A federal judge from the Southern District of Ohio provided some relief to a participant in a basketball game, who sued an indoor sports facility after he became injured in a freak accident.
Dalton McGue, 17, injured his leg at the Kingdom Sports Center, Inc. (KSP), a privately-owned multi-sport indoor facility located in Franklin, Ohio, while playing in a basketball game on April 30, 2011. McGue alleged that he was severely injured when he accelerated toward the basketball goal, made a lay-up, and landed on the goal’s support structure.
The plaintiff subsequently sued, alleging that the defendant negligently, recklessly, and intentionally maintained its premises in a manner that allowed the goal’s support structure to be positioned too close to the baseline of the court, rendering the court dangerous for play.
KSP moved for summary judgment.
Before rendering its analysis, the court noted that KSP was not a member of the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), National Federation of High School Sports (NFHSS), or the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA).
KSP purchased the basketball goals in question in 2004 from a private seller. It was advised by the seller at the time that these were “collegiate basketball goals.” Prior to the plaintiff’s injury, KSP was never advised by any person or entity that its use of these basketball goals was improper at the KSP facility.
The court continued, noting that the basketball goals at issue were used for at least six basketball seasons prior to the plaintiff’s accident, and approximately 1,000 games were played with these goals per year. No injuries associated with the basketball goals were reported during that time.
Among the arguments made in KSP’s motion was that the plaintiff’s expert witness is not qualified to provide expert testimony and improperly relies on rules and regulations that are not applicable to the defendant. The court turned to the Daubert framework to assess its arguments.
The court noted that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits testimony based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” by experts qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” if the testimony is both relevant and reliable. The trial judge must act as a gatekeeper, admitting only that expert testimony which is relevant and reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). Daubert attempts to strike a balance between liberal admissibility for relevant evidence and the need to exclude misleading “junk science.” Best v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 176-77 (6th Cir. 2009).
The expert witness testified that Mike Roe, the defendant’s owner and operator, “failed to implement well-established safety procedures and failed to provide a product in his facility that would minimize the risk of injury or comply with well-established safety rules.” To support these conclusions, Andres compares the specifications of the goal used by the defendant with AAU, NFHSS, and NCAA regulations. Specifically, the expert testified that the defendant used a T-Rex 66 basketball goal, made for only 66 inches of safe play, while NFHSS and NCAA rules specify that regulation size basketball courts require the use of a basketball goal providing at least 96 inches of safe play. Further, he testified that the defendant positioned the goal supports approximately two feet from the baseline, while AAU, NFHSS, and NCAA rules require a clearance for goal supports to be a minimum of four feet from the baseline.
“It is uncontested that the defendant’s facility is privately-owned and that the defendant is not a member of the AAU or the NFHSS,” wrote the court. “Roe affirms that the tournament in which the plaintiff participated was not an AAU tournament. The plaintiff does not cite any authority for the proposition that AAU, NFHSS, and NCAA regulations establish a legal duty on the defendant. Accordingly, to the extent that Andres testifies that such regulations created a legal duty by which the defendant was bound, the court finds his testimony unreliable.”
Turning to the negligence claim, the court wrote that “the plaintiff is required to prove the traditional tort elements of duty, breach, and proximate causation. Bennison v. Stillpass Transit Co., 5 Ohio St.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 213 (1966) (syllabus).
“In a premises liability case, the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff depends on the plaintiff’s status—invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 315, 1996 Ohio 137, 662 N.E.2d 287 (1996). The owner of a business owes its business invitees a duty of ordinary care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn invitees of latent or hidden dangers. Uddin v. Embassy Suites Hotel, 165 Ohio App. 3d 699, 2005-Ohio-6613, 848 N.E.2d 519, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.) Here, the defendant does not dispute that the plaintiff was a business invitee.”
McGue’s negligence claim hinged upon the open-and-obvious doctrine. Specifically, “Where a danger is open and obvious, a landowner owes no duty of care to individuals lawfully on the premises. Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St. 3d 79, 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d 1088 (syllabus).
“… Here, the plaintiff was aware of the location and nature of the goals. His team did a shoot-around session prior to his first scheduled game, and then, after the game was forfeited by the other team, the plaintiff sat and watched another entire game. After that, the plaintiff’s team went through a warm-up prior to the game in which the injury occurred. The hazard was observable by the reasonable person, and Plaintiff has failed to set forth specific facts showing that the basketball hoop was not an open-and-obvious hazard. Accordingly, the court finds that the goal presented an open-and-obvious danger and, accordingly, the plaintiff’s negligence claim is barred.”
Next, the court turned to the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury, and how the Supreme Court of Ohio has established the following standard for cases involving injuries during a sporting event:
“Where individuals engage in recreational or sports activities, they assume the ordinary risks of the activity and cannot recover for any injury unless it can be shown that the other participant’s actions were either ‘reckless’ or ‘intentional’ as defined in Sections 500 and 8A of the Restatement of Torts 2d.” Marchetti v. Kalish, 53 Ohio St.3d 95, 559 N.E.2d 699 (1990), syllabus.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant “negligently, recklessly and intentionally” maintained its premises in a dangerous condition by improperly placing the basketball goal at issue.
The court agreed the claim should survive, at least to trial.
“Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court assumes that the goals were not set according to the above-mentioned specifications, most specifically that the goals were not placed with at least four feet of clearance from the baseline to the base of the basketball goal,” the court wrote. “A reasonable mind could conclude that the defendant was reckless because it created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the plaintiff, one substantially greater than that necessary to make its conduct merely negligent, given the nature of its business and the players’ vulnerability to serious injury. Accordingly, the court finds that a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on the plaintiff’s recklessness claim.”
Dalton McGue v. Kingdom Sports Center, INC.; S.D. Ohio; Case No. 1:14-cv-162, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40668l; 3/30/15
Attorneys: (for plaintiff) Charles David Ewing, LEAD ATTORNEY, Ewing & Willis PLLC, Louisville, KY; Damon B Willis, PRO HAC VICE, Louisville, KY. (for defendant (Richard Joseph Rinear, LEAD ATTORNEY, Droder & Miller Co LPA – 1, Cincinnati, OH.)
