A federal judge from the Middle District of Pennsylvania has granted summary judgment to Messiah College, which was sued by a student athlete, who claimed it discriminated against her because of her dyslexia when the coach kicked her off the team. In so ruling, the court found that the defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level of “outrageousness” necessary to support the plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiff Ariana Borreggine enrolled at Messiah College in August 2011. The following spring, she injured her foot. She alleged on or around July 18, 2012 that a pattern of discriminatory behavior began, which was based on her dyslexia.
Borreggine alleged specifically that Messiah College Women’s Lacrosse Coach Heather Greer told her that she used dyslexia as a crutch; (2) drew diagrams insinuating that she was incapable of understanding instructions; (3) raised her voice at her when she did not understand instructions; (4) asked teammates to translate/ instructions for Borreggine; and (5) insisted on having Borreggine’s teammates present when she would ridicule her and imply that the plaintiff’s disability was exaggerated.
On January 22, 2013, the plaintiff’s parents complained to Messiah College Athletic Director Jack Cole about the discriminatory treatment directed at their daughter. A day later, at a meeting where the subject was whether to remove the plaintiff from the lacrosse team, Greer again, allegedly, called Borreggine a liar. The plaintiff was subsequently removed from the lacrosse team.
On January 26, 2013, Greer held a meeting with the team during which she allegedly told them they should cease all communications with the plaintiff. As a result, Borreggine was forced to withdraw from school, claiming she was ostracized by her friends.
On May 28, 2013, the plaintiff sued Messiah, the Board of Trustees of Messiah, and Messiah College staff Greer, Cole and Dr. Kris Hansen-Kieffer. She alleged in count one that all defendants unlawfully discriminated against her in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. She alleged in count two that all defendants violated Pennsylvania law by intentionally inflicting emotional distress. She also sought monetary damages as a result of the alleged discriminatory treatment she suffered and her resulting financial loss from transferring to a new school.
On July 25, 2013, the defendants moved for summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court dismissed the claim without prejudice, finding that the claim lacked sufficient evidentiary support.
The plaintiff refiled an amended complaint. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the two counts alleged in the plaintiff’s amended complaint: “(1) Plaintiff’s claims under the Rehabilitation Act, and (2) Plaintiff’s claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law.”
Addressing the Rehabilitation Act (Count I), the court noted that to qualify for protections under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must be a qualified individual with a disability, and must be discriminated against on the basis of that disability. See, e.g., Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009).” The plaintiff “appears to allege alternatively that she was discriminated against on (1) the basis of her foot and Achilles tendon injuries and (2) her dyslexia,” according to the court.
The “foot” injury was a non-starter with the court, which wrote that the plaintiff “has not established that she suffered from more than ‘comparatively moderate’ limitations on her ability to walk. See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 103-06 (3d Cir. 1996).”
Turning to the discrimination claim premised on her dyslexia, the court focused on “whether there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff was removed from the lacrosse team on the basis of her disability, i.e., her dyslexia.
“The Court finds that no reasonable fact finder could conclude that the plaintiff’s dyslexia was the sole reason for her removal from the lacrosse team, and will grant summary judgment on this claim.”
Next was the motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff’s “intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.” The defendants argued that it’s “actions are not sufficiently outrageous, and (that) the plaintiff suffered insufficient physical manifestation of her injury.”
Elaborating on the first argument, it wrote that “a reasonable fact-finder could not conclude based on the record of this case that the conduct of the defendants was sufficiently outrageous to sustain her IIED claim under Pennsylvania law, and summary judgment is therefore appropriate on this claim.”
Ariana Borreggine v. Messiah College, et al.; M.D. Pa.; No. 1:13-cv-01423, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109724; 8/19/15
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Stephen T. O’Hanlon, LEAD ATTORNEY, Philadelphia, PA. (for defendants) Karen A. Salvemini, Rhoads & Sinon, LLP, Harrisburg, PA; Todd J. Shill, Rhoades & Sinon, Harrisburg, PA.
