A Massachusetts state appeals court has affirmed the ruling of a trial court in a case involving a musician and the Boston Red Sox. In so ruling, the appeals court found that a federal court had already rendered a ruling, which precluded the state court from reconsidering the legal arguments.
In 2004, Samuel Bartley Steele composed a “country-rock Boston Red Sox and baseball-themed musical anthem” entitled, Man I Really Love This Team. Subsequently, the plaintiff developed a “concept” or “marketing plan” for how the song lyrics could be adapted to other professional baseball markets outside of Boston, leading him to create a piece entitled, Man I Really Love This Town (Town Song). The plaintiff distributed numerous copies of his CDs and accompanying lyric sheets to Red Sox and Major League Baseball (MLB) executives between 2004 and 2006 in the hopes of entering into a business relationship. Ultimately, no such relationship materialized.
In the summer of 2007, TBS aired its “I Love This Town” advertising campaign, which featured the band Bon Jovi, in promotion of its 2007 MLB postseason telecasts. This prompted the plaintiff to file a pro se action in the Federal District Court in 2008 naming many of the same defendants that are named in the instant action. The judge concluded that the Bon Jovi song and advertisement did not have a “substantial similarity” to the Town Song under the Federal Copyright Act, and entered judgment for the defendants. Steele v. Turner Bdcst. Sys., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Mass. 2010) (Steele I). The plaintiff filed Steele v. Bongiovi, 784 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Mass. 2011) (Steele II), in July, 2010, and Steele v. Ricigliano, 789 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D. Mass. 2011) (Steele III), a month later. Both Steele II and Steele III involved many of the same defendants as Steele I, alleged Federal copyright violations, and were dismissed as precluded by Steele I.
After the state court claim was filed, the defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging the claim was precluded. The court noted that claim preclusion bars a subsequent lawsuit if there is “(1) a prior final judgment on the merits, (2) sufficient relatedness between the claims asserted in the prior and subsequent actions, and (3) sufficient relatedness between the parties in the two suits. Airframe Sys.,Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 601 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2010). Claim preclusion operates to bar not only claims that were actually made in a prior lawsuit, but also claims that could have been raised. Ibid.
“Turning to the unjust enrichment claim, we conclude that the plaintiff may not relitigate his copyright infringement grievance in the guise of a state law unjust enrichment cause of action. First, there is no dispute that Steele I constitutes a final judgment on the merits. Second, the gravamen of the claim asserted here is indistinguishable from the plaintiff’s earlier copyright claims. Simply put, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s efforts to recast his claim, he continues to seek compensation for what he believes to be the defendants’ wrongful copying of his song lyrics and marketing concept. Furthermore, all of the named defendants in this action were either present in Steele I or are closely affiliated with the original named defendants. The factors for applying claim preclusion are therefore clearly met with respect to the unjust enrichment claim. The plaintiff’s related argument that claim preclusion ought not apply in this case because the judgment in Steele I was obtained by ‘fraud on the court’ is also precluded. The court in Steele I expressly rejected the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations to the court, finding ‘no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Defendants.’ Steele I, supra at 239.”
In addition, the court noted that the plaintiff’s “brief is bereft of any factual or legal argument relating to the motion judge’s dismissal of the civil conspiracy claim, apart from the conclusory statement that the plaintiff should prevail. This is insufficient appellate argument, and therefore the issue is not properly before us. See Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 919 (1975). Even if the issue had been sufficiently presented, however, the plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim is also barred under claim preclusion principles. The underlying conduct supporting this claim is exactly the same alleged wrongful copying of and benefit from the Town Song lyrics and concept, and there is no reason why the existence of concerted action to accomplish such copying could not have been argued in Steele I.”
Samuel Bartley Steele vs. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club Limited Partnership et al.; App. Ct. Mass.; 14-P-260, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 1120; 19 N.E.3d 867; 2014 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1163; 11/17/14
