Aura Moody appealed a 2016 ruling of a district judge who had voluntarily dismissed a discrimination case she had brought against the NFL on behalf of her son Julian Moody. The judge had concluded that because her son was an adult, and because he had reached a settlement with the NFL months earlier, that she had no standing. The appeals court agreed.
The original case filed in 2015 by Moody, through counsel, brought a discrimination action against the NFL on behalf of her minor son, Julian Moody, in the Supreme Court of New York, Queens County. Moody alleged that the NFL prohibited Julian from competing with his team at a national tournament because of his diabetes in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The NFL subsequently removed the case to the Eastern District of New York. During the proceedings, it came to light that Julian was an adult, and the complaint was amended to substitute Julian as the sole plaintiff. Julian, through counsel, then reached an agreement with the NFL and, on Aug. 12, 2016, voluntarily dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
During a Sept. 15, 2016 hearing before the District Court, Moody argued that Julian had been intimidated into settling. “Your honor, Julian is a very sheltered young man who was in his junior year at college at the time of the mediation in this case,” she wrote. “It is my good faith belief that Julian was intimidated and pressured into agreeing to the terms presented to him by (the NFL). … They even went as far to preach to him about the dangers involved in playing football, that the NFL is used to bad publicity and the limited possibility that he had of earning a scholarship.”
On Dec. 12, 2016, the District Court entered a text order advising her that it would take no further action in the case. Moody, proceeding pro se, appealed the order, arguing primarily that, “in its treatment of her son, the NFL infringed upon her rights and caused her damages.”
In its analysis, the court wrote that “’as a general rule, only a party of record in a lawsuit has standing to appeal from a judgment of the district court.’ Hispanic Soc’y of N.Y.C. Police Dep’t v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 806 F.2d 1147, 1152 (2d Cir. 1986). Our case law notes two exceptions to this general rule: ‘where the non-party is bound by the judgment and where the non-party has an interest plausibly affected by the judgment.’ NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 239 (2d Cir. 2013). Neither exception applies here.
“First, Moody is not bound by the district court’s text order, which pertained only to Julian’s claim—the only matter properly before that court. Second, Moody has not identified any legal interest of her own that may plausibly be said to be affected by the text order. The suit was based on allegations that the NFL unlawfully discriminated against Julian, not her. Although she has views about the matter, those are not legally cognizable within a setting where her adult son is a party to the proceedings. In Hispanic Society, for example, we held that nominal appellants did not have standing to appeal the district court’s approval of a settlement agreement in a class action employment discrimination suit. 806 F.2d at 1152-53. The appellants did not allege that they had been discriminated against and had not intervened in the underlying case. We concluded that the validity of the settlement agreement did not affect their rights. Id. Similarly, Moody’s legal rights would not have been affected if the District Court had permitted additional activity related to Julian’s claims instead of entering its Dec. 12, 2016 text order. Nor were Mrs. Moody’s legal rights affected by the stipulation with the NFL to which Julian agreed. See Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC, 504 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that non-party appellant lacked standing because it “would possess the same legal rights . . . whether or not the Settlement Agreement were approved”). Finally, we note that permitting Moody’s appeal would interfere with the affairs of the parties because, as the District Court confirmed with him and as reflected by his Rule 41 dismissal, Julian wished not to continue the case.”
Aura Moody, On Behalf of Her Minor Child, Julian Moody v. National Football League; 2d Cir.; 16-4315, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 3506; 2/15/18
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) pro se. (for defendant) William A. Brewer III (Michael L. Smith, on the brief), Brewer Attorneys & Counselors, New York, NY.
