A district judge from the District of Columbia has denied D.C. United’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit brought by the team’s former goalkeeper, Charles Horton, who alleged that the Major League Soccer (MLS) team was negligent for failing to supervise one of Horton’s teammates who assaulted him, leading to a concussion and the premature end of Horton’s career.
Horton signed with D.C. United in February 2016 and by all rights had a promising career ahead of him. But on March 29, 2016, he got into a fight with teammate Fabian Espindola, whom Horton claims had a history of “violent conduct on and off the field,” according to a complaint initially filed in state court in the District of Columbia and later removed by the defendants to federal court.
After the altercation, Horton allegedly experienced “dizziness, shakiness, visual disturbances, nausea, sensitivity to light and sound and other symptoms.” He further claimed that the team did not put him in the league-mandated concussion protocol and that he practiced the next day. After Horton’s symptoms worsened after practice, the team allegedly diagnosed him with a concussion the next day. He wasn’t cleared to play again until the following May. However, he continued to experience “post-concussive symptoms,” which he claimed prevented him from regaining his spot with D.C. United, and ultimately led to his departure from the league at age 22.
Horton would amend the aforementioned claim to focus on the negligent supervision argument.
The defendants moved to dismiss, advancing two arguments. “First, they assert that the plaintiff’s claims are preempted by federal labor law because resolving the plaintiff’s tort claims would require interpreting and applying the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between MLS and the players’ union,” wrote the court. “Second, the defendants contend that the plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because the sole remedy available to him arises under the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA).”
In its analysis, the court noted that Section 301 of the LMRA “confers exclusive federal jurisdiction over controversies involving CBAs and preempts any state-law causes of action if such claims are either: (1) founded on rights created by a CBA, or (2) substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of such agreement. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405, 410 n.10, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988).
Thus, “when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract,” the claim must be treated as arising under section 301 or, alternatively, dismissed as preempted.
“Here, the defendants assert that any conversion to a Section 301 claim would be futile as such a claim would be foreclosed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust remedies as required by the CBA and time barred because he did not file suit within Section 301’s six-month limitations period,” wrote the court. “Entry of judgment in their favor, the defendants insist, is therefore the only proper outcome.”
The court was unmoved, finding that the defendants’ argument “fails for lack of factual support. …
(I)t may be that the CBA provisions are essential to defining the standard of care and proving a breach. But, at this juncture, the defendants’ assertion that the CBA is not merely relevant but controlling is a legal argument; it is not supported by any evidence, expert or otherwise.”
The defendants’ alternative argument rested with the idea that the WCA “confers upon them immunity from the plaintiff’s tort claims. The WCA provides a no-fault system of liability for the accidental injury or death of employees in the District of Columbia occurring within the course of employment. See Grillo v. Nat’l Bank of Wash., 540 A.2d 743, 748 (D.C. 1988).”
While the plaintiff did not disagree with the role of the WCA and then legal protection it affords, it disagreed with the defendants of whether D.C. United qualifies as an “employer” under the WCA and is thus immune from suit.
“The Act defines an ‘employer,’ in relevant part, as ‘including any individual, firm, association, or corporation, or receive, or trustee of the same . . . using the service of another for pay within the District of Columbia.’ D.C. Code § 32-1501(10). The D.C. Court of Appeals recognizes that for purposes of the WCA, the term ‘employer’ includes a joint employer, or a ‘special,’ employer–an employment situation that arises when an employer lends an employee to another party. See Union Light & Power Co. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 796 A.2d 665, 667 n.3, 669 (D.C. 2002); see also USA Waste of Md., Inc. v. Love, 954 A.2d 1027, 1032 (D.C. 2008) (‘Under the workers’ compensation laws of Maryland and the District of Columbia, a worker may have more than one employer at the same time.’).
“To qualify as a special employer, an entity or ‘second employer’ must satisfy three criteria: (1) ‘the employee has made a contract of hire, express or implied, with the second employer’; (2) ‘the work being done is essentially that of the second employer’; and (3) ‘the second employer has the right to control the details of the work.’ Union Light & Power Co., 796 A.2d at 667 n.3 (quoting Arthur Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 67.01[1] (2001)). An employee seeking to establish special employment status must overcome the presumption favoring continuance of the general employment.’ Id. at 669.”
The defendants argued that D.C. United was the plaintiff’s special employer for two reasons.
“First, although the defendants acknowledge that the plaintiff signed an employment agreement only with MLS, and not D.C. United, they contend that D.C. United is a ‘joint’ employer because the CBA provides that: ‘[f]or purposes of workers compensation coverage, the parties’ — MLS and the players’ union — ‘acknowledge and agree that MLS and the Team that the Player has been assigned to are joint employers of that Player,’” wrote the court. “Phrased alternatively, The defendants would have this court conclude, as a matter of law, that D.C. United is the plaintiff’s special employer, and thus enjoys the WCA’s immunity, because the players’ union and MLS entered into a contract stating as much. District of Columbia law is to the contrary, however. The D.C. Court of Appeals has stated that, ‘under workers’ compensation law, the companies’ characterization of their temporary staffing arrangement cannot be allowed to override its reality.’ Love, 954 A.2d at 1036. Rather, the ‘nature of that relationship must be ascertained not from the label given to it by the parties themselves but from the consequences which the law attached to their arrangements and to their conduct.’ Id. (quoting Danek v. Meldrum Mfg. & Eng’g Co., 312 Minn. 404, 252 N.W. 2d 255, 261 (Minn. 1977)). Thus, the court here cannot simply look to what the CBA says about D.C. United’s status as an employer; it ‘must examine the substance and effect of [D.C. United’s] commitments to [MLS]’ and its relationship with the plaintiff. Id. Accordingly, the court concludes that the CBA does not control D.C. United’s status as a special employer.”
Second, the defendants relied on Namoff v. D.C. Soccer, No. 2012 CA 7050 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 8, 2014), a case in which a D.C. Superior Court judge held that the WCA barred a player’s claim against D.C. United for negligent medical treatment, because D.C. United “concurrently” employed the plaintiff with MLS. The defendants asked the court to “honor and adopt” the decision in Namoff in the instant case. The court declined to do so, noting that “there is no record before this court on which to find that D.C. United was this the plaintiff’s ‘special employer.’
“The facts here, once developed, may point to a different conclusion than Namoff. For instance, the CBA that the defendants say is applicable in this case was created after Namoff was decided in 2014. … Whether that different agreement changes the analysis remains to be seen. Moreover, even if D.C. United does qualify as a special employer, it must have contributed to the purchase of workers’ compensation insurance to enjoy immunity. See D.C. Code § 32-1534(a); Love, 954 A.2d at 1032 This record contains no evidence as to D.C. United’s contribution, or lack thereof, to securing workers’ compensation insurance for its players. This is not to say that Namoff got it wrong. Rather, in the absence of a well-developed factual record that informs the ‘reality’ of the relationship between the plaintiff, D.C. United, and MLS, the court declines to grant summary judgment in favor of the Defendants based on Namoff alone. See Love, 954 A.2d at 1036.
Charles A. Horton v. Fabian Espindola, et al.; D.D.C.; Case No. 17-cv-01230 (APM), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133058; __ F.SUPP.3D __; 8/8/18
Attorneys of record: (for plaintiff) L. Palmer Foret, LEAD ATTORNEY, ASHCRAFT & GEREL, LLP, Alexandria, VA. (for defendants) Christopher E. Hassell, LEAD ATTORNEY, Matthew Hoyt Johnson, BONNER KIERNAN TREBACH & CROCIATA, LLP, Washington, DC.
