A federal judge from the Eastern District of Missouri has denied a motion for a temporary restraining order in a case in which the mother of a high school athlete sued to have her son reinstated to the soccer team after he had been cut.
The claim was brought by Jane Doe, next friend of John Doe, who claimed that the coach’s decision to cut her son amounted to improper age-based discrimination.
Specifically, John Doe is a junior at Ladue Horton Watkins High School (LHS) in the St. Louis suburb of Ladue, Missouri. As a sophomore, Doe played for the LHS junior varsity (JV) soccer team, netting five goals and assisting on two more. Ahead of the 2018 school year, Doe attended tryouts in the hope of securing a spot on the LHS varsity team. LHS fields three boys’ teams: Varsity, JV and the “C Team,” which is essentially a freshman squad. LHS head soccer coach Dave Aronberg1 testified that some 90 students tried out.
John Doe was one of eight juniors not selected for any of LHS’s three soccer teams. Upon learning that Doe had been cut, his stepfather asked Coach Aronberg why Doe hadn’t made the varsity team. The coach emailed to explain that, despite Doe’s apparent skill and coachability, he was “on the bubble” of making varsity due to “a few holes in his game . . . that put him behind a number of kids. … In the end,” Coach Aronberg concluded, “there were just too many kids who had a little better soccer skill and soccer IQ for him to make the team.” The stepfather then asked why Doe could not play on the JV team. According to the stepfather, Coach Aronberg told him that the program had a policy of not putting juniors on the JV team. Doe’s stepfather asserts that Coach Aronberg explained that this rule was due to the prior year, when four juniors were placed on the JV team, but saw very little game time. In response, their parents complained to the coaching staff.
Believing that Coach Aronberg’s policy of excluding juniors amounted to improper age-based discrimination (as well as gender-based discrimination because the girls’ team does not have such a policy), Doe’s stepfather wrote to the Ladue School District Board and advised it that Coach Aronberg’s policy was illegal. Thereafter, he met with LHS’s principal and administrative director. In the meantime, the District opened a formal investigation into the alleged discrimination. The District ultimately found no evidence of a discriminatory policy and refused the request for relief. The District noted that the coaching staff’s decision to cut the eight juniors who did not make varsity was based on their belief that rostering the juniors, even on the JV team, “was not best for the competitive development of the players or the program.” Doe’s stepfather appealed the District’s decision. The Ladue School District Superintendent affirmed. Thereafter, Doe’s mother, Jane Doe, filed suit in this Court, alleging age-based discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq., gender-based discrimination in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and violations of the District’s own policies against discrimination.
The plaintiff named LHS, the Ladue School District, and the seven members of the Ladue Board of Education as defendants. The next day, Jane Doe moved the Court to enter a TRO ordering the District to place John Doe on the JV team and to terminate its policy of prohibiting junior boys from playing JV soccer. In testimony presented to the court, Coach Aronberg said that there was no blanket policy of precluding juniors from the JV team. Instead, the coaching staff rostered teams based on a number of individual, external, and practical considerations. At tryouts, Coach Aronberg and his staff evaluated and scored each student on a variety of metrics, such as endurance, passing ability, decision making, and coachability. Those scores were averaged, and the players were ranked. Coach Aronberg testified that, while the rankings were relevant to the selections, there were a number of external factors that affected the final decisions. Chief among those factors, according to Coach Aronberg, were the number of students trying out and each student’s ability and opportunity to develop. Coach Aronberg also stated that the JV coach preferred a smaller team and that, in any event, the program simply could not accommodate every student who tried out due to practical restrictions like the number of uniforms available. Ultimately, the goal was to fill out the teams’ rosters in a manner that maximized the competitiveness of the program by devoting its limited time and resources to the players most likely to be or become significant contributors to the varsity team. Because freshmen and sophomores have more remaining years of eligibility–and therefore greater opportunity to improve–than do juniors, the younger players’ development was prioritized. To that end, Coach Aronberg testified that the same philosophy and evaluation dictated his decision making for the girls’ program.
