By Michael S. Carroll, PhD & Andrew L. Goldsmith, PhD
A high school baseball player in Denison, TX sued numerous defendants, including the school, district, baseball coach, athletic director, and superintendent for alleged constitutional rights violations. Braedon Wright was a student and baseball player at Denison High School (DHS) in Denison, Texas. During the 2015-2016 academic year, Wright alleges that he was subjected to bullying and unfair penalties by defendants in the case after he reported “sexually-laced comments” and incidents of cheating that he witnessed while a member of the DHS varsity baseball team. The Court granted summary judgment for all defendants in the case.
Background
In February of 2016, Wright alleged that the baseball coach, Charles Bollinger, made inappropriate sexual comments about his mother, not just to Wright but also in front of others on numerous occasions. Wright also alleges that in March of 2016, Bollinger encouraged him to cheat while playing baseball by putting Vaseline on his glove. Following these events, Wright and his parents reported Bollinger’s conduct to Henry Scott, Superintendent of the Denison Independent School District. Wright claims that after he and his parents reported the alleged inappropriate behavior to Scott, not only was no corrective action taken against Bollinger, but in fact Bollinger retaliated against Wright without cause or explanation and letting the rest of the team know that he would remain benched. Wright and his parents subsequently met several times with DHS Athletic Director Chad Rogers regarding Bollinger’s conduct and treatment of Wright but to no avail. Wright’s father sent an email to every member of the DISD school board, outlining the alleged retaliation against his son by Bollinger and also met with Scott and DISD Assistant Superintendent, David Kirkbride. Mr. Wright alleges that he was told at this meeting by Superintendent Scott that if things do not change, his son would be kicked off the baseball team for causing “this mess with the coach.” At the end of season athletics banquet, Wright did not any recognition for his anticipation on the baseball team and his performance as a pitcher, despite the fact that he was the top performing pitcher on the team. Wright subsequently brought suit, asserting two claims under U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”): (a) a Monell claim against Denison Independent School District (“DISD”) and (b) a First Amendment retaliation claims against all defendants.
Arguments & Analysis
The DISD defendants argue that Wright’s First Amendment retaliation claim he never suffered an actual constitutional harm. A Section 1983 claim requires that a plaintiff suffer a deprivation of a right or interest secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and that the deprivation occurred under color of state law. The First Amendment does protect against retaliatory government action designed to inhibit free speech. When the plaintiff is not a government employee or otherwise contractually involved with government actors, he must satisfy the elements of an “ordinary citizen” claim: (a) he was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (b) the defendants’ actions caused him to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (c) the defendants’ adverse actions were substantially motivated against the plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. When the alleged retaliatory conduct occurs in a school setting, the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights must be viewed within the special characteristics of the school environment. In this case, Wright alleges that Coach Bollinger retaliated at first base by not talking to him. Defendants argue that these simply represent trivial slights arising from normal coaching decisions and interactions between coaches and players and do not give rise to an actionable First Amendment retaliation claim. They further argue that federal Courts should not micromanage disputes over things such as playing time, coaching decisions, and interactions between players and coaches in a high school extracurricular sports program. In response, Wright argues that Bollinger’s actions were not trivial due to his position of authority and that he held substantial power over Wright’s future as a baseball player. The Court agreed with DISD defendants, finding that established policy and case precedent was in agreement that micromanagement of such matters was outside the bounds of the federal Court system. Furthermore, the Court found that Wright’s allegation that Bollinger stopped talking to him was not supported by the evidence in the record. Bollinger testified that he attempted to talk to Wright but that Wright isolated himself during practice and did “his own thing.” Wright allegedly refused to lift weights with the team and instead worked with a privately hired trainer, he left practice early, and remained in the dugout while the team was taking batting practice. Wright failed to submit any evidence to contradict Bollinger’s accounts of his actions. The Court found that that Wright’s allegations, even if true, are trivial matters common to interactions between coaches and players and that as a matter of law did not give rise to an actionable First Amendment retaliation claim.
With respect to Wright’s claims that Bollinger refused to play him at first base following his refusal to cheat by using Vaseline on his glove, Bollinger stated that he made this decision before the Vaseline incident. The Court noted that there was evidence that prior games in which Wright did not play first base and that he did in fact pitch in six of the remaining twelve games following the Vaseline incident. The Court found that Wright’s belief that he was “due” to play first base and pitch was simply a disagreement with a coaching decision and that Bollinger’s actions were not motivated by the Vaseline incident. As such, the Court found that Wright failed to submit evidence to establish that Bollinger’s coaching decisions were motivated by a desire to punish or adversely affect Wright. With respect to Wright’s argument that Bollinger retaliated against him by denying him a pitching award and interfering with his transfer, the Court found that there was no evidence that Wright was entitled to a pitching award and that allegations that it was withheld from him by Coach Bollinger in order to retaliate against him speculative and unpersuasive. The Court also noted that there was no information in the complaint regarding the alleged interference with his transfer. In sum, the Court found that Wright had not established that his speech was curtailed by Bollinger’s retaliatory actions since the record demonstrated that Wright filed multiple grievances with DISD after the alleged retaliatory conduct. For similar reasons, the Court found that the retaliatory actions alleged by Wright against DISD Superintendent Scott and DHS Athletic Director Rogers did not establish the requisite constitutional harm required.
Although Wright separately alleges a retaliation claim and a municipal liability claim under Section 1983 against DISD, both claims turn on the same analysis. The Court must consider two separate issues: (a) whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and if so, (b) whether the school district is responsible for that violation. Under Monell, a plaintiff may seek liability on a municipality (e.g., school district) under Section 1983 by identifying a “policy” or “custom” that caused plaintiff’s injury or deprivation of constitutionally protected rights. The Court noted that Wright provided no evidence that the DISD Board of Trustees (DISD’s policymaker as a matter of law) adopted any policy that was the major force behind his alleged violation of First Amendment rights through retaliation. In order to prevail on his claim regarding municipal liability, Wright would have needed to identify a pattern which “must have occurred for so long or so frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to the governing body of knowledge and that the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted practice of [District] employees.” The Court found that Wright provided no evidence of a past “pattern and practice of retaliation and failure to respond to employee misconduct” that would give rise to an actionable custom. Nor had he provided evidence that the conduct in question “has become a traditional way of carrying out policy and has acquired the force of law.” Wright simply listed his own complaints regarding alleged retaliatory conduct, which the Court found insufficient to establish a pattern or custom giving rise to a policy for purpose of municipal liability. As such, the Court found that DISD was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Even in cases involving an actionable Section 1983 claim, a government official (e.g., public school teacher/employee) may be protected by qualified immunity, which protects government officials from civil damages liability. The Court found that the individual defendants in this case were entitled to qualified immunity because Wright failed to establish an actionable violation of his First Amendment rights. In conclusion, the Court granted the DISD defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this case.
Michael S. Carroll is an Associate Professor of Sport Management at Troy University specializing in research related to sport law and risk management in sport and recreation. He has published over 30 articles and delivered over 50 presentations at professional conferences. He is currently serving as President of the Sport and Recreation Law Association. He lives in Orlando, FL.
Andrew L. Goldsmith is an Assistant Professor of Sport Management at Troy University specializing in research related to organizational behavior and ethical decision-making in sport and recreation.
