The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed the ruling of a district court dismissing the claim of the parents of a student athlete who challenged the Virginia High School League (VHSL), Inc.’s decision to deny their son eligibility to participate in interscholastic and athletic activities at the school of their choice.
In affirming the ruling, the panel agreed with the district judge that the “right to control” where one competes in athletics is not a “constitutionally protected right.”
The controversy began when the VHSL applied its “transfer rule” to the son of Greg and Jennifer Bailey, meaning he was going to be initially ineligible if he transferred to another school.
After exhausting administrative remedies with the VHSL, the plaintiffs filed a complaint asking a judge to intercede. The defendant moved to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district judge granted the motion and the plaintiffs appealed.
“While a court, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,’ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007), the complaint must contain sufficient facts to state a claim that is ‘plausible on its face,’” wrote the panel, citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
The Baileys argued that the court relied “on facts outside the complaint, and that such reliance is reversible error.”
The panel agreed that the court “cannot go beyond these documents on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 12(d), 56. Such a conversion is error where the parties have not had a reasonable opportunity for discovery. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d at 448-49.”
But in the instant case, the panel “reviewed the record and found no facts raised at the hearing that were not included in the complaint. Accordingly, this claim fails.”
The Baileys also challenged the district court’s classification of VHSL as an “organization,” because VHSL’s corporate identity is important “in gauging how the edicts of an independent private corporation can outweigh the fundamental right of a parent to make decisions about the welfare of one’s child.”
The panel rejected this argument, too, since “it contradicts the Baileys’ own description of VHSL in the complaint as, in essence, a state actor.”
Finally, the Baileys challenged the district court’s dismissal of their claim “that the transfer rule interferes with their fundamental right to make decisions in the best interest of their son. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d
49 (2000) (‘It cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.’) Although ‘the Supreme Court has never been called upon to define the precise boundaries of a parent’s right to control a child’s upbringing and education,’ C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 182 (3rd Cir. 2005), it is clear that the right is neither absolute nor unqualified, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1983) (holding that constitutional protection is available for parent-child relationship in ‘appropriate cases’). See Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding school district’s mandatory school uniform policy); Hooks v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1036, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding state statute denying speech therapy services to home- schooled children); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding school district’s full-time attendance policy); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding school district’s mandatory community service program).
“The Baileys’ right to control individual components of their son’s education, including his participation in interscholastic sports and other activities, is not constitutionally protected, and the district court correctly dismissed this claim. Finally, because the complaint does not implicate a fundamental right, the Baileys’ reliance on Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 127 S. Ct. 2489, 168 L. Ed. 2d 166 (2007), is misplaced.”
Greg Bailey et al. v. Virginia High School League, Inc.; 4th Cir.; No. 11-2369; 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14965; 7/18/12
Attorneys of Record: (for Appellants) Hugh F. O’Donnell, Client Centered Legal Services of Southwest Virginia, Norton, Virginia. (for Appellee) R. Craig Wood, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Charlottesville, Virginia; Aaron James Longo, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina.
