A federal judge from the Eastern District of Washington granted, for the most part, a university and several individual defendants’ motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by a former baseball coach, who alleged the defendants violated his Constitutional rights when they did not renew his employment contract.
This was a second defeat for the coach after a Wisconsin appeals court affirmed a lower state court’s ruling for the defendants earlier this year.
Plaintiff Thomas Lechnir’s affiliation with the University of Wisconsin—Oshkosh (UWO) and its baseball program spanned 35 years, first as a student player, then assistant coach, then 25 years as head coach. His employment largely was governed by a three-year “rolling-horizon” contract, which provided for automatic yearly extensions without a formal renewal process.
In 2002, UWO began work on the Oshkosh Sports Complex (OSC), a facility that would serve several UWO sports programs. Baseball was not one of them. Lechnir offered to head up funding a baseball stadium, “Alumni Stadium,” that would be financially independent of the OSC. UWO agreed. In addition, the UWO Foundation agreed to cover the “carrying costs,” or capitalized interest.
In April 2010, UWO Chancellor Richard Wells advised Lechnir that his rolling-horizon contract arrangement would end on June 30, 2013, with the expiration of his then-existing contract, but he would be subject to contract renewal in the May 2012 renewal cycle. Wells told Lechnir the reason was “the significant debt created in the expansion and renovation of Alumni Stadium.” The contract-change decision was not subject to appeal or grievance.
In May 2012, Wells informed Lechnir that, for “reasons … derived from a review by your supervisor,” UWO would not be offering him a new contract. Pursuant to Lechnir’s written request, Wells explained that the nonrenewal was due to Lechnir’s inadequate performance in four areas: fundraising, student athlete retention and academic success, administrative duties, and community relations and engagement.
Lechnir asked a state court judge to intervene. When that judge denied his request, he appealed. Unsuccessful in that bid, Lechnir sought help from a federal court, claiming that the non-renewal constituted a violation of due process and retaliation. The defendants moved to dismiss those claims, leading to the instant opinion.
The core argument presented by the defendants was that the state courts’ rulings preclude the plaintiff from “bringing essentially the same claim in federal court. Wisconsin law, which governs the analysis, provides that three factors must be present in order to preclude a later action: (1) identity between the parties or their privies in the prior and present suits; (2) prior litigation resulted in a final judgment on the merits by a court with jurisdiction; and (3) identity of the causes of action in the two suits. Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 2000). The earlier judgment is conclusive as to all matters which were litigated or which might have been litigated in that proceeding. Wilhelm v. County of Milwaukee, 325 F.3d 843, 846-47 (7th Cir. 2003). The Restatement of Judgments provides a succinct explanation:
“A given claim may find support in theories arising from both state and federal law. When the plaintiff brings a claim in a court, either state or federal, in which there is no jurisdictional obstacle to his advancing both theories or grounds, but he presents only one of them, and judgment is entered with respect to it, he may not maintain a second action in which he tenders the other theory or ground. If however, the court in the first action would clearly not have had jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory or ground (or, having jurisdiction, would clearly have declined to exercise it as a matter of discretion), then a second action in a competent court presenting the omitted theory or ground should be held not precluded.”
Lechnir argued “that claim preclusion does not apply because he could not have raised the federal claims he now raises.” The defendants countered that “not only could he raise his due process in the state proceedings, but that Lechnir in fact did do so and is therefore precluded from asserting it here. Whether Lechnir did or did not assert his due process claim in the state proceedings makes no difference. The fact that he was free to do so is enough to preclude his raising it here,” held the federal court, citing the 7th Circuit decision in Froebel v. Meyer.
“Even if the claim were not precluded, there is no reason to reach a different conclusion than the state courts reached. The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s due process claim must fail because he had no property interest in continued employment, given that his contract was to expire in 2013. Lechnir concedes he had no property interest in a given contract, but argues that such an interest can be created through implied promises … that his contract would be renewed if he demonstrated efforts to raise money to pay off what he calls the phantom debt arising out of the baseball field construction.”
The problem with the argument, however, is that “that is the implicit promise in almost every job imaginable, not just Lechnir’s. Presumably most employees expect their contracts to be renewed upon their satisfactory performance, and those expectations may often sprout from the kinds of informal assurances and utterances that are common in the workplace. But if such commonplace expectations are enough to create a protected property interest, the United States Constitution would obviate the need for most public employment contracts.”
Thomas Lechnir v. Richard Wells, et al.; E.D. Wash.; Case No. 14-C-1020, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83979; 6/29/15
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Jason G Wied, Menn Law Firm Ltd, Green Bay, WI; Kurt F Ellison, William P McKinley, Menn Law Firm Ltd, Appleton, WI. (for defendants) Rachel L Bachhuber, LEAD ATTORNEY, Steven C Kilpatrick, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Madison, WI.
