A federal judge from the Eastern District of Tennessee has denied a school district’s motion for summary judgment in a case in which it was sued by one of its coaches for racial discrimination.
In so ruling, the court found that questions of fact remain regarding the school district’s decision not to promote the plaintiff to a head coach position.
The defendant in the case is the Hamilton County Board of Education. Plaintiff Gary Bloodsaw has been a teacher in the school district since the 1997-1998 school year. During that time, he has a coach at Brown Middle School of football, girls’ basketball, and track. He also served as the head track coach at Central High School.
In spring of 2010, the head football coaching position at Central became available and the position was posted on the website of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association. At the time, the only open teaching position was for drafting. A panel of individuals interviewed select applicants for the position, including Bloodsaw. The panel interviewed Bloodsaw, in spite of the fact that he was not certified for the vacant position, because of the close relationship he had with Central and because “it was the right thing to do.”
Ultimately, the panel decided not to offer Bloodsaw the job and instead hired Coach Montgomery, a certified drafting teacher, for the coaching position.
When the school district discovered that Montgomery’s teaching license had expired, Montgomery left and the position was open again. The vacancy was posted to the TSSAA website and another panel interviewed five candidates for the position, again including Bloodsaw. The panel included Principal King; Athletic Director Brent Cooper; Assistant Principal Lesa Johnson; Gary Fomby, a science teacher; a parent representative whose son played for the football team; and a student athlete. Both Fomby and the parent representative were African-American and “were apparently chosen at least in part to make the panel more diverse,” wrote the judge. “Bloodsaw intimates that this decision was made because he filed an EEOC charge following the previous panel’s decision to hire a white coach.
“The interview panel had a number of goals in mind for Central’s new football coach. Central’s facilities were in need of improvement and the panel was searching for a candidate who had experience improving facilities, which necessarily included fundraising experience. Also, the panel sought a coach who would bring stability to the program, which had seen considerable turnover in the head coaching position. Prior high school coaching experience was also an important factor.
“Bloodsaw is quick to note, however, that the actual posting on TSSAA’s website did not mention any of these goals but only stated that the head coach position was open, teaching positions had not yet been determined, and interested applicants should contact Athletic Director Cooper and Principal King.”
The panel ultimately selected John Allen, a certified teacher, who was in his fifth year as director of development and head football coach at Silverdale Baptist Academy. Allen, who is white, had a very successful track record as a coach and fund raiser.
The panel did approach the plaintiff to see if he would be interested in being Allen’s assistant coach. Bloodsaw expressed an interest. But the problem remained that there was not an open PE position. The search for an assistant coach dragged on until a PE position finally opened up on June 30, 2011. However, Bloodsaw could not apply for it because a current employee may not transfer within the school system past June 1. Another candidate, who was white, was hired.
On December 15, 2011, Bloodsaw filed a complaint of racial and national origin discrimination against the defendant with the EEOC. The EEOC charge alleges that Bloodsaw has been “continually denied promotion opportunities and employment assignments for coaching positions,” and that lesser-qualified applicants who are not members of a protected class have been hired instead. His charge focuses on the 2011 hiring of Allen as head coach as well as the 2011 hiring of Cook as an assistant coach. On September 28, 2012, Bloodsaw received a notice of right to sue from the EEOC. He filed suit in this court on December 21, 2012, alleging that Defendant violated his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et. seq.3
The defendant moved for summary judgment.
The court noted that “a circumstantial racial discrimination claim is evaluated using the familiar burden-shifting approach established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), and refined by Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Vaughn v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 291 F.3d 900, 906 (6th Cir. 2002).
“Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for its actions. Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 463 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).”
Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate the employer’s explanation is pretext. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04, 807.
Addressing the first instance of alleged discrimination, centering on the head coach position, the court concluded that Bloodsaw had presented “sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that he and Allen were similarly qualified for the head coach position.”
Turning to the pretext stage, the court noted that the “burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for not promoting Bloodsaw. The defendant has done so: Allen had more experience as a high school football coach, had more experience and proven success fundraising to improve athletic facilities, and Allen was capable of filling an open position at Central. Bloodsaw, on the other hand, had limited fundraising experience and had not coached on the high school level for seventeen years. Moreover, there was no vacant teaching position at Central that Bloodsaw was certified to fill. As a result of these circumstances, and not because of Bloodsaw’s race, the defendant chose Allen to fill Central’s head coach position.”
Even so, the court reasoned that Bloodsaw had demonstrated that a “question of fact” remained about whether the defendant’s “non-discriminatory explanation is pretext for discrimination,” leading to the denial of the summary judgment motion.
As for the assistant coaching position, the district argued again that the candidates did not have “similar qualifications.” The court disagreed and found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination.
While the defendant “articulated a number of legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for choosing Cook,” the plaintiff, as he had done with the head coach position, “attacked” each one. The court agreed with the plaintiff, noting, “a question of fact exists, leading to the denial of summary judgment on this instance.”
Gary Bloodsaw v. Hamilton County Board Of Education; E.D. Tenn.; 1:12-cv-426, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55561; 4/22/14
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Courtney L Wilbert, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, Colbert & Wilbert, PLLC, Franklin, TN; Richard L Colbert, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, Kay, Griffin, Enkema & Colbert, PLLC, Nashville, TN. (for defendant) D Scott Bennett, Mary C DeCamp, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Leitner Williams Dooley Napolitan, PLLC, (Chattanooga), Chattanooga, TN.
