A federal judge from the Northern District of Illinois has granted a motion to dismiss filed by Jerry M. Reinsdorf, the principal owner of the Chicago White Sox, and others, who were sued by the former executive director and chief executive officer of the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority (ISFA), who claimed they orchestrated her firing.
The ISFA is a unit of local government created by the Illinois General Assembly, whose purpose is to use public funds for the provision of sports stadiums in Illinois. Its principal asset is U.S. Cellular Field, and the relationship between the ISFA and the White Sox is governed by a management agreement that runs through 2029. Under that agreement, the White Sox “have enjoyed a very favorable taxpayer-financed stadium deal,” according to the court. “Among other advantages, the ISFA paid 100 percent of the costs of building U.S. Cellular Field and continues to pay for improvements. The White Sox also paid no rent for the first 18 years and currently pay only token rent.”
Plaintiff Perri Irmer was named the executive director of the ISFA in December 2004 and continued in that role until her termination on April 25, 2011.
As the most senior employee, Irmer reported directly to the ISFA’s board of directors, including the chairman, James R Thompson. The board is selected by the Mayor of Chicago and the Governor of Illinois. Although Irmer alleged that the Governor alone selects the chairman, the Illinois statute provides that the chairman “shall be appointed by the Governor subject to the approval of the Mayor of the City of Chicago . . . .” 70 ILCS § 3205/4. Thompson was the Governor of Illinois when ISFA was created and served as the chairman of the board from 2006 through 2011.
“After becoming executive director, Irmer recognized that the ISFA was in a difficult financial condition, due in substantial part because it was putting the interests of the White Sox ahead of the interests of Illinois taxpayers,” wrote the court, citing the complaint. “As a result, Irmer sought to reform the relationship between the White Sox and the ISFA established in the management agreement, which she viewed as abusive to taxpayers. To that end, Irmer developed and implemented a facilities management plan, resulting in millions of dollars of savings for ISFA. Irmer also sought to develop new sources of revenue from non-baseball events, such as music concerts. She advocated that the White Sox pay rent to the ISFA and also sought to develop the publically owned lands around Cellular Field to generate additional revenue. The White Sox and Reinsdorf opposed these proposals because of the economic detriment to them. Reinsdorf also opposed the music concerts on the basis that they could detract from revenue generated by concerts held at the United Center,” which he had an ownership interest in. “Reinsdorf increasingly viewed Irmer as an opponent based on her reforms,” added the court, citing the complaint.
After being terminated, Irmer sued, alleging the following claims: (1) Count I, asserted against Thompson, for infringement of Irmer’s First Amendment right to free speech and retaliation; (2) Count II, asserted against Reinsdorf and Thompson, for conspiracy to violate Irmer’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) Count III, asserted against Reinsdorf, for a state law claim of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.
Addressing Count I, the court wrote that an employee must show: “(1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) the protected speech was a ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s action; and (3) he suffered a deprivation because of the employer’s action.” Wackett v. City of Beaver Dam, Wis., 642 F.3d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 2011). However, a public employee’s speech is not protected if it is made pursuant to her official duties. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006).
The defendants honed in on the latter condition, noting that Irmer’s First Amendment claim “should be dismissed because she was acting within the scope of her duties as Executive Director of the ISFA when she instituted reforms and protested against ISFA actions.” Irmer countered that she was whistleblowing and acting outside of her official duties because she spoke out beyond the ISFA. She pointed to her meetings with politicians and public officials, as well as her attempts to meet with the governor and mayor.
The court sided with the defendants, noting “a mere speculative possibility” that she spoke as a citizen is insufficient.
“Moreover, Irmer has failed to make any plausible allegations that Thompson knew about her allegedly protected speech,” wrote the court. “To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Irmer must connect her protected speech with her termination. See Caldwell v. City of Elwood, Ind., 959 F.2d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1992) (dismissing claim where plaintiff failed to plead any defendant actually knew of the allegedly protected speech). Irmer has not done so.”
The court found Count II similarly lacking.
“As discussed above, Irmer has failed to sufficiently allege that she was deprived of her First Amendment right to free speech. This is sufficient by itself to dismiss her conspiracy claim. See Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008).
“Moreover, Irmer’s Complaint is devoid of any facts that would establish an agreement between Thompson and Reinsdorf to deprive Irmer of her constitutional rights. The existence of such an agreement is essential to a conspiracy claim. See Redwood v. Dobson, 476 F.3d 462, 466 (7th Cir.2007).”
Further, Irmer’s conspiracy claim against Reinsdorf “is barred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which provides private citizens with immunity from civil liability for petitioning the government for official action in their favor, even if the results might harm others. See Tarpley v. Keistler, 188 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, Irmer alleges only that Reinsdorf petitioned government officials to remove her, in order to achieve economic benefits for the White Sox and himself. This alleged conduct is protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.”
According to the court, Count III, or the state law claims, was also lacking factual support, since the plaintiff “has not alleged sufficient facts to establish that Reinsdorf intentionally interfered with her employment so as to cause her termination. Although she alleges that Reinsdorf lobbied to remove her in 2008, she states that her contract was renewed at that time through 2010. Irmer has not alleged that Reinsdorf had any communications with any ISFA Board members or otherwise caused her termination in 2011. Because Irmer has failed to state a claim, Count III is dismissed.”
Perri L. Irmer v. Jerry M. Reinsdorf et al.; N.D. Ill.; Case No. 13-cv-2834, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83762; 6/19/14
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Carmen David Caruso, Jamie L. North, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Caruso & Roeder LLC, Chicago, IL; Linda C. Chatman, LEAD ATTORNEY, Chatman Law Offices, LLC, Chicago, IL. (for defendant) Bruce S. Sperling, Greg Shinall, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Matthew H Rice, Sperling & Slater PC, Chicago, IL.. Kimball Richard Anderson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Scott Tadashi Sakiyama, Sean Gerald Wieber, Shivani C. Bautista, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL.
