A South Carolina appeals court reversed, in part, a lower court, breathing new life into a claim by several University of South Carolina Athletics (USCA) boosters that the school breached the contract it had with them when it altered their parking privileges.
Specifically, the panel of judges sided with the appellants/plaintiffs on their equitable estoppel claim.
The contracts in question were signed almost three decades ago when the plaintiffs acquired Lifetime Scholarship Memberships in the Gamecock Club, an organization supporting USCA. In exchange for donations to the Gamecock Club, the donors received lifetime rights and privileges that were memorialized in a Membership contract. A 1986 brochure described Lifetime Scholarship Membership football parking benefits as “Assigned Reserved Parking,” ostensibly on the apron of the University’s football stadium in reserved parking spaces.
By 2012, that benefit had been eroded as USCA began looking for new ways to generate revenue from its fan base. The plaintiffs sued, alleging the university breached the Lifetime Scholarship Membership contracts by requiring them to move to less-advantageous parking spaces. Each side moved for summary judgment.
On August 9, 2013, the circuit court heard the motions. The plaintiffs argued the Lifetime Scholarship Membership contract unambiguously provided them with priority. The court sided with the defendants, sparking the appeal.
The appeals court leaned heavily on Lee v. The University of South Carolina, 407 S.C. 512, 757 S.E.2d 394 (2014). In that decision, summarized in Sports Litigation Alert, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed a lower court and found that the university violated the terms of a contract it had with a booster when it required him to pay a seat license fee for the right to continue purchasing his tickets.
In the instant case, the court wrote that “the elements of equitable estoppel for the party asserting the estoppel are the following: (1) a lack of knowledge and of a means of knowing the truth as to the facts in question; (2) a reliance upon the conduct of the estopped party; and (3) a prejudicial change in position. Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 589, 553 S.E.2d 110, 114 (2001). The elements as to the party being estopped are the following: (1) conduct by the estopped party amounting to a false representation or a concealment of material facts; (2) an intention that such conduct be acted upon by the other party; and (3) actual or constructive knowledge of the true facts. Id. The party asserting estoppel carries the burden of proof. Blue Ridge Realty Co. v. Williamson, 247 S.C. 112, 122, 145 S.E.2d 922, 927 (1965).
“The circuit court rejected the plaintiffs’ equitable estoppel claim. In reversing the circuit court, we again rely on recent South Carolina Supreme Court precedent. In Springob v. The University of South Carolina, 407 S.C. 490, 493, 757 S.E.2d 384, 385-86 (2014), the court considered the plaintiffs’ challenges to the Gamecock Club’s imposition of premium seating fees on Gamecock Club members. The premium seating was originally offered to high-level Gamecock Club members via a brochure offering the seats and other amenities, including preferred parking, access to a private club in the arena, and the option to purchase the best tickets to all events held at the arena. Id. at 493-94, 757 S.E.2d at 386. The brochure offered the opportunity to purchase the tickets over five years at $5,000 per seat in the first year and $1,500 per seat in years two through five. Id. at 494, 757 S.E.2d at 386. USC employees allegedly promised the plaintiffs that after year five, they would only have to pay the face value of the season tickets and maintain their Gamecock Club memberships to retain the premium seats. Id. After the fifth year, USC requested a $1,500 per seat fee and informed the plaintiffs they would be required to pay $1,500 per seat each year to retain the premium seating. Id. The plaintiffs filed an action alleging breach of contract, and the circuit court granted USC’s motion for summary judgment, finding that due to the absence of a written contract between the parties, the statute of frauds barred the plaintiffs’ claims. Id.
“Our supreme court affirmed in part, finding the circuit court correctly found the agreement was barred by the statute of frauds. Id. at 495, 757 S.E.2d at 386. However, the court reversed in part and remanded, finding there was a factual issue as to whether USC was equitably estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense based on an alleged oral promise that the plaintiffs would not have to pay the fee beyond year five. Id.”
Turning to the instant case, the appeals court noted that the plaintiffs relied on the university’s “assurances of first and second priority ‘always’ in exchange for the increased donations made to USC. This is sufficient to create an issue of material fact as to whether (the plaintiffs) suffered a detrimental change in reliance on the representations. See id., 407 S.C. at 498, 757 S.E.2d at 388 (finding a fact question existed, which precluded summary judgment on the Gamecock Club members’ estoppel claim based on oral representations by USC). Thus, we reverse and remand, finding a factual issue exists in this case as to whether USC was equitably estopped from denying the plaintiffs’ the highest priority to available parking as Lifetime Scholarship Members.”
Linda Rodarte et al. v. University of South Carolina and University of South Carolina Gamecock Club; Ct. App. S.C.; 2015 S.C. App. Unpub. LEXIS 437; 7/15/15
Attorneys of Record: (for Appellants) Julius W. Babb, IV, and J. Lewis Cromer, both of J. Lewis Cromer & Associates, LLC, of Columbia. (for Respondents) Robert E. Stepp and Bess J. DuRant, both of Sowell Gray Stepp & Laffitte, LLC, of Columbia.
