009. With regard to this event, the plaintiff had an agreement with the headmaster and other school administrators that the money raised would be exclusively used for improvements in the athletic department.
Beginning in the fall of 2009, further requests by the plaintiff to use the funds for athletic improvements were denied. The school headmaster told the plaintiff that the money would be better spent on buses, a budgeted item included in normal operating expenses. Disappointed in this decision, the plaintiff advised the headmaster and principal “that he would not proceed with the golf tournament in 2010 because he would not allow himself to be placed in the position of misrepresenting to the public what use was being made of the money.”
The relationship between the plaintiff and officials at the school continued to be strained, coming to a head on June 15, 2011. That day, coaches and football players were present at the athletic facilities for summer conditioning as authorized by the plaintiff and headmaster. The plaintiff alleged that the facilities director for the school arrived “in an intoxicated state, ‘reeking of alcohol’ according to the coaches present” and confirmed via e-mail from other witnesses. The facilities director, who had operated a motor vehicle to arrive at the school and who had access to other machinery on school grounds, proceeded to demand that all students present evacuate the facility. The coaches reported this incident to the plaintiff, and the next day, the plaintiff sent an e-mail to the headmaster, the superintendent, and the board chair to report the incident and seek assistance. Within 27 hours from the time the e-mail was sent, the superintendent and headmaster terminated the plaintiff’s employment.
The plaintiff sued. The defendants subsequently moved to strike, citing the following three reasons: (1) the speech alleged by the plaintiff was made within the course of his employment duties and is therefore not entitled to protection under the statute pursuant to Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., 304 Conn. 585, 43 A.3d 111 (2012), and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 1038, 126 S. Ct. 1645, 164 L. Ed. 2d 332 (2006); (2) the speech does not allege a matter of public concern; and (3) adjudication of the claims would result in impermissible entanglement of the court in religious matters in violation of the defendants’ first amendment rights.”
In its analysis, the court agreed that “an employee’s speech does not receive first amendment protection under the United States Constitution if it was made pursuant to the employee’s official job duties,” citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 424.
But the plaintiff was able to convince the judge that his speech regarding the mismanagement of funds “was made in his capacity as an alumnus and donor, not solely as an employee of the school. Accordingly, the plaintiff contends that this speech falls outside his job duties and would be entitled to federal constitutional protection.”
Next, the court turned to the plaintiff’s argument that his speech was one of public concern, and this enjoyed federal and state constitutional protections. Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Count, Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 563; Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 778, 734 A.2d 112 (1999).
“Presently, there are two incidents alleged by the plaintiff to be speech addressing a matter of public concern, which will be discussed in turn: (1) speech on behalf of the plaintiff relating to mismanagement of funds and charitable donations from the golf tournament; and (2) speech on behalf of the plaintiff relating to the conduct of the facilities director and student safety,” wrote the court.
Addressing the first incident, the court wrote that the “complaint alleges that the plaintiff spoke about a tournament that was advertised to raise athletic department funds and those funds were withheld for other purposes. The allegations do not concern the plaintiff’s opinion that the funds could have been better spent, but the fact that they were withheld from use for their stated purpose. Additionally, the plaintiff is alleged to have spoken not only as an employee, but as a donor and alumnus.
“Accordingly, for the purposes of the instant motion to strike, the facts alleged are sufficient to establish that the speech regarding the golf tournament funds alleges public concern.”
As for the speech relating to conduct of the facilities director and student safety, the court noted that the plaintiff has extensive case law in his corner, “that have recognized safety concerns in schools as public and societal concerns. See Spencer v. Philemy, 540 F.App’x 69, 70 (2d Cir. 2013).”
The court concluded that “the facts alleged are sufficient to establish that the speech regarding student safety and an intoxicated person who drove a motor vehicle onto school grounds implicates public concern.”
The defendants’ last argument rested on the concept that “the possible inquiry into allocation of fundraising monies, would constitute impermissible excessive entanglement with religion.” Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, 120 Conn.App. 666, 670-71, 994 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 901, 3 A.3d 74 (2010).
But the court would have none of it.
“In the present case, the facts as alleged in the complaint concern the plaintiff’s termination of employment from a religious school. The plaintiff was a baseball coach for the school and had organized a charity tournament of which the proceeds were advertised to be used for athletic department improvements. After speaking out to school administrators regarding the use of the funds and other matters relating to student safety concerns, the plaintiff was fired.”
The court continued: “The sole element of the claim at issue in terms of religious entanglement concerns the possibility of an inquiry into how the tournament funds were used. The complaint does not contain allegations that religious doctrine has been violated, that the plaintiff was a non-secular employee or that the plaintiff’s work was non-secular in nature. The allegations are of an employment dispute with a secular employee, an athletic director. See Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, supra, 120 Conn.App. 674. Thus, an inquiry into the … claim alleged here, does not implicate religious or ecclesiastical principles. It involves the application of statutory law and case law to evaluate the speech.”
William Buscetto v. Saint Bernard High School et al.; Super. Ct. Conn.; CV116011089, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1898; 7/25/14
