A federal judge has from the Southern District of Ohio has denied a request of the parents of a disabled high school student, who sought a permanent injunction that would have required the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA) to make an exception to its rule that a student must reside in Ohio to be eligible to compete at one of the association’s member high schools in that state.
The ruling was counter to the court’s decision in the fall of 2014, which granted a temporary injunction to the plaintiffs, noting at the time that the association could have accommodated the student athlete and complied with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court then encouraged the two sides to settle, but those talks stalled.
Charles Steines was a ninth grade student at The Summit Country Day School in Cincinnati. Despite residing in Kentucky, Steines has attended school in Cincinnati since being diagnosed with a learning disability, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, prior to the first grade. He hoped to play on the varsity soccer team, but the OHSAA refused to grant an accommodation or waiver of the OHSAA’s instate residency requirement (Bylaw 4-6-3). The parents sued, alleging a violation of the ADA.
In its analysis, the court noted that district courts must “consider the following four factors when deciding to issue a temporary restraining order: (1) whether the movant has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of preliminary injunctive relief would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of preliminary injunctive relief. See Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000).”
That court went on to recap the plaintiffs’ argument “that the OHSAA bylaws have the effect of discriminating against Steines on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Titles II and III of the ADA.” That court found that they had demonstrated “a strong likelihood of success on their claim under Title II of the ADA.”
The court rendering the instant opinion ruled differently.
“There are three methods by which a student athlete can establish that a high school athletic association has discriminated against him,” wrote the court “on the basis of his disability: (1) by offering evidence that learning disabilities were actually considered by the high school athletic association in formulating or implementing its eligibility rule; (2) by showing that the high school athletic association could have reasonably accommodated his disability, but refused to do so; and (3) by proving a disparate impact upon disabled students. McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1997)
“This dispute focuses on the second method of proof, by which a plaintiff can establish an ADA violation without proving intentional discrimination. The OHSAA argues that because Bylaw 4-6-3 applies to all disabled and non-disabled students without distinction, the rule does not exclude C.S. from participating in interscholastic sports because of his disability but rather solely because he resides in Kentucky. The second method of proof, however, does not require the Steines to prove that the OHSAA intended to discriminate against C.S. because of his disability. “It is sufficient to establish that the OHSAA could accommodate his disability, but refuses to do so. The Steines allege that the OHSAA could accommodate C.S.’s disability by granting him a waiver of Bylaw 4-6-3.”
However, the court also wrote that “an accommodation is generally necessary only ‘when it allows the disabled to obtain benefits they ordinarily could not have by reason of their disabilities, and not because of some quality they share with the public generally.’ Wis. Community Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 754 (7th Cir. 2006); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 276 (2d Cir. 2003) (same principle). There must be an ‘identifiable relationship, or nexus, between the requested accommodation and the individual’s disability.’ Joint Statement of The Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Justice, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act (May 14, 2014); see also PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 688 (stating that Title III of the ADA requires courts to examine whether a requested accommodation is necessary for the disabled person). ‘Ordinarily, an accommodation of an individual’s disability operates so that the disability is overcome and the disability no longer prevents the individual from participating.’ Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035 (emphasis in the original). A plaintiff challenging the eligibility rules of a high school athletic association must establish that ‘but for his learning disability, he would have been eligible to play sports.’ Washington, 181 F.3d at 849
“C.S. is ineligible to play sports for Summit because his parents live outside of Ohio, not because he is disabled. Because his parents live in Kentucky, C.S. would be ineligible to play sports for Summit even if he was not disabled. Moreover, waiving Bylaw 4-6-3 does not accommodate or overcome C.S.’s learning disability in any way. C.S. cannot establish that ‘but for’ his learning disability, he would be eligible to play Ohio interscholastic sports for Summit.
“The Steines want the Court to focus not on their choice to be residents in Kentucky—the fact that creates C.S.’s ineligibility for interscholastic sports under Bylaw 4-6-3—but rather on their choice to send C.S. to high school at Summit in Ohio. The Steines assert that C.S. would attend school in Kentucky, and not at Summit, but for his disability. The Court cannot accept this premise to the extent that the factual record in this case establishes that Summit is not the only school which could provide the educational services C.S. requires to accommodate his learning disabilities. Ann Munson Steines and Michael Steines both have stated Holy Cross High School in Kentucky could provide C.S. with the services he needs as a disabled student.”
“(T)the Court cannot conclude that there is a sufficiently close nexus between C.S.’s disability and the reason for his ineligibility under Bylaw 4-6-3 to find disability discrimination.”
C.S., a Minor, by his Parents and Natural Guardians, Ann Munson Steines and Michael Steines v. Ohio High School Athletic Association; S.D. Ohio; Case No. 1:14-cv-525, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99003; 7/29/15
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiffs) John Patrick Concannon, Katherine Daughtrey Neff, Randolph Harry Freking, of Freking & Betz, Cincinnati, OH.