Coach Aronberg testified that he was being sincere when he wrote that Doe was “on the bubble” of making varsity, even after he testified that Doe lacked the skill to start for JV. When the Court asked Coach Aronberg to explain how Doe could simultaneously be “on the bubble” of making varsity but not good enough to start for JV, the coach explained that the JV team was a developmental squad designed to provide the maximum amount of practice and playing time for players who were likely to play varsity in future years. With this in mind, the coaching staff routinely placed on JV players who have the skill to play varsity but were unlikely to start, opting to give those players significant playing time with the JV team as opposed to offering them a reserve role on the varsity team. As a result, Coach Aronberg testified, the JV team included enough higher-skilled players such that Doe was unlikely to see significant playing time, even on JV. In other words, Doe was “on the bubble” of making a reserve role on the varsity team and, once he missed that cut, he did not have a viable opportunity to meaningfully contribute to the LHS soccer program, even as a member of the JV team. Coach Aronberg testified that placing Doe on the JV team would have a detrimental effect on the development of the higher-skilled players insofar as doing so would reduce the amount of practice and playing time those players received.
The court identified the following factors when deciding whether to grant a temporary restraining order: (1) threat of irreparable harm to Doe if a temporary restraining order is not granted; (2) whether the threatened harm to Doe outweighs any harm that granting the injunction will inflict on Defendants; (3) whether Doe has shown a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) whether granting a temporary restraining order is in the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
Addressing the first prong, the court noted that Doe “would be eligible to play in fewer than half of the season’s games and possibly only one. The small number of remaining games reduces the developmental value of participating on the JV team. Second, the court will in no event order the LHS coaching staff to play Doe in whatever games he might be eligible. The court is reluctant to ever involve itself in such coaching decisions and would not do so absent a much more severe injury and much stronger evidence than is involved in this case. Thus, Doe’s requested relief likely fails to address his most significant alleged harm–decreasing his chances of making varsity by losing a year of development–which harm is, in any event, insufficient to justify a TRO. The threat of irreparable harm weighs against the plaintiff.”
As to the second prong, the court agreed, for the most part, with the plaintiff’s argument “that one player’s participation on the JV team would not significantly impact the other players’ opportunity and development.” However, it was also “sympathetic to the defendants’ argument that granting a TRO in this case could result in an increase of similar requests going forward. In any event, the court will not second-guess the coaching staff’s determination as to what will and will not affect their players’ development. The balance of harms therefore weighs in favor of the defendants.”
The court skipped ahead to the fourth prong because of its connection to the second. It wrote that “involving a federal court in a soccer program’s coaching decisions as to an individual student-athlete will rarely advance (the public) interest. “The court reiterates that Doe’s mother and stepfather’s advocacy on behalf of their son is admirable, and, as it did on several occasions at the hearing, commends them. Nevertheless, the court does not believe that John Doe’s case warrants its involvement, and therefore concludes that the public interest favors the defendants.”
Regarding the third prong, the court wrote that the plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Act “is unlikely to succeed for several reasons,” namely a failure “to exhaust her administrative remedies” under the Act.
Similarly, the Title IX claim” is also unlikely to succeed.
“Once again, the court finds Coach Aronberg’s testimony persuasive,” it wrote. “Coach Aronberg, who is the head coach of both the boy’s and the girl’s teams, testified that he used the exact same evaluation criteria and selection method for both teams. The only difference the coach noted was that there are only two girls’ teams. Put simply, the court sees no evidence of gender-based discrimination in the way LHS’s soccer program is run. Indeed, the court notes that juniors have, on occasion, played on both the boys’ and girls’ teams in the last seven years. That this has happened more often for the girls’ team only bolsters Coach Aronberg’s explanation that the number of students trying out–which is substantially higher for the boys–has a significant effect on the rostering of junior boys.”
In conclusion, the factors “weigh against the issuance of a TRO. Notably, Doe lacks a legal interest in participation, the evidence suggests that there is no policy of excluding juniors, and the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits.”
Jane Doe, next friend of John Doe v. Ladue Horton Watkins High School, et al., E. D. Mo.; No. 4:18-CV-01637 JAR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169074; 10/1/18
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiffs) Edwin C. Ernst, IV, LEAD ATTORNEY, SOWERS ERNST LLC, St. Louis, MO; Paul A. Maddock, CAREY AND DANIS, St. Louis, MO. (for defendants) Celynda L. Brasher, Michelle H. Basi, LEAD ATTORNEY, TUETH KEENEY, St. Louis, MO; Mandi Diane Moutray, LEAD ATTORNEY, BROWN AND JAMES, P.C., St. Louis, MO.
