A federal judge from the District of Minnesota has a denied a youth football association’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by four individuals under the auspices of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court concluded that more facts are need before deciding whether the association operates a place of public accommodation and is subject to the ADA.
The defendants in the case are the Spring Lake Park Panther Youth Football Association and several of its coaches and administrators. The plaintiffs are David Nathanson, Gloria Nathanson, and their two children, D.N. and G.N. Each of the plaintiffs are hearing-impaired, possessing a disability as defined by the ADA. They primarily communicate using American Sign Language (ASL).
D.N., then age eight, began playing football with the association in 2011. His brother, G.N., then age six, joined the association in 2013. In 2011 and 2012, the association arranged and paid for ASL interpreters for D.N.’s games and practices. Beginning in 2012, the association permitted the use of a sideline drum that was struck upon the snap of the football on each play. The vibration of the drum assisted D.N. by signaling when each play started.
Beginning in August 2013, the Fridley School District, where D.N. and G.N. attended school, provided ASL interpreters for football practices, games, and meetings under the boys’ Individual Education Plan. On September 11, 2014, however, Fridley determined that since the association was not a Fridley Public School sponsored event, it would no longer provide interpretation services for D.N. and G.N. The plaintiffs requested the association to provide interpretative services for games and practices, but their requests were denied. As a result, the association did not provide interpretative services for D.N. and G.N.’s fall 2014 football games or practices. Use of the drum was also discontinued in 2014.
The parent’s portion of the complaint centered on the association’s alleged refusal to provide David with an ASL interpreter for the mandatory prospective coaches meeting, when he was a coach, and the association’s decision not to provide an ASL interpreter for Gloria and David at various meetings.
The plaintiffs argued that they have suffered humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional and physical distress as a result of the association’s refusal to provide ASL interpreters. The plaintiffs alleged violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01 et seq.
In a motion to dismiss, the association and other defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ ADA claim must be dismissed because the association is not a place of public accommodation, and thus not subject to Title III’s mandate. The plaintiffs countered that the association satisfies the legal definition of a place of public accommodation because it “operates or controls access to a place of public accommodation: the football fields used for the association’s games and practices.”
The court noted that the ADA provides a detailed list of private entities that are considered to be public accommodations. Those entities are:
“(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office [*8] of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.”
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A—F).
Furthermore, the categories “are to be construed liberally to afford individuals with disabilities equal access to the establishments available to the non-disabled.” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 676-677, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 149 L. Ed. 2d 904 (2001).
To prevail on a discrimination claim under Title III of the ADA, the plaintiff in the instant case “must show that: 1) the plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, 2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation, and 3) the defendant failed to make reasonable modifications that do not fundamentally alter the nature of the public accommodation.” Mershon v. St. Louis Univ., 442 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 2006).
The court then turned to a case that was “similar to the one at hand” — Shultz by & Through Schultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1996). “In that case, an 11 year old child with cerebral palsy petitioned the defendant association to be permitted to play on a baseball team designed for ballplayers aged 9-10. Id. at 1224. In denying the request, the association claimed that allowing the 11 year old child to ‘play down’ would violate the rules established by the association’s parent organization. Id. In granting the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, the district court concluded that the association was ‘a place of public accommodation’ under the ADA irrespective of their link to any physical facilities.’ Id. at 1225 (quoting Carparts Dist. Cent. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994)).
“The association argues that it does not ‘operate’ a place of public accommodation because it does not exercise the degree of control over the football fields like the PGA did with the golf courses in Martin or the NCAA with the stadiums in Matthews or Bowers,” wrote the court. “The plaintiffs have, however, pled sufficient facts to the contrary. The plaintiffs aver the association ‘operates a youth football association’ that ‘hosts football practices, games, and social events for registered participants.’ (The term) ‘operates’ has been accorded its plain and ordinary meaning of ‘put or keep in operation,’ ‘to control or direct the function of,’ or ‘to conduct the affairs of; manage.’ Tatum v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (citing Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1995)). Here, the Football Association’s games and practices are presumably scheduled in advance, suggesting the Football Association has an arrangement with the City of Spring Lake Park allowing access and control to the fields. Although the exact relationship between the City of Spring Lake Park and the Football Association will be developed through discovery, the plaintiffs have, at the dismissal stage, plausibly stated that the association operates a place of public accommodation.”
David Nathanson et al v. Spring Lake Park Panther Youth Football Association et al.; D. Minn.; Civil No. 15-1510 ADM/BRT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120530; 9/10/15
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Heather M. Gilbert, Esq., Gilbert Law PLLC. (for defendants) Laurel J. Pugh, Esq., Bassford Remele, PA, Minneapolis, MN.
