A federal judge from the Middle District of Pennsylvania has granted in part a school district’s motion for summary judgment in a case in which it was sued by a coach after it chose not to renew his contract. The coach had claimed the district’s decision was based on the fact that he complained over the district’s suspension of his son, and that the district had violated his Constitutional rights.
Plaintiff Ted Jackson Sr. was the head varsity football coach for the Dallas School District for 28 years, beginning in 1984. As such, he led the school district football team to 14 Wyoming Valley Conference titles, four Eastern Conference titles, three District 2 titles, and the 1993 PIAA Class AA state title.
During the 2011 season, the plaintiff’s son, Ted Jackson Jr., came under fire after he was suspended as an assistant football coach for two games during the 2011 season after receiving unsportsmanlike conduct penalties in consecutive games. The elder Jackson expressed his “disappointment in how his son had been treated.”
After a poor evaluation, the plaintiff’s contract was not renewed after the season. Jackson presented evidence that his evaluation went from fairly exemplary to poor in a matter of months. He was replaced someone he believed to be less qualified. Robert Zaruta.
In the fall of 2012, he sued the school district and several administrators, alleging violations of the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Count I asserted a cause of action for violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments rights to speech and association with regard to his termination. Count II asserted that he was not selected for the position of head coach in violation of his speech and association rights. Count I and Count II are asserted against the defendants in their official capacities. Count III and Count IV assert the same causes of action against the defendants in their individual capacities.
The plaintiff sought reinstatement to his former employment; a permanent injunction against the defendants enjoining them from taking adverse employment actions based upon political affiliation, speech and association; a permanent injunction against defendants enjoining them from retaliating against plaintiff for filing this action as vindication of constitutional rights; back pay; compensatory damages; punitive damages; pre-judgment interest; reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and other relief as may be just and equitable.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, leading to the instant opinion.
The court granted the motion as it related to the plaintiff’s free speech claims and with regard to punitive damages against the school district and the defendants in their official capacities. It was much less receptive to other aspects of the motion, like the plaintiff’s discrimination claim.
“Evidence alone that Zaruta was less qualified than plaintiff may not be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment qualifications,” wrote the court, noting that “it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, because the issue is whether the employer acted with discriminatory animus. Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 283 (3d Cir. 2001). However, that is here coupled with the fact that Zaruta supported the campaigns of three of the decision makers by placing signs in his yard. Moreover, plaintiff’s political party registration is Democrat whereas the Board majority and plaintiff’s replacement were all Republicans. Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence, which if believed by the factfinder, may give rise to the inference that he was forced out of his job and replaced by Zaruta for political reasons. Thus, he has met his prima facie case. The burden shifts to the defendant to provide non-discriminatory reasons – – here they assert that their decision was based on the plaintiff’s performance. Plaintiff then rebuts this with the same evidence used to support his prima facie case.
“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants sought to open up the position plaintiff held for political reason, took affirmative steps to facilitate plaintiff’s termination and covered it up in the guise of a poor performance evaluation. As such, plaintiff has pointed to evidence in the record that could cause a reasonable jury to disbelieve defendants’ non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination (and failure to re-hire him) thereby creating a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the real reason for defendants’ actions. Summary judgment on this issue will therefore be denied.”
Turning to the defendants’ argument that summary judgment “is appropriate because the plaintiff has failed to identify a policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violations,” the court disagreed.
“Courts have clarified that government organizations can be liable under Section 1983 for the civil rights violations of its employees in the following situations:
“First, the municipality will be liable if its employee acted pursuant to a formal government policy or a standard operating procedure long accepted within the government entity, Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989); second, liability will attach when the individual has policy making authority rendering his or her behavior an act of official government policy, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986); third, the municipality will be liable if an official with authority has ratified the unconstitutional actions of a subordinate, rendering such behavior official for liability purposes, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988).
McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367 (3d Cir.2005).
“In the instant case, plaintiff alleges that the school directors violated his rights. School directors qualify as individuals with final policy making authority for the school district and thus their decisions are official governmental policy for purposes of Monell liability. See Sciotto v. Marple Newton Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 559, 574-75 (E.D. Pa. 1999). Accordingly, the school district may be held liable for the actions of the individual defendant school directors and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this ground will be denied.”
Ted Jackson, Sr. v. Dallas School District et al.; M.D. Pa.; No. 3:12cv1903, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94292; 7/21/15
Attorneys of record: (for plaintiff) Joseph C. Borland, Kimberly D. Borland, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Borland & Borland, LLP, Wilkes-Barre, PA USA. (for defendants) Andrew T. Bench, John E. Freund, III, King Spty Herman Freund & Paul LLC, Bethlehem, PA USA. (for mediator) Raymond P. Wendolowski, LEAD ATTORNEY, Law Offices of Raymond P. Wendolowski, Wilkes-Barre, PA USA.
